

CONFIDENTIAL

NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

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CONFIDENTIAL

Governmental Affairs

WASHINGTON POST
3 December 1972

Helms to Resign As CIA Director

2d-Term Revisions Continue

By Lou Cannon
Washington Post Staff Writer

KEY BISCAYNE, Fla., Dec. 2—Richard Helms will soon resign as director of the Central Intelligence Agency. He has been offered a new job by President Nixon and is expected to accept.

Helms' intentions became known in Washington today while the President was announcing here that he would retain his principal White House advisers but would accept the resignation of special counsel Charles W. Colson.

Presidential press secretary Ronald L. Ziegler announced that No. 1 assistant H. R. (Bob) Haldeman, domestic affairs assistant John D. Ehrlichman and foreign policy adviser Henry A. Kissinger would stay on in the second term.

Ziegler also announced the retention of eight other high-ranking officials, including himself, and the anticipated resignations of counsellor

Robert H. Finch, deputy counsel Harry S. Dent and special assistant Robert J. Brown, the highest-ranking black in the Nixon administration.

Donald H. Rumsfeld, director of the Cost of Living Council, will be given an unidentified "major new assignment," Ziegler said. Rumsfeld has been mentioned frequently as a likely choice to replace George Romney, who resigned early last week as Secretary of Housing and Urban Development.

Mr. Nixon pledged Monday at Camp David that he was going to "change some of the players and some of the plays" in an effort to prevent his administration from "coasting downhill" in its second term. Most of the announcements during the week have been of administration holdovers, and Ziegler conceded that the appointments have not amounted to a "traditional shakeup."

Instead, Ziegler said, the various changes in assignments will produce "more efficiency" in the White House and "allow us to get the job done better."

The full list of holdovers announced by Ziegler today includes Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Kissinger, Ziegler, congressional liaison man William E. Timmons, special consultant Leonard Garment, director of communications Herbert G. Klein, counsel John W. Dean III, personal secretary Rose Mary Woods and speechwriters Raymond K. Price Jr.,

Patrick J. Buchanan Jr. and William Safire.

Ziegler also announced that Roy L. Ash, the newly appointed director of the Office of Management and Budget, would be made an assistant to the President, a designation which means that he will be available to take on special assignments in addition to directing the budget office.

Helms got into intelligence work in World War II as a young naval officer assigned to the Office of Strategic Services. He joined the CIA when it was formed in 1947, and has remained there ever since. He rose to the position of deputy director after an assignment as the director of CIA's covert or "black" operations.

President Johnson picked him to head the agency in 1966 as a replacement for Adm. William F. Raborn Jr.

Helms' reputation as a "professional" in the intelligence community and in the larger political community of Washington has been high. A newspaper columnist wrote a common judgment in 1966: "(He) fits none of the stereotypes of the spy thriller and the innumerable spy films of recent years. Slender, soft-spoken, modest in demeanor... he is not even a distant relative of James Bond."

While no information was available last night on a new assignment for the 59-year-old Helms, it was determined that

he regards the President's new offer as a promotion from his present job.

There was speculation, too, that Helms might be replaced by James Schlesinger, who is presently chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. Schlesinger is highly regarded by the White House and played an important role in evaluating and helping to reorganize the government intelligence community after Mr. Nixon took office.

The Washington Post reported on Nov. 25 that Colson, a controversial troubleshooter who served as liaison man to labor and ethnic groups during the election campaign, would be leaving the White House to resume private legal practice in Washington. He most likely will join a firm headed by his old partner, Charles H. Morin, who said that he and his partners would "welcome him with open arms."

Ziegler said that Colson will remain on the White House staff for at least 60 days to help with transition to the second term.

Finch, who said two weeks ago that he was returning to California with an eye on running for either the governorship or U.S. Senate, is to hold a news conference in Washington Tuesday to discuss his formal plans.

Dent will return to his legal practice in South Carolina and Brown to his business in North Carolina, Ziegler said.

WASHINGTON STAR
4 December 1972

Helms' Exit From CIA Linked to Kissinger Rift

By OSWALD JOHNSTON
Star-News Staff Writer

The impending resignation of Richard M. Helms as the nation's top intelligence officer can in large part be traced to a serious and continuing policy disagreement with Henry A. Kissinger, according to informed sources in the intelligence community.

gence community.

The disagreement reportedly began with Helms' position in 1969 on a key intelligence issue — whether the Soviet Union, with its giant SS-9 missile, was going for a "first-strike capability." Helms took the less alarmed view.

Helms' departure, which has

been involved in intelligence work ever since World War II.

But insiders already are voicing skepticism that any job outside the intelligence field could be anything but a comedown for Helms, who is believed to have been anxious to stay on as CIA chief.

A key element in this view is the belief within the intelligence community that Helms had lost the confidence of the White House—Kissinger especially.

Kissinger felt that Helms wasn't so much trying to support the administration as playing politics on his own—his constituency

together in the intelligence establishment," one source explained.

In all outward respects, however, Helms appeared to have been given President Nixon's full confidence, expressed both in public statements and in Helms' assignment just a year ago to a position of broadened responsibility in intelligence.

As a result of a sweeping reorganization of the intelligence community in November 1971, Helms' official title, Director of Central Intelligence, was expanded to include new budgetary and organizational authority over the whole \$5 billion-a-year U.S. intelligence effort.

The White House had ordered the reorganization because of its dissatisfaction with redundant and at times contradictory ways in which intelligence information was processed and interpreted by the separate intelligence agencies.

The origin of Kissinger's dissatisfaction with Helms is said

to reside in an incident, early in 1969, in which Helms made an intelligence assessment involving a fundamental question of national security that was sharply at odds with the view advanced by Pentagon intelligence experts and held privately in the White House.

The incident was one of those rare occurrences when the latent disagreements in the intelligence community surfaced publicly, in this case in the persons of two rival chieftains, Helms himself and Melvin R. Laird, secretary of Defense.

At issue were the massive Soviet SS-9 intercontinental ballistic missiles, whose existence as a new weapon in the Soviet arsenal became known to intelligence early in the administration's first year.

Laird testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the new missiles, which are capable of carrying a much heavier payload than anything deployed previously, meant that the So-

viet Union was going for a "first strike capability."

About the same time, Helms let it be known that in his assessment the new missiles did not indicate a shift from the traditional emphasis on defense, and that the smaller Minuteman-style SS-11 would remain the backbone of the Soviet strategic missile arsenal.

Later, in June 1969, both men appeared together before the committee in executive session, and their views were in some part reconciled: Helms is said to have deferred to the administration view, which was that the Pentagon intelligence assessment, championed by Laird, was the one on which to base policy.

The administration has subsequently based some of its fundamental decisions in the nuclear strategy and national security fields upon that intelligence judgement. They include: the decision on an anti-ballistic missile system whether to go ahead with

rapid development of multiple missile warheads, and basic negotiating positions in the strategic arms control talks with the Soviets.

The Soviet Union has now clearly shifted to the SS-9 as its basic strategic weapon, and in this respect Helms' assessment appears in retrospect to have been wrong.

Coordination of intelligence assessments was to be a basic improvement resulting from the restructuring of the intelligence, over which Helms was put in charge in November 1971. But, in fact, during the past year the Pentagon-CIA rift over basic intelligence assessments has become more bitter than ever, according to informed sources within the community.

The leading candidate to replace Helms is authoritatively reported to be James R. Schlesinger, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and a chief architect of a study that shaped the intelligence reorganization.

WASHINGTON STAR
6 December 1972

Exit Richard Helms

It isn't official yet, but our usually impeccable official sources tell us that Richard M. Helms will soon be stepping down after six years as director of the Central Intelligence Agency, presumably to take on a new and important assignment in the Nixon administration. Whatever his future job may be, he will be sorely missed in the one which he is leaving.

Of the men who have headed the CIA since its inception in 1947, Helms stands out as the one truly professional intelligence expert. His career in the spy business covers a span of 29 years, beginning with a four-year stint with the Office of Strategic Services in World War II. After transferring to the newly-formed CIA, he served as deputy director for plans under General Walter Bedell Smith and John A. McCone, previous CIA heads.

As director, Helms brought a coolness of judgment and great administrative talent to one of the most sensitive and difficult jobs in the federal government. Under his leadership, the performance of the agency, in contrast to past years,

has been highly discreet and, to the extent that such things can be judged, effective. It is suggested that his departure from the CIA may have resulted in part from a dispute within the intelligence community regarding the deployment of Russian nuclear missiles. Yet from all the available evidence, his assessment of the world situation — and particularly in Indochina, where the CIA has borne heavy responsibilities — has been remarkably accurate.

The highly essential business of intelligence-gathering, being necessarily secret and to some minds distasteful, requires the kind of public confidence that Helms has been able to provide. As President Johnson remarked at his swearing-in ceremony: "Although he has spent more than 20 years in public life attempting to avoid publicity, he has never been able to conceal the fact that he is one of the most trusted and most able and most dedicated professional career men in this Capital." As director of the CIA, Richard Helms has fully justified that assessment.

THE LONDON DAILY MAIL
4 Dec 1972

Kissinger's 'kiss of death' for spy chief

NEW YORK: Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's top foreign policy adviser, is reported to have given the 'kiss of death' to Richard Helms as head of America's powerful Central Intelligence Agency.

Yesterday, in a telephone conversation with Mr Nixon before he left for the latest round of Vietnam peace talks in Paris, Mr Kissinger was said to have urged that Mr Helms should be replaced as head of the super spy agency.

He was reported to have lobbied for Mr Helms to be dropped since the CIA failed

to give adequate advance warning of a big North Vietnamese offensive last spring.

Nixon Administration aides, who confirmed that Mr Helms was leaving, apparently were trying to talk a reluctant James Schlesinger into taking the tricky CIA job even though he insisted that he preferred to stay as chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

Mr Helms, originally named CIA chief by ex-President Johnson, is expected to be given a new job in the changes being made at Cabinet level or just below for the second Nixon Administration which begins on January 20.

THE LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH
4 Dec 1972

CIA chief to be replaced after clash

By Our Washington Staff

PRESIDENT NIXON has decided to replace Mr Richard Helms, 59, as director of the Central Intelligence Agency, it was learnt in Washington yesterday.

He is expected to be replaced by Mr James Schlesinger, 43, head of the Atomic Energy Commission.

It has been reported that the CIA has had differences with Dr Kissinger's staff in intelligence analysis in recent months.

Some reports say that Dr Kissinger considered that the spy agency had failed to give adequate advance warning of Hanoi's intention to stage its outright invasion of South Vietnam when the Communists opened their Easter offensive earlier this year.

CIA dispute

The CIA is also reported to have been at odds with other intelligence services over the timing and subsequent handling of the Indo-Pakistani conflict in Bangladesh last year.

Mr Nixon has let it be known that he plans to cut the White House staff by half to improved efficiency. He has long pressed for a similar streamlining of America's intelligence agencies.

Dr Kissinger is to remain as the President's special adviser on national security affairs.

WASHINGTON STAR
6 December 1972

Helms Shift Not Due To Rift, Kissinger Says

Presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger denied yesterday a report in Monday's Star-News that a serious policy disagreement between him and CIA director Richard M. Helms is a factor behind Helms' impending resignation as intelligence director.

A White House official said Kissinger indicated in one of his calls from Paris yesterday that it was "directly contrary to the truth" to suggest that he was in any way instrumental in President Nixon's as yet unannounced decision to reassign Helms.

Kissinger was likewise reported to be appalled at any inference that Helms should be stepping down as U.S. intelligence chief because of a disagreement between him and Helms.

Kissinger's denial did not relate to any specific points in the Star-News account, which reported that a conflict arose over Helms' position

in 1969 over whether the Soviet Union, with its massive SS-9 missile, was going for a "first-strike" capability.

Neither did Kissinger's demurrer contain a specific denial that a policy disagreement, in fact, existed.

A White House official explained that Kissinger and top administration officials are concerned that Helms' reassignment away from the CIA to another position of responsibility not be given a negative interpretation.

Helms' intention to resign as director of Central Intelligence was reported late last week by high administration sources, who have indicated that an official announcement is being held up so Helms can decide whether to accept the other job being offered him. There have been no indications what the new assignment is to be.

Efforts to reach Helms have been unavailing.

Newsweek
December 18, 1972

NIXON'S KEEN SCYTHE

The great Administration housecleaning continued, but last week Richard Nixon seemed to be wielding not so much a broom as a scythe. What had begun a fortnight ago as a bureaucratic overhaul assumed the proportions of a general purge, as the President sought to make room in his topmost ranks for those who shared his emphasis on economy, efficiency and unquestioned political loyalty. The new breed of bureaucrats that Mr. Nixon installed last week were more conservative and management-oriented than their predecessors. They also displayed an almost uniform lack of political charisma or clout, which left them beholden only to the President and his White House inner circle.

The exits were just as significant as the entrances—Mr. Nixon's reorganization seemed designed to clear out those who

were judged too independent, too liberal or too outspoken to fit the new Nixonian low profile of a model civil servant. The casualty list included Cabinet Secretaries Peter Peterson of Commerce and John Volpe of Transportation, Central Intelligence Agency director Richard Helms, Republican National Chairman Robert Dole and a growing host of lesser officials who, to their chagrin, found their pro forma resignations promptly accepted. Behind the bloodletting, many Washington observers thought they detected the hands of the White House palace guard led by H.R. Haldeman and John Erlichman, eager to settle some scores and break up independent centers of power. Among the major appointments: Frederick Dent, 50, a textile manufacturer from South Carolina, replaced Peterson at Commerce. The appointment

was a favor to both Sen. Strom Thurmond and the textile industry, whose respect Dent has earned as a leader in the fight for stiffer import restrictions. He is plainspoken about his distaste for big government and equally vocal in what a colleague terms his "deep personal regard, almost love" for Mr. Nixon. A transplanted Connecticut Yankee (and graduate of St. Paul's and Yale) who lost a leg in a bout with cancer, Dent is the new Cabinet's only Southerner.

■ Claude Brinegar, a California oil executive, was tapped for Secretary of Transportation: predecessor John Volpe, who had wanted to stay on for a while, will be bundled off as next Ambassador to Italy. Brinegar, 45, may bring less sympathy to the cause of mass transit that Volpe espoused. Two years ago, Brinegar's Union Oil Co. helped defeat a California referendum on subsidizing public transport with gasoline taxes.

■ James Lynn, Undersecretary of Commerce was promoted to Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. Lynn, 45, a bright and charming attorney from Cleveland, distinguished himself last summer in helping to hammer out the Soviet trade agreement. He confesses he has no knowledge of housing beyond "owning a couple," but he shares the President's suspicion of bureaucracy. "You know," Lynn says, "damn near everything the government does could be done better by private industry."

■ Cabinet incumbents Earl Butz of Agriculture, Richard Kleindienst of Justice and Rogers Morton of Interior were all reappointed to their jobs, but the purge decimated the second echelons of both Interior and Justice. Three assistant secretaries, the National Park Service Director and the Commissioner of Reclamation were sacked in what Morton called a reappraisal of the Interior Department's role in conserving dwindling national resources. Two top officials of the Bureau of Indian Affairs were also discharged in the wake of the militant Indian occupation of BIA headquarters. At Justice, there was evidence that Kleindienst might not enjoy an entirely free hand: Deputy Attorney General Ralph Erickson and three assistant attorneys general were let go despite the eagerness to keep some of them on.

The most surprising departures—and

THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS
Washington, D. C., Thursday, December 7, 1972

Aide in Bay of Pigs Fiasco Outlines Views on Planning

By JEREMIAH O'LEARY
Star-News Staff Writer

The man who was inspector general of the CIA during the Bay of Pigs fiasco now believes it would have been wiser to have trained the invasion force at a military base inside the United States to preserve the security of the anti-Castro operation.

Prof. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick Jr., now on the faculty of Brown University, disclosed this view in a lecture delivered at the Naval War College in Newport, R.I. The speech has been published in the current college review.

Kirkpatrick also said: "If the President makes the policy to get rid of Castro, that is about the last he should hear of it. If something goes wrong he can fire and disavow, which

the most carefully engineered—were those of Peterson from Commerce and Helms from the CIA (Helms's resignation has not been announced, but he will be forced to step down early next year). Both men are brilliant, popular in Washington's social and journalistic circles (a distinct black mark in the White House view), and favorites of Henry Kissinger—whose massive publicity of late has kindled resentments within the President's staff.

Peterson, who handled the delicate Russian trade agreements this year had wanted a policymaking job in international economic and trade policy. But this trod uncomfortably close to the toes of Presidential aide Peter Flanigan, and, besides, Peterson was a close friend of Illinois's liberal GOP Sen. Charles Percy, whose Presidential ambitions are suspect around the White House. After a false leak alleging friction between Peterson and Treasury Secretary George Shultz, the new job evaporated.

Helms, besides being vulnerable as one of Washington's only top Democratic holdovers had miffed the White House by spending too much time on intelligence-gathering and too little on budget-cutting. He too was victimized by leaked word of his coming demise: Atomic Energy Commission chairman James Schlesinger is the current front runner as his replacement.

Some loyalists stepped into new jobs. Donald Rumsfeld will leave the Cost of Living Council but was rewarded with the ambassadorship to NATO. One old face seemed slated for a surprising return; Harvard professor Daniel Patrick Moynihan, formerly a key domestic adviser of Mr. Nixon's, was reportedly selected as new ambassador to India.

The outcome of the week's maneuvering was a new Administration line-up that was industrious, reliable—and comfortably obscure. Independent politicians such as George Romney and John Volpe had been sidetracked; suspect quantities such as Peterson and Helms had been pared away. And Mr. Nixon prepared to ride into his second term with a matched gray team of mostly managerial experts who could be counted on to pull together in obedient harness.

Newsweek, December 18, 1972

BY STEWART ALSOP

THE CONNALLY SCENARIO

But Connally's ambitions are not limited to megabucks. The following scenario is taken seriously in political Washington. Connally makes his megabucks; declares himself a Republican; campaigns for Republicans in 1974; takes over the State Department; triumphantly tidies up the global economic scene, much to the economic advantage of the United States; and runs for President in 1976, with the powerful backing of the incumbent.

This is mere speculation, and soft speculation at that. But certain facts, both hard and soft, fit rather neatly into it. One is the appointment of such economic nationalists as Brennan and Dent. Another is the shift of authority over foreign trade to the State Department, which can hardly have been done solely for the benefit of the Secretary, William Rogers.

If the Connally-or-Kissinger theory is correct, the hard-and-soft facts about Henry Kissinger also fit into the scenario—the planted story about Kissinger pushing Helms out, the story about the President being miffed, the departure of two Kissinger allies.

The President, all agree, cannot do without Kissinger now. But he has said himself that in his second term he will be more concerned with economic than with political foreign relations. Connally is Mr. Economic and Kissinger is Mr. Political. Kissinger, if only because he is foreign-born, cannot pick up the Nixon torch. Connally can.

One caveat must be added. The whole thing may be a lot of balderdash. The hard facts are hard enough, and some of the soft facts are pretty hard. But the rest is the sort of tale spinning that makes Byzantium-on-the-Potomac an entertaining place to live.

flee. Having covert operations run out of the White House or even out of the office of the secretaries of state or defense "makes absolutely no sense whatever in any society."

"Never Understood"

Although he said he was speaking only his personal views, Kirkpatrick said the blame for failure of the Cuban exile invasion belongs to the CIA, not on the military where President Kennedy tried to place it.

"It can be concluded," said Kirkpatrick, "that the President never really fully understood that this proposal entailed a military operation in the true sense of the word. Instead of an assault landing consisting of some 1,500 men, Kennedy seemed to think this

is what a President should do, not acknowledge and accept blame. Of course, I am being critical of the President (Kennedy) but I think this is essential."

The former CIA official said the control of "covert" operations like the Bay of Pigs exercise in 1961 should be at a much lower level of government than the President's of-

was going to be some sort of mass infiltration that would perhaps, through some mystique, become quickly invisible."

Kirkpatrick said it would have been more feasible to have used U.S. bases instead of those in Guatemala and

Nicaragua for the invasion of Cuba because the United States could have isolated the brigade and trained the pilots without disclosure.

"The Bay of Pigs experience," he said, "does not mean that we should forget covert operations as a tool for

implementing national policy. In fact, that's the last thing it means. The capability to mount a covert operation is an exceedingly important capability for our government to have."

Looking back over the Bay of Pigs operation, Kirkpatrick said the most vital lesson learned was from the opera-

tors' failure to secure accurate intelligence. He said inaccurate intelligence was the basis for the disaster adding, "there is no other place to put the blame for that than on the agency mounting the operating."

WASHINGTON POST
3 December 1972

Rumors on Kissinger's Status Rush into Peace News

Void

By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer

Discreetly, quizzically and somewhat *sotto voce*, the question is being floated around the offices, the corridors and luncheon tables where such things are discussed: Is Henry in trouble?

Henry is, of course, Henry Kissinger — the improbable glamorist who has come to personify the foreign policy of the Nixon administration and, most recently, triggered the widespread public expectation that "peace is at hand" in Vietnam.

As Ambassador William J. Porter said in Paris the other day of the blacked-out final round of negotiations on Vietnam: "Those who know are not talking and those who are talking don't know."

But that sort of conventional wisdom in this town is no deterrent to speculation.

It is generally conceded that Kissinger's power within the bureaucracy is vested in only one man, Richard M. Nixon. He has no public enclaves and no institutional bases of support outside the White House.

For his foreign policy counterpart in the executive bureaucracy, Secretary of State William P. Rogers, he has, as one former aide put it, "little more than contempt." The feelings, as best as it can be ascertained are mutual.

Even in the White House the practical operatives who guard the President's door, and formulate domestic policy have no love for the President's foreign affairs adviser, who manages to dominate both the front pages and society columns and whose background is the alien and suspect world of academia and the Council on Foreign Relations.

"You hear around town

that Henry is in trouble," said a former staff member of Kissinger's national security apparatus. "I am absolutely baffled that he should have invested so much of his credibility in the Oct. 26 statement on the settlement. At the same time my respect for his intelligence is so high that I can't believe he was sloppy enough to get himself in trouble with the President."

To be sure, Kissinger is under public attack in Saigon and in such organs of the American political right as Human Events. It was charged that he had allowed himself to become the instrument of a prospective sell-out of a beleaguered ally, the Thieu government.

But he is also being taxed by supporters of George McGovern for abetting what McGovern called a politically inspired "fraud" by suggesting that merely a few "nuances" of diplomatic dialogue lay in the path of a settlement. The differences could be resolved, Kissinger promised on Oct. 26, in "not more than three or four days" of negotiating.

As it turned out, the differences included questions long central to any settlement of the war: the presence of North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam and the nature of the tripartite Council of National Reconciliation and Concord, which Thieu branded as a disguised form of coalition government.

In the ensuing weeks the inference began to find its way into print that Kissinger had concurred with Hanoi on terms that President Nixon was not prepared to impose on the Thieu government, at least not in three or four days.

Was the President repudi-

ating the diplomatic handiwork of his own super negotiator, whose image as the administration's chief emissary of peace had been steadily enhanced by the White House, the media and Kissinger himself?

Asked at a private lunch recently about such conjecture as well as the possibility that he had exceeded his negotiating mandate with Hanoi, Kissinger shot back his reply:

"Do you think I was born yesterday?"

It is a widely held conviction in the foreign affairs community — although no official will voice it for attribution — that the diplomatic theatrics of the past few weeks between Washington and Saigon have been political window-dressing.

The objective, in this view, is to make the inevitable settlement between Washington and Hanoi more palatable to the Republican right and also to soften the protests from the Thieu government.

In this scenario Kissinger has, to some extent, played the interim role of fall-guy for the President, who maintained loftily throughout that he would not be stampeded into anything but peace with honor.

Kissinger may, in fact, have been forced to play the role more heavily than he intended by underestimating the obduracy of the Thieu government against the draft agreement made public last month in Hanoi and Washington.

"Henry may well have believed he could sell Thieu on the agreement," said another former staff aide who worked closely with Kissinger on Southeast Asia policy. "He thinks he can sell anyone anything. But he

came back from Saigon with nothing nailed down."

Kissinger prides himself on the precision, caution and immense reflectiveness that go into his recommendations to the President and his own public utterances. He is not the sort of man who is given to premature statements on television, or who would, in fact, relish the role of scapegoat — even in a close election.

This is the composite view of some half a dozen men who worked with him in close and senior capacities during the past four years.

"In these negotiations Henry has been operating as an autocrat," one of them emphasized. "He holds the reins tightly and operates outside the machinery of government. This is not the kind of thing you can submit to the bureaucracy."

"The great flaw is that as the negotiations become more sensitive and the stakes get higher, the passion for secrecy becomes overwhelming, and it becomes an autocratic exercise. Opinions and options begin to fade away."

In such an atmosphere, it was repeatedly pointed out, Kissinger, and through him the President, may have miscalculated the intensity of Saigon's response to the prospective settlement — much as the Johnson administration did four years ago at the beginning of the Paris negotiations.

The question that is central to Kissinger's future in Washington is whether he will have expended too much of his own political credits in the quest for a Vietnam settlement, even if one is achieved before Christmas.

"The President is a cold political op-

erator," said one former White House aide. "If something comes unstuck in Paris, the onus for this particular settlement, as things stand, lies fully on Henry. The President has left some water between himself and Henry on this agreement."

It is something of an irony that the Vietnam settlement, if it is achieved, will appear at least publicly to be the centerpiece of his contribution. Even before coming to Washington, Kissinger made it clear that he considered the Vietnam conflict as peripheral to the proper concerns of the United States.

At a Harvard dinner not long ago, Kissinger was confronted by a young professor who cited the enormous human cost of the Vietnam war in lives and social disruption.

"That's a very interesting point you raise," Kissinger replied with measured coolness. "But I really don't think it is relevant to the discussion this evening."

Those who speak of Kissinger's policies as amoral cite such examples as this, or the famous exchanges during the deliberations of the National Security Council's Special Action Group on the Indo-Pakistan war.

But Kissinger has repeatedly said that the important foreign policy initiatives during the first four years of the Nixon Administration will, in historical retrospect, be the moves toward stable relationships with the Soviet Union and China.

As to his own intentions, in this transitional time of arrivals and departures, Kissinger has only let it be known that he plans to take a long vacation after the conclusion of the Paris negotiations.

It would be difficult to imagine, with Vietnam out of the way as a torment to American society, that he would not want to pursue his vision of a world climate comparable to that which followed the Congress of Vienna more than a century and a half ago.

One of his famous social page flippancies is that "power is the ultimate aphrodisiac." There is no evidence yet that the poor refugee boy from Euerth in Nazi Germany who is now engaged in reshaping the world, is ready to give up the bouquet of power.

And in Key Biscayne yesterday, President Nixon, the sole custodian of Kissinger's power, showed his disposition toward taking it away.

WASHINGTON POST
6 December 1972

Victor Zorza

Four More Years: Kissinger's Role

THE EXTENSION of Henry Kissinger's job to what now looks like an eight-year term carries within itself the seeds of disaster, unless he makes some drastic changes in his own method of operation.

The next stage of the international power game will be infinitely more complex than it was in the last four years. There will be many more players, and they will be acting at cross-purposes. They will be playing for the biggest stakes ever, for a "generation of peace" that should open the way to a world without wars, and, for Nixon and Kissinger, to a place in history unsurpassed by any figure of antiquity or modern times.

But they have only four years in which to do it, and the danger is that they may push history more than it is willing to be pushed. "We are moving with history," as a good Marxist would put it, "and moving history ourselves." Only the words are Mr. Nixon's.

The Nixon-Kissinger formula that would allow Europe, China and Japan to join the two main superpowers, the United States and Russia, in a five-sided power structure to keep the world's peace, is viewed with suspicion outside the White House and the Kremlin. Even the Kremlin has its doubts, but the outsiders will have to be coaxed and bullied into an international framework which the two superpowers may design in the interest of all—but which the others will believe is in the interest of the two.

THE UNITED STATES has already browbeaten both Japan and Europe into accepting an international economic arrangement which they see as being mainly in the American interest—and they fear that there is more to come. The Sino-Soviet dispute began in earnest when Nikita Khrushchev tried, as Peking saw it, to make a global deal

with President Eisenhower at China's expense. Washington and Moscow came together to impose a settlement on North and South Vietnam, both of whom were screaming "betrayal." The White House and the Kremlin are already working to impose a similar deal on their Israeli and Arab clients.

This is certainly in the interests of peace, and small countries in Indochina or in the Middle East may be told that if they don't like it, they can lump it. But Europe, China, and Japan are a different proposition. They will have to be talked into it in a protracted series of interlocking negotiations that cannot possibly be completed in four years.

If obstacles threaten to interfere with Mr. Nixon's time-table, he is apt to increase the pressure to the very limit, as he did, for instance, when he ordered the bombing and mining of North Vietnam. But this always carries the risk of crossing the limit, and endangering the whole intricate structure of negotiation.

When the international power game becomes so much more elaborate than it was in Mr. Nixon's first term, the sheer quantity of Kissinger's work will grow so greatly as to threaten a rapid deterioration in its quality.

KISSINGER REFUSES to rely on the State Department, but his own staff cannot provide the detailed diplomatic footwork which will now have to be integrated with his own thinking and activities.

These weaknesses will be greatly multiplied unless an altogether new working formula is developed for the altogether new situation which we are now approaching. If the State Department has to be bypassed, and there may be good reasons for this, some other framework must be devised, or the "generation of peace" may prove to be as elusive as many people think it is.

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WASHINGTON STAR
29 November 1972

WASHINGTON CLOSE-UP

Kissinger- Watching as a Hobby

By FRANK GETLEIN

Orlana Fallaci, one of the best interview reporters anywhere, recently published an interview with Henry A. Kissinger in L'Europeo—described as a "left-of-center" magazine—a description that carries the fascinating implication that someone knows where center is.

It probably was the best Kissinger interview yet, even better than the one that left the French woman interviewer convinced that Kissinger had first made love to her and then abandoned her, delightful as that was.

The Fallaci interview was so good that its English translation immediately evoked from its subject one of those not-quite-denials in which one hopes to create the illusion of errors and misstatements without actually bringing on the transcripts. Thus: Some of the quotes were taken out of context, he felt, and others may have been garbled in translation.

★

But his not-quite-denial reached beyond the limits of the form to the essential character of the man when he concluded that he granted the interview at the request of the Italian ambassador and added, "Why I agreed to it I'll never know."

In that sentence may be seen the typical public figure or celebrity largely created by the media, enjoying his media existence and at the same time complaining about it.

It is a pattern familiar to Americans at least since Brenda and Cobina, the two original celebrities of modern times, from mid-Depression to Pearl Harbor.

The same combination has been observed in such classic examples of the species as Frank Sinatra in his right-jab period, assorted members of the Gabor family, Liberace and Salvador Dali.

Besides Kissinger's self-characterization as a lonesome cowboy, "who leads the convoy, alone on his horse... who comes into town all alone on his horse," the most significant point in the interview was the one in which the

subject, known throughout the world for his intimate dinners with starlets in restaurants that automatically alert the press to his presence, talked of his reputation as a ladies' man.

★

"Partly exaggerated," he said of his rep in this field, "but partly it is true," adding that his image as a swinger has helped him in his endless negotiations because it "reassured" Le Duc Tho, Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung—all of whom seem to need a rather special brand of reassurance.

At the heart of the question, however, Kissinger — once more acting in the central tradition of the minor vaudeville chasing the autograph seekers down the street so as to complain about them — said: "For me, women are

only amusing, a hobby. Nobody spends much time on a hobby."

This completes the circle because, as Kissinger must know, for many women — as indeed for many men — Kissinger himself is chiefly amusing, a kind of hobby that comes with the daily paper, like horoscopes and a chuckle for today.

Undoubtedly much of his following consists of people titillated by his stepping out with burlesque stars and tripping the light fantastic while other administration members stay at home reading inspirational literature.

But there is a solid core of Kissinger fans who exercise a kind of connoisseurship on his more weighty manifestations.

Until recently, most of these fans agreed that his finest

hour was when the troops of West Pakistan were raping and killing their way through what was then East Pakistan and Kissinger was explaining the need for a United States policy of neutrality with a "tilt" in favor of the rapists and killers.

Some, however, gave an even higher rating to Kissinger's arrangements for his master's sensational travels in China and Russia, trips which, to be sure, hinted at an unexpected eruption of common sense all around — a rare enough commodity among chiefs of state — but which were achieved at the cost of the entire public history of that same master.

★

Obviously, if the assumptions of the famed journeys for peace were tenable, then

Jerry Voorhis or Helen Gahagan Douglas should be president today, since Nixon constructed his career on the threat to American security posed by those two Californians who now appear to have been premature Nixonians.

But Kissinger hobbyists are now preparing to give up their personal preferences for the "tilt" over the switch, or vice versa, in unanimous accolade for the peak of their personality's career: Creating a "generation of peace" on the solid foundation of each day's bombing establishing a new record. If this be peace, who needs war?

For those with the fondness for it — it is rather a special taste — the Henry hobby can be even more amusing than are his fair companions at dinner and the dance.

WASHINGTON POST
7 December 1972

Taking Exception . . .

Chester Bowles On Appointment Of Ambassadors

ON THE editorial page of The Washington Post of Nov. 29, there was an article by Charles W. Yost, a former delegate and U. S. Ambassador to the United Nations, which was entitled "Ambassadorships to the Highest Bidders." In it Ambassador Yost expressed his concern that in the weeks ahead, a large number of ambassadors will be appointed, the principal qualifications of whom will be the extent of their financial support to President Nixon's recent campaign.

Although I share Ambassador Yost's concern about the ambassadorial choices which are likely to be made, I cannot agree that "appointments by Republican and Democratic administrations in this regard have

The writer is a former U.S. ambassador to India and headed the Office of Price Administration during World War II.

been about the same." I can vouch for the fact that President Kennedy's ambassadorial appointments in 1961 when I was Undersecretary of State were remarkably free of political implications.

In my first discussion with President Kennedy following his inauguration he brought up the question of ambassadorial appointments and said that there were only "a handful of embassies" in which he had a special interest. These were India, to which he had appointed Kenneth Galbraith, the eminent Harvard economist who could certainly not qualify as a tycoon; Ireland, for which he nominated Matt McCloskey — a long time friend who served with distinction; the Netherlands, for which he nominated John

Rice from Pennsylvania; France, for which he nominated General Gavin (in the hope that he could establish a closer relationship with General deGaulle); Switzerland, for which he nominated a personal friend whose name now escapes me; and the United Kingdom, for which he nominated David Bruce. The only member of this group who might have been in a position to contribute generously to the Democratic Party was David Bruce. However, Ambassador Bruce had been deeply involved in American policy in Europe for several years and I doubt that even the most partisan Republican would question his qualifications.

President Kennedy then asked me to examine the remaining posts and recommend to him those ambassadors who I thought should be transferred or retired and the individuals who I felt were best qualified to replace them. This assignment was completed in April 1961. Approximately half the incumbents remained at their posts (all of them Foreign Service officers), and two-thirds of those who were moved were replaced by Foreign Service officers. The odd posts that remained were filled, not by generous party-givers, by men who were uniquely qualified by experience and background to handle their particular assignment. Not only were none of these ambassadors selected on the basis of his political contribution, but in no instance was he even asked how he had voted.

The non-career ambassadors whom we selected were: for Japan—Edwin Reischauer, director of the Center of Japanese Studies at Harvard; for the Philippines—William Stevenson, President of Oberlin College; for South Korea—Sam Berger, who had served with distinction as U.S. labor attaché in London for 10 years; for Thailand—Kenneth Young, who had many years experience in government and business in Southeast Asia; for Burma—John Everton, who had served in that country with the Ford Foundation for 10 years; for the United Arab Republic—John Badami, former president of the American College in Cairo and a respected Arabic scholar and expert on Middle East affairs; for Guinea—William Attwood, for several years foreign correspondent for Look magazine; for Senegal—Philip Katsert, a former Assistant Secretary in the Department of Labor; for Chile—Charles Cole, president of Amherst College; for Venezuela—

—Teodoro Moscoso, a close associate of Governor Muñoz Marín of Puerto Rico; for Peru—James Loeb, editor of an upstate New York newspaper who was identified closely with the Truman administration in various capacities; for Bolivia—Ben Stepihansky, who had served for 10 years as a U.S. labor attaché in Mexico; for Brazil—Lincoln Gordon, former professor of economics at Harvard, president of Brookings and later Johns Hopkins University.

Also included were two retired foreign service officers whom we persuaded to accept ambassadorial posts—George Kennan, former ambassador to the Soviet Union, to Yugoslavia; and Charles Baldwin to Malaysia.

Our ambassadorial appointments also included two highly qualified civil servants who were not members of the Foreign Service. These were William Handley, who became ambassador to Mali and Leonard Sagala who went to El Salvador. We also retained two able Republican political appoint-

ees who entered government service during the Dulles regime—William McComber, who served President Eisenhower as Assistant Secretary for Congressional Affairs, became ambassador to Jordan; and Robert MacElvain, a newspaper publisher from Pennsylvania who joined the Eisenhower administration in 1957, became ambassador to one of the newly independent African countries.

Let me emphasize again that while I share Ambassador Yost's deep concern about the qualifications of the ambassadors who may be selected within the next few weeks, I do not believe this method of selection is a necessary part of the American political tradition. At least I can vouch for the integrity of the choices made by the Kennedy administration in the year 1961. Ambassador Yost himself, was offered an important ambassadorial post in Europe in January of 1961. However, Adlai Stevenson felt that he was ideally equipped to become his deputy to the United Nations and he agreed to take this post.

WASHINGTON STAR
1 December 1972

SHAKEUP

Housecleaning Set In State Department

By OSWALD JOHNSON
Star-News Staff Writer

The Foreign Service shakeup President Nixon has ordered as a top priority for his new State Department team will make liberal use of a forced retirement regulation for top officials that up to now has been invoked primarily as a form of punishment.

A parallel mechanism planned for clearing out higher echelons in the department and in embassies overseas is an accelerated program of assigning aging Foreign Service officers to other government departments on a nominally temporary basis.

According to senior State Department sources, these methods of bureaucratic housecleaning have been under active consideration at high levels in the department ever since Nixon's re-election.

Along with the official White House announcement yesterday that Secretary of State

William P. Rogers would stay on—and that three new deputies would serve with him—came clear notice that the foreign service is due for a major shakeup.

The main objective, sources close to the President said, is to enhance the "vitality" of the department by opening the way for officers in the 30 to 40 age group to high-ranking positions.

Senior State Department officials have been ordered to move on two fronts:

- An unprecedentedly widespread use of executive powers under section 519 of the Foreign Service Act, which enables the President to force retirement of any homecoming Foreign Service officer of ambassadorial rank whose routine resignation has been accepted.

Up to now, section 519 has been a rarely invoked punitive measure used to weed out dissidents.

Its first and most celebrated victim was Ambassador George F. Kennan, who was retired in 1953 in the early years of the John Foster Dulles stewardship at State.

- A concerted effort to transfer older Foreign Service officers "on loan" to other departments in the government. About 100 State Department officials are already temporarily loaned out. It is anticipated that the number will be sharply increased in Nixon's second term, so long as

shrinking budgets elsewhere in the federal bureaucracy can absorb talent farmed out from the higher ranks of the State Department.

Top levels in the department have been under orders to weed out since early this month—to be precise, since Nixon's ideas about streamlining the government became known through post-election directives to the agencies and through his Star-News interview.

One option open to immediate executive action without going to Congress for amendments to the Civil Service laws apparently will not be used:

It was quickly made known that the White House had no intention of expanding foreign service appointments by re-

ducing the number of non-career, political appointments to some popular ambassadorships.

Department officials recognize a fourth way to beef up the higher Foreign Service grades with younger men. This is through a natural process of attrition under a newly liberalized pension policy, through normal end-of-term retirements, and through long-established "selection out" procedures for persons who overstay a prescribed 12 years in Grade 1 or 10 years in Grade 2 without promotion.

Aides Seek Moves

Among ranking officials who have made it known within the department that they want to move on to some of these am-

bassadorships are: William B. Macomber, deputy undersecretary for management; Marshall Green, assistant secretary for East Asian Affairs; William H. Sullivan, director of the Vietnam working group and a key participant in the Indochina peace negotiations; Samuel DePalm, assistant secretary for international organizations; and David D. Newsom, assistant secretary for African Affairs.

The ranks most likely to be affected by these changes are the top Foreign Service classifications beneath the honorific grade of career ambassador (whose sole incumbent, U. Alexis Johnson, is to be replaced as undersecretary in the new State Department).

They are: Career minister, a rank at present filled by 51 officials with an average age of 59, of whom 30 are ambassadors; Class 1, with 291 officials, average age 62, with 42 ambassadors; Grade 2, with 404 officials, average age, 50, with three ambassadors.

The key beneficiaries of the shakeup would be the persons in Class 3, with 607 officials, at average age 47, and Class 4, with 717 officials at average age 41.

Numbers Reduced

During the last four years the Foreign Service establishment has been cut back substantially—from some 3,500 officers to some 3,000. This has been accomplished largely by cutback in re-

recruitment of younger persons, and a slower rate of promotion. But its immediate result has been abnormal bunching of older men in the top ranks.

The plans are likely to stir up a good deal of controversy in the department, and at first they could lower foreign service morale rather than raise it.

WASHINGTON POST
1 December 1972



Marilyn Berger

Rogers Signals 'Continuation'

FOLLOWING the White House announcement yesterday that Secretary of State William P. Rogers would remain in his job, he promised that foreign affairs over the next four years would "involve continuation of policy already established."

Continuity was given as a major reason for asking Rogers to stay. White House press spokesman Ronald L. Ziegler said. And continuity is precisely what many ranking officers in the Foreign Service fear. They have few objections to the policy, but they are hoping for major changes in the way it is made.

For four years the State Department has been eclipsed by the National Security Council staff, and most of all by its chief, Henry A. Kissinger. For four years the role of initiating, and in many cases, implementing policy, has fallen to the White House staff.

AS A RESULT the Foreign Service has fallen on sad days. So low had morale dropped that even members of the White House national security staff began to worry that it was no longer good for the country, officials recalled yesterday. Even Kissinger has been heard to talk about getting the department back into the process again.

The new faces at the department include Kenneth Rush, who replaces John N. Irwin as deputy secretary, and William Casey, who comes over from the Security Exchange Commission to head the newly elevated department that will deal with international economic affairs. But, in the words of one ranking officer who has held numerous important posts, "nothing fundamental changes until the top job

If as a result of section 519 all ambassadors run the risk of forced retirement after a tour is up, the post may become unpopular except in the more prestigious embassies, one source warned.

"A man under 45 would think a long time before accepting an ambassadorship if he thought he would have to retire from the service after it was over."

changes." In other words, unless Rogers asserts his own role, or unless he is replaced, the department will continue in eclipse.

This view is widespread, but by no means unanimous. A few officials have said they would leave if Rogers stayed; one or two may go over to the Pentagon to rejoin Elliot Richardson whom they admired when he was at State. Others are simply disgruntled, seeing the changes at the top as having only marginal significance but, as one said, "on balance an improvement."

Rush is widely seen as being far more forceful than Irwin who is considered by all who know him as one of the nicest men around. But, in the words of one State Department official, "you're not effective unless you're a little bit aggressive and loud. Irwin is neither; he doesn't use his elbows."

Irwin is understood to have been offered the job of ambassador to France. Rush, who won high marks as the man who helped negotiate the Berlin agreements, is frequently considered to be in line for the top job for there is a widespread expectation that Rogers could well resign within the year. It is anticipated Rush will be more aggressive than Irwin, that, in the words of one officer "he will make a little more splash."

William Porter, named to the job of under secretary for political affairs, is being spoken of in glowing terms like "outstanding," "a real veteran," "a pro," "a fine, broad-gauged guy." He replaces U. Alexis Johnson, currently the department's only career ambassador.

Casey could upgrade the department's role in international economic affairs, according to some Foreign Service officers. But he will still have strong competition

WASHINGTON STAR
12 December 1972

CAN'T PUBLISH ARTICLE

CIA Agent Loses

The Supreme Court yesterday rejected, 6-3, a plea by a former Central Intelligence Agency employee for permission to publish articles about the CIA without the agency's prior approval.

The justices, in a brief order without comment, refused to hear the appeal for Victor L. Marchetti, of Vienna, Va., who worked for the CIA from 1955 to 1969.

Justices William O. Douglas, William J. Brennan Jr. and Potter Stewart dissented, saying they would grant full review of Marchetti's appeal. It takes the vote of four justices for a full court review.

The effect of the court's action was to leave standing an order by Judge Albert V. Bryan Jr. of U.S. District Court in Alexandria which bars Marchetti from writing about the agency. Bryan's order was later upheld by the 4th U.S. Court of Appeals.

THE GOVERNMENT sought the order after it learned that Marchetti was planning to publish an article in "Esquire" magazine about the CIA.

Justice Department attor-

Commerce and Treasury.

MUCH OF WHAT happens in State will depend on just how the President implements his pledge to put more power into the hands of his Cabinet officers and to thin out the White House staff.

A few officers around the department said the time was coming when State would be playing a larger role because the problems of the next four years involved some of the less flashy and more intricate, legalistic matters that can best be handled by the bureaucracy.

Many were taking a wait-and-see attitude. Some to see how policy responsibilities would be apportioned by the White House, some to see whether the grass would be greener over in the Pentagon, some to see whether the foreign assignments they had requested would come

neys, representing the CIA, said that Marchetti isn't entitled to publish articles or books dealing with the agency because he signed a contract with the CIA in 1955 in which he pledged never to do so.

In appealing to the Supreme Court, the American Civil Liberties Union attorneys representing Marchetti said that Bryan's order violates his right to free speech.

They said the contract is "a systematic scheme of censorship which will surely result in the denial of the fundamental right of the American people to be supplied with information about the conduct of government."

THE COURT ORDER against Marchetti amounts to "a prior restraint forbidden by the First Amendment," they added.

Since he left the CIA, Marchetti has published a novel, "The Ropo Dancer," about a hypothetical "National Intelligence Agency." He also published an article in "The Nation" magazine that was critical of the CIA.

His attorneys said he has abandoned plans to publish the "Esquire" article, but has signed a contract to write a book about the CIA.

In another case involving the Washington area, the Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal in which it was asked to curtail the authority of Metropolitan Police officers to arrest persons for cursing on public streets.

THE PRACTICE of arresting people who utter curse words when accosted by police is "obnoxious" and "a serious and unlawful infringement upon the liberty of many citizens," said attorney John Vanderstar, representing William Von Sleichter, who was arrested in Georgetown in 1969.

"We strenuously urged that this delegation of authority to police to arrest for speech on public streets should be reviewed and sharply curtailed by this court," he said. But the justices declined to go along.

Von Sleichter was arrested by an officer who testified that he spotted Von Sleichter "passing and changing" something with two other men. When he approached Von Sleichter, the officer said, Von Sleichter cursed him and ran away.

The officer found him underneath a car nearby and arrested him for disorderly conduct.

— cursing in public. When Von Schleicher climbed out from under the car, the officer found a bag of heroin where he had been lying.

Von Schleicher was never

prosecuted for disorderly conduct. Instead, he was brought to trial only on the narcotics count. He was convicted and sentenced to a fine of \$100 or a jail term of 90 days.

Thursday, Dec. 11, 1972 THE WASHINGTON POST

U.S. Edict Fails to Stir Data Flow

By Lewis Gullick
Associated Press

A presidential order aimed at peeling the secrecy wraps from old government papers has produced only a trickle of new public information since it took effect five months ago.

The White House edict will show greater impact later on, officials say, as declassifiers delve into a mountain of aging documents, and controls crimp the flood of new secret writings.

But an effort by The Associated Press to dislodge some documents under one portion of the order has met with virtually no success so far. Other inquirers have had similar experiences.

Under President Nixon's June 1 directive, any paper more than 10 years old is supposed to be made available to a member of the public if he asks for it unless a review by officials finds it should be kept secret.

The order calls also for automatic declassification for all documents when they become 30 years old, unless specifically exempted by a department head in writing, and it pares sharply the number of officials allowed to impose secrecy stamps.

Of eight requests made by the AP since June 1 under the 10-year proviso, seven have yet to produce any once-secret material.

CIA Refused

The lone exception was a request for a National Security Council document from the Kennedy administration. Nearly two months after the request was submitted, the NSC noted that it had already been declassified.

All other AP queries have proven fruitless to date, including a request for the record of NSC recommendations made to former President Dwight D. Eisenhower during the 1953 Lebanon crisis.

David Young, an NSC aide supervising the declassification program for the administration, has acknowledged that the request for the 1953 papers falls within the guidelines of Mr. Nixon's order. But the papers have yet to be made available.

The CIA responded to a query for documents relating

to an incident in the early 1950s by saying that the request was not specific enough.

However, the CIA refused to say what additional information was needed and a follow-up request, couched in more specific terms, was turned down.

The AP has appealed the CIA's rejection to an Interagency Classification Review Committee set up under Nixon's order.

Study on Access

A June 1 request to the Defense Department for some Korean war documents produced a July 11 response that the material was not in the files of the assistant secretary for international security affairs and an Aug. 8 response that a search for it would require "an unreasonable amount of effort."

After a newsman noted that Eisenhower referred to the material in his memoirs as coming from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Pentagon searchers said they would look some more.

A book-length report on scholars' access to documents covered by the June 1 executive order says the new review procedures "will not be of much assistance to the scholar."

The study, published by the nonprofit Twentieth Century Fund, notes that the 1968 Freedom of Information Act already allows citizens to ask for declassification of documents, of whatever age, with appeal possible in court.

The June 1 order, which covers only documents that are at least 10 years old, provides for appeal within the executive branch, where the secrecy label was applied in the first place.

The directive requires also that the request be specific enough that a government search can locate the document "with only a reasonable amount of effort."

Countless Files

However, only insiders know just what secret documents exist. An outsider can guess, but serious scholars usually prefer to have access to an entire file to make sure they don't miss something important.

Just how many requests have been made under the new directive is uncertain. One guess is that there have been more than a hundred so far, with most still in various stages of processing.

Thus, early signs are that the June 1 executive order will not prove of much immediate help to scholars or newsmen searching for secret papers tucked away in countless government files.

Prospects are much brighter, however, for creation of an internal-control system stemming the flood of new secret writings and for yanking away the secrecy of government documents by the time they are 30 years old.

No one knows exactly how many government documents are under lock and key, hidden from public view by security classifications ranging from "confidential" to "top secret."

But by conservative estimate, there are more than a billion pages of such material. That's enough paper to circle the earth a half-dozen times if placed end to end along the equator.

NSC Directive

And, with the help of modern photocopying gear, federal officials were spewing an estimated 200,000 pages of newly classified documents into their files daily as of June 1.

All that secrecy is expensive.

WASHINGTON POST
7 December 1972

Bargaining Agent Chosen By State Dept. Workers

Associated Press

The American Foreign Service Association has been chosen the bargaining agent for Foreign Service officers and other State Department employees.

In an affiliation election, the association received 3,023 votes while its opponent, the American Federation of Government Employees, received 1,056. There were 430 votes against any representation, and 235 votes were challenged.

The election was fought over the issue of whether

A General Accounting Office study covering just four agencies—the State Department, Defense Department, NASA and the Atomic Energy Commission—rated their annual outlay for administering the security-classification system at \$60 million.

Since June 1, the White House says, the number of persons authorized to wield secrecy stamps has been slashed 49 per cent or from 32,536 to 16,238. Those figures do not include the Central Intelligence Agency, which keeps the number of its classifiers secret.

By NSC directive, each agency is supposed to report by July 1, 1973, all major classified documents on file after the end of this year, giving their subject headings and when they should become available to the public.

This information is to be fed into a computerized Data Index System which, hopefully, will start giving up-to-date accounting on the secret paper flow in 1974.

The end of the line for most old government papers, and coming duplicate copies and minor items which are destroyed, is the national Archives.

Remove Secrecy

And here, say the archivists, the outlook is bright for eventually putting nearly all once-secret documents into the public domain.

AFSA would represent the Foreign Service officers and employees or would in actuality serve as a mouthpiece of management.

AFGE, an affiliate of the AFL-CIO charged that the association was linked to the leadership of the State Department and was interested in perpetuating those ties.

AFSA answered that it alone could protect the unique professional nature of the Foreign Service.

NEW YORK TIMES
12 December 72

Mistrial Is Declared in the Ellsberg Case

By MARTIN ARNOLD
Special to The New York Times

LOS ANGELES, Dec. 11—The trial of Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony J. Russo Jr. was officially declared a mistrial today and the Pentagon papers case was back to arguing over jury selection.

Four months ago a jury was selected in the case. It never heard a word of testimony.

After the declaration of mistrial, the defendants both waived their double jeopardy protection and Federal District Court Judge William Matthew Byrne Jr. said that he would dismiss the jury tomorrow and try to select another on Wednesday.

But the defense said it would challenge the new jury selection on several grounds — the main one being that the chief Federal judge of this district had, as had, as far as the defense was concerned, already prejudged the next array of prospective jurors with asides he made about the Ellsberg case.

From Big Panels

Juries are chosen for each case from large panels of persons (about 2,000 here) who are periodically brought together to become potential jurors. The Pentagon papers jury was chosen from a group of citizens who were registered to vote as of December, 1971.

The judge would have the new jury selected from an array of about 2,000 persons who were brought together in July, 1972, but were still on the list of registered voters as of December, 1971.

The defense wants the new jury to come from among persons who were registered to vote as of October, 1972 — mostly because that group presumably would have a good percentage of 18- and 19- and 20-year-old members. The defense feels that the younger

the prospective juror, the better able he or she will be to associate with the type of defense Dr. Ellsberg and Mr. Russo are putting together. The first jury in this case only had one member under 40 years of age.

To get a jury with teen-age members on it the defense will have to mount a successful challenge to the current array of prospective jurors.

Complain of 'Taint'

Its chief argument is that this list was "tainted" against the defendants because of remarks made to it in another case by Chief Judge Albert Leo Stephens Jr. of the Federal Court here.

Judge Byrne gave the defense until 9:30 A.M. tomorrow to file an affidavit indicating on what grounds it intended to challenge the new jury selection and gave it until Friday to file a formal motion. However, in

the interests of speeding the trial, he can make his rulings based on tomorrow's affidavit without waiting for the formal motion.

Judge Byrne also ordered the prosecution to complete its survey of electronic surveillance in the case and report the results to him by Friday. Under the rules the survey results are given to the judge in private. If he finds any of the defendants are under electronic surveillance or their counsel are being wiretapped on matters concerning his case, he makes that information public and then holds a court hearing of the material gathered.

Dr. Ellsberg is charged with 12 counts of espionage, conspiracy and theft in the Pentagon papers case and Mr. Russo is charged with three counts.

NEW YORK TIMES
12 December 72

Schlesinger and Aide to Nixon Debate Public's Right to Know

By PETER KIHSS

Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. yesterday labeled the Nixon Administration "the most closed government within memory," while Herbert G. Klein, President's communications director, declared that Americans now were "the best-informed public this country has ever seen."

The duel in words between Professor Schlesinger, the former adviser to the Kennedy Administration, and Mr. Klein, for the Nixon Administration, took place before 400 people attending a Foreign Policy Association luncheon at the New York Hilton on "the public's right to know."

'Manipulation' Charged

Professor Schlesinger, arriving with a formidable text, contended that the pre-election report of "peace at hand" in Vietnam now appeared to have been "indefensible misjudgment or indefensible deception."

Mr. Klein, confidently extemporaneous, held it inappropriate to discuss the current negotiations on Vietnam, but asserted "the ones who know the most say the least." He said this had been "the most thoroughly reported war in all American history."

Professor Schlesinger, Pulitzer prize-winning historian, charged the Nixon Administration "carried news manipulation farther than any of its predecessors," and took "unprecedented steps

doing their job."

Mr. Klein politely suggested more research by Professor Schlesinger. He said that since general guidelines were issued two years ago by the Attorney General in response to journalistic protests, there had been 13 Federal subpoenas to newsmen, with 11 of them having wanted such procedures before giving information to law enforcement agencies.

President Nixon has moved against government secrecy, Mr. Klein said, with the number of agencies empowered to classify documents as confidential cut from 37 to 25; the number of individuals so authorized reduced from 52,000 to 20,000, and the officials able to apply the top-secret lid shrunk from 7,134 to 1,631.

Need for a Law Disputed

Mr. Klein said "an adversary relationship between the government and press is healthy and necessary," and favored protecting the confidentiality of reporters' sources. He disagreed with the recent imprisonments of reporters in New Jersey and California, but he said these had been state actions and he did not yet see any "demonstrated need" for a Federal shield law.

Professor Schlesinger charged the Nixon Administration had not "understood" a need to assure information "essential to democratic decision." He accused it of "misleading and

HINDUSTAN TIMES
19 November 1972

INSIDE CIA

WITH the C.I.A. activities getting so much spotlight in India these days, it is interesting to read the inside story by a man who started it all in the first place. The man was an American named Turner Catledge. As executive editor of the New York Times, it was he who first decided to expose the C.I.A. scandal in April 1966.

In a series of highly controversial articles written by top reporters after worldwide investigation, and checking and rechecking their accuracy to the last word, the paper in one stroke ripped open the protective and highly secretive mask through which the agency was conducting its mysterious operations. The C.I.A. from then on became a household word not only in the U.S. but outside.

Catledge has given a detailed inside account of how the Times decided to expose the scandal, even at the risk of Government prosecution, in his autobiographical memoirs "My Life and The Times" published last year.

The "C.I.A." exposure, according to him, was a fine example of what in journalistic parlance can be called "developed news." The idea originated at a daily news conference in early September 1965, when the foreign news editor told Catledge of an amazing story out of Singapore. Lee Kuan Yew, the Singapore Prime Minister, had charged that a C.I.A. agent had offered him a \$33 million bribe to cover up an unsuccessful C.I.A. operation there in 1960. It developed that not only was the charge true, but when the State Department denied it, Prime Minister Lee produced the letter of apology from Secretary of State Rusk to prove it. Catledge was astounded. He told his colleagues: "What is this C.I.A.? For God's sake, let's find out what they're doing. They are endangering all of us." The fact-gathering machinery at the Times was activated and after six months of investigations, their effort was channelled into a series of five long articles by a team of writers, headed by Tom Wicker, the then Washington bureau chief of the paper. The publication was preceded by a lot of soul-searching by the publisher, and countless pressures by the State Department on the paper to resist such a risky undertaking. But the paper took the risk and gloriously survived it. The C.I.A. has never been lacking in publicity since then.

stance by proclaiming neutrality in the Indian-Pakistani war "while the President privately instructed the Government to 'tilt' American power in favor of Pakistan."

Mr. Klein argued that the policy on the war had been an effort to avert India's escalation of the hostilities into West Pakistan.

Responding to a questioner, Mr. Klein said: "I believe the Government does not have a right to lie—it has the right on certain occasions not to discuss a subject, for instance, the content of current negotiations.

THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS
Washington, D. C., Wednesday, December 6, 1972

Watergate Motives Sought

By BARRY KALB
Star-News Staff Writer

The secrecy surrounding the prosecution of the Watergate bugging was pierced ever so slightly on Monday, when a prosecutor indicated in public that he plans to introduce evidence linking the alleged crime with politics and the Republican party.

But that was about all he said, and the question voiced all along by critics of the Nixon administration remains:

How far will the U.S. Attorney's Office, which works for the Nixon-run Justice Department, go to prove or disprove charges that somebody "higher up" in the administration knew about the bugging, and that the bugging was only part of a larger political sabotage plot by the GOP?

Before the indictments in the case came out Sept. 15, these critics predicted that the government's case would be a whitewash. After the indictments were issued, the critics felt their predictions had been borne out.

Evidence To Be Tabled

These people were given some cause for hope, for the first time, at a pretrial conference Monday in U.S. District Court.

Chief Judge John J. Sirica said he felt the jury would want to know what the motives for the episode were, who if anyone hired the defendants — "why did they go in there?"

Asst. U.S. Atty. Earl J. Silbert told Sirica he did plan to introduce evidence in response to these questions, and Sirica offered him "considerable latitude" to do so.

But what had Silbert revealed? Not much.

He did say definitely that he would trace during trial two sums of money which without dispute passed through the Committee for the Re-election of the President, and which are suspected to be involved in the Watergate case.

'Up To The Jury'

Beyond that, Silbert was more evasive than informative:

"Well, there will be some evidence introduced," he told Sirica. "It is a question (on) which the jury will make the proper inference — it is up to the jury to accept or reject the evidence that we propose to offer, but there will be evidence we will offer that will go from which the jury may draw, we think, an appropriate inference as to perhaps a variety of interests."

Interpretation

Silbert undoubtedly told Sirica as little as possible because he knew that newsmen and defense attorneys were listening carefully, and as an experienced prosecutor did not want to give away his case in advance.

Because of his evasiveness and Sirica's firmness, some observers felt the judge was attempting to push Silbert beyond what he had intended to present when the trial begins Jan. 8. Sirica told a reporter yesterday that this was not the case.

A Feel For The Case

"I wasn't trying to tell the district attorney how to try his case," Sirica said. He said he was just trying to get a feel for the government's theory of the case.

Just how for Silbert is planning to go remains to be seen. The indictment he had a hand in drawing up offers little guidance.

It makes no mention of politics, except to note that it was Democratic National Committee headquarters and a McGovern campaign office which were bugged, and that two of the defendants were employed by the Committee for the Re-election of the President.

William O. Bittman, one of seven defense attorneys in the case, was quick to point out that two sums of money were not mentioned anywhere

in the indictment, and objected to reference to them at the trial.

"There is not even a scintilla of a suggestion in the indictment the government expected to rely on any of that evidence, and I suggest it would be a variance from the indictment," Bittman said.

Silbert countered, "We did say and say again to the court that an indictment sets out the theory and the nature of the prosecution's case. It does not have to set forth the evidence and the proof."

Of the two sums of money, the first is a \$25,000 check which went from a former supporter of Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey, Dwayne Andreas, to a Midwest Nixon fund raiser, Kenneth Dahlberg and on to the Committee for the Re-election of the President, where Nixon's chief fundraiser, Maurice H. Stans, has admitted it quickly passed through his hands; ultimately it went to the bank account of Bernard L. Barker, one of the defendants.

The second is \$89,000 in cash and checks which, according to an investigation by the General Accounting Office, went from Nixon donors in Texas, through a Mexican bank, and then on to the Nixon re-election committee.

There have been charges in the press that part of this money was used in the bugging.

Silbert told Sirica he plans to trace the \$25,000 check, and to trace the \$89,000 "not neces-

sarily from the source, but ... part of the way through the system."

It is impossible to say whether Silbert will have to, or wait to go any further in linking the defendants to the GOP.

He may have help in this, however, from four of the five men actually arrested inside Democratic headquarters the morning of June 17.

The four, all from Miami, are Barker, Frank Sturgis, Virgilio Gonzalez and Eugenio Martinex. They are represented as a group by Henry B. Rothblatt of New York.

The four, according to reliable sources, were hired by James W. McCord Jr., who was a security advisor for the re-election committee at the time of the bugging, and who was arrested with the four Miami men that June morning.

According to government sources, the prosecution is now theorizing that the defense of these four will be that they thought they were working for someone high in the administration — perhaps the President himself — and were engaged in legal national security work.

This would put them in direct conflict with McCord and the remaining two defendants, E. Howard Hunt Jr. and G. Gordon Liddy, but as one government source said, echoing the thoughts of some of his associates, "There have got to be conflicting defenses here. I don't know how you can have a unified defense that's going to be a winner."

WASHINGTON POST
8 December 1972

Bug Case Figures Used Covert Executive Phone

By Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward
Washington Post Staff Writers

Former White House consultant E. Howard Hunt Jr. had a special private telephone in the Executive Office Building that was used almost exclusively for conversations with Bernard L. Barker, a defendant in the Watergate bugging case, according to a former White House personal secretary.

The telephone apparently was the only one in the White House complex for which bills were sent to a private home — that of the secretary, Kathleen Chenow.

Miss Chenow told The Washington Post that by prearrangement she would submit the bills to an aide in the office of John Ehrlichman for payment. Ehrlichman is President Nixon's principal assistant for domestic policy.

Deputy presidential press secretary Gerald Warren said the White House would not comment on the matter because it might relate to the Watergate bugging investigation.

By not commenting, the White House left unanswered

the questions of how Hunt's official duties could require a camouflaged telephone listing and why Ehrlichman's office would approve the arrangements for such phone service.

On June 20, it was reported that Hunt was associated with at least two of the men who were arrested in the break-in and alleged bugging of Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate three days earlier. At the time, a White House spokesman stressed that Hunt was only a part-time consultant whose work involved declassification of the Pentagon Papers and "narcotics intelligence."

In addition to being indicted in the Watergate bugging, Hunt, according to federal investigators, was an important figure in a campaign of spying and disruption against Demo-

cratic presidential candidates. Investigators have said the operation was conceived by high White House aides as basic re-election strategy.

Miss Chenow said the private phone, in use from August, 1971, to March, 1972, was intended only for Hunt's use.

Asked why it was listed in her name at her Alexandria address, she said: "That's a good question; they apparently wanted it in my name because they didn't want any ties with the White House—for what reason I don't know."

The C&P Telephone Co. official in charge of White House service confirmed that he had been asked by administration officials to have the phone installed and said that in his 25-year career in the Executive Mansion he could recall no such arrangement for anyone else.

Miss Chenow, 25, worked during 1971 and early 1972 in a basement suite in the Executive Office Building shared by Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy, another Watergate defendant, and David Young, a White House aide who, like Hunt and Liddy, were on the Ehrlichman staff.

During a 90-minute telephone interview, Miss Chenow also became the first person associated with the White House to confirm that a special team of officials there—the so-called "Plumbers"—was assigned to investigate government leaks to the news media.

Miss Chenow said that the team consisted of at least Young, Liddy, Hunt and Egil Krogh, another aide to Ehrlichman—and that they referred to themselves as "The Plumbers." She said that Young, for whom she worked as a personal secretary, made regular reports on the team's investigations to Ehrlichman. Young has declined to answer phone calls for a reporter.

Asked about the special telephone, Miss Chenow said:

"That was Mr. Hunt's phone. It was put in for me to answer and take messages for him." The phone rang "an average of once a week, sometimes two or three times a week," said Miss Chenow, and the caller usually identified himself as Bernard Barker.

"Mr. Barker always called that phone; he was about the only one who ever called," added Miss Chenow. She was among the witnesses who testified before the grand jury that indicted Barker, Hunt, Liddy and four other men on charges of conspiring to bug the Democratic headquarters

at the Watergate.

Referring to outgoing calls by Hunt, Miss Chenow said, "I remember him calling Mr. Barker and his (Barker's) wife—nobody else." Hunt and Barker appeared to be good friends, she added, because they "were always chummy" on the phone, with Hunt often saying "How are you?, What you been up to?"

On occasion, said Miss Chenow, Liddy "might have used the phone to talk to somebody Hunt had placed a call to."

After the bills for the phone service were mailed to her home, Miss Chenow continued, she sent them "to John Campbell of the Domestic Council staff . . . so the White House would pay them. Apparently it had been arranged."

Asked who made the arrangements for installing the telephone and the billing procedure, she said: "Mr. Hunt, Mr. Young and Mr. Liddy. They had talked to Mr. Campbell and he would take care of it."

Campbell, 28, is a member of the Domestic Council staff headed by Ehrlichman. While House staff members say he functions as an office manager for Ehrlichman.

Jack Harrington, the C&P White House marketing representative, confirmed the existence of the telephone and said: "I can't understand why they did it . . . I've never heard of such an installation before."

According to Miss Chenow, neither she nor Young—who is a member of Dr. Henry Kissinger's National Security Council staff—had any idea that Hunt or Liddy might have been involved in undercover political operations; but after the Watergate bugging Young "put two and two together," she said.

During the period that she worked with Hunt and Liddy, Miss Chenow said, there were occasional visits and calls on standard White House telephones to either or both of the men from other Nixon administration officials.

Among them, she said, were Robert C. Mardian, then assistant attorney general in charge of internal security and later political coordinator of the Nixon campaign (Mardian reportedly directed the destruction of important records and documents after the Watergate break-in); Jeb Stuart Magruder, at the time acting manager of the President's re-election campaign and one of several persons who withdrew large sums of

campaign money from a fund allegedly used to finance political spying and disruptions.

Also: Robert C. Odle, a former White House aide and Magruder's assistant at the Committee for the Re-election of the President (Odle allegedly participated in the destruction of records); and Charles W. Colson, special counsel to President Nixon and the man on whose recommendation Hunt was hired by the White House.

In addition, former Attorney General John N. Mitchell talked by phone with Young, said Miss Chenow, adding: "I don't know what about; I didn't know how often."

Miss Chenow said she had no idea of the purpose of the visits and calls by those persons and that at no time was there any suggestion that they involved anything sinister.

The former White House secretary, who now lives in Milwaukee, also said that:

"Many of the telephone conversations between Hunt, a former CIA operative, and Barker, a Cuban refugee with extensive CIA contacts, were conducted in Spanish—which Miss Chenow does not understand."

"Colson's secretary often typed for Hunt and on one occasion Miss Chenow typed a memo from Hunt to Colson—the contents of which she cannot remember. ('I couldn't be sure if he worked with Colson but I knew they were good friends,' Miss Chenow said. . . . Mr. Hunt once said his family was going to the Colsons for dinner (and) he would say, 'I have a meeting with Mr. Colson at such-and-such a time'.")

On at least two occasions, Mardian—who has denied association with the operation known as "The Plumbers"—visited Hunt, Liddy and Young in their basement office in the Executive Office Building. Mardian also attended a meeting with Hunt, Young and several others in Krogh's office during the period when government leaks to the news media were being investigated, Miss Chenow said.

She was tracked down in England shortly after the Watergate bugging by a member of the staff of presidential counsel John Dean and asked to accompany him back to Washington to be interviewed by Dean and the FBI.

Dean, who the White House has said conducted an investigation of the Watergate

case for President Nixon, never questioned her. Instead, he listened without taking notes while two FBI agents interviewed her in the presence of Young and another White House aide.

The day before she appeared before the grand jury, Assistant U.S. Attorney Earl J. Silbert questioned her extensively about Colson and asked her at one point "if I thought Colson was involved" in the hugging and how closely Mr. Hunt worked with Mr. Colson—if he did." She said she knew nothing about the hugging, in which Colson has denied involvement or knowledge.

Liddy, following his departure from the White House in December, 1971, to become counsel to the Nixon re-election committee, would return to the White House about once a week "to visit."

Concerning the team of "Plumbers" assigned to investigate news media leaks, Miss Chenow said: "For a while they were studying State Department leaks. They checked embassy cables and tried to put two and two together about whose desks the cables went across."

The original project dealing with the Pentagon Papers entailed determining if accounts of their contents, as written by the New York Times, were consistent with what the actual documents stated, Miss Chenow said. Soon, however, "they were looking for leaks . . . to determine how the Pentagon Papers got out."

In addition to looking for leaks on the Pentagon Papers, she said, "The Plumbers" also attempted to determine how syndicated columnist Jack Anderson had obtained confidential White House memos on administration policy related to the Indo-Pakistani war.

Miss Chenow, who left the White House in March to travel extensively in Europe, described the origin of the term "Plumbers" this way:

"David Young's mother-in-law or grandmother or somebody saw in The New York Times that Krogh and Young were working on leaks. She called it to his attention, saying, 'Your grandfather would be proud of you, working on leaks at the White House. He was a plumber.' So David put up a sign on the door that said, 'Plumber: Mr. Young.'"

WASHINGTON POST
13 December 1972

Executive Phone Used to Hunt 'Leaks'

By Carl Bernstein
and Bob Woodward
Washington Post Staff Writers

A special White House telephone, reportedly used for numerous conversations between two defendants in the Watergate bugging case, was actually installed for use by Nixon administration officials investigating leaks to the news media, according to presidential press secretary Ronald L. Ziegler.

In making the first White House acknowledgement that such an investigation took place, Ziegler said the special telephone was installed to permit confidential "information to flow freely to those involved" in tracking down the source of news leaks in late 1971.

According to a former White House personal secretary, the private, nongovernment telephone line was used almost exclusively for conversations between former White House consultant E. Howard Hunt Jr. and Bernard L. Barker, both of whom have been indicted in the break-in and alleged bugging attempt at Democratic National Headquarters at the Watergate here.

The secretary, Kathleen Chenow, told The Washington Post in an interview last week that Hunt was among a group of self-labeled "plumbers" who investigated news leaks to the media, but said the special telephone appeared unrelated to those duties.

Ziegler was questioned by reporters yesterday about the Chenow interview, particularly her statements that bills for the special telephone were sent to her home in Alexandria and that she then submitted them to the office of John Ehrlichman for payment by

the White House. Ehrlichman is President Nixon's principal adviser for domestic affairs.

Asked who paid the bills for the telephone, Ziegler said yesterday, "I don't know." He confirmed Miss Chenow's report that Ehrlichman supervised the work of "The Plumbers", but insisted that Ehrlichman knew nothing about the special telephone.

According to Miss Chenow, the special White House team investigating news leaks was headed by Egil (Bud) Krogh, an assistant to Ehrlichman, who has been nominated to be under secretary of Transportation; David Young, a member of the National Security Council staff; Hunt, and G. Gordon Liddy, who also was indicted in the Watergate case.

Miss Chenow worked in a basement office in the Executive Office Building shared by Hunt, Liddy and Young during 1971 and early 1972.

Ziegler said yesterday that "to the best of my knowledge," Liddy was not assigned to work on the project. When asked if Hunt worked on it, he responded, "I don't believe so, no."

Miss Chenow told The Post that the investigation of administration leaks to the news media focused on how The New York Times obtained the Pentagon Papers and the source of National Security Council documents quoted by columnist Jack Anderson.

Asked if "The Plumbers" had identified the sources of the leaks, Ziegler said "pretty much so," but declined to answer whether any individuals were disciplined or fired as a result.

In a 90-minute telephone interview last Thursday, Miss Chenow said arrangements for

the installation of the special telephone and billing it to her home were made by Hunt, Liddy, Young and John Campbell, an assistant in Ehrlichman's office.

Asked why the phone was listed in her name at her Alexandria address, Miss Chenow said, "That's a good question; they apparently wanted it in my name because they didn't want any ties with the White House—for what reason I don't know."

She added, "That was Mr. Hunt's phone. It was put in for me to answer and take messages for him."

The phone rang "an average of once a week, sometimes two or three times a week," she said, and the caller usually identified himself as Bernard Barker. "He was about the only one who ever called," Miss Chenow said, and Hunt was the only person to make outgoing calls.

Ziegler said yesterday that it "would be folly" to associate use of the telephone with the alleged bugging of Democratic headquarters last May and June, because the special phone line was in use only from August, 1971 to March, 1972.

According to the C&P Telephone Co. official in charge of White House service for the past 25 years, the phone installed in Miss Chenow's name was the first in his experience to be billed to the home of a White House employee.

Ziegler said yesterday that "this has been a situation that has existed in the past; there have been private phone extensions."

Meanwhile, there was no exact explanation yesterday of why the wife of one of the Watergate bugging defendants

was carrying \$10,000 in cash when she was killed in the United Airlines crash in Chicago on Friday.

The \$10,000 in \$100 bills was found in the purse of Dorothy Hunt, according to Chicago police.

In a New Times interview, Hunt was quoted yesterday as saying that the money was for a "business investment" which he called "confidential." The investment purportedly involved Mrs. Harold C. Carlstead and her husband, who is an accountant with investments in the motel business near Chicago. Mrs. Carlstead was identified as a cousin of Mrs. Hunt.

A source in the FBI said yesterday that the bureau was investigating the source of the \$10,000 to determine whether it is related to the Watergate case.

Chicago police authorities say that the \$100 bills found in Mrs. Hunt's purse do not appear to be part of a withdrawal of \$100 bills made from a Miami bank last April by Barker, one of the seven Watergate suspects.

The authorities said this was because the money found in Mrs. Hunt's purse was old and none of the bills had sequential serial numbers, while the \$100 bills traced to the Watergate suspects were new and numbered in sequence.

When five of Hunt's co-defendants were arrested inside Democratic headquarters on June 17, \$5,300 in \$100 bills was found on their persons or in their hotel rooms.

THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS
Washington, D. C., Tuesday, December 12, 1972

New Watergate Dimension?

By THOMAS B. ROSS
Chicago Sun-Times Service

A fake passport, produced by the Central Intelligence Agency for former White House consultant E. Howard Hunt Jr., was being carried by one of the suspects at the time of the Watergate break-in, investigators have disclosed.

The passport, made out in the name of "Edward Hamilton" — the same initials as

Hunt's — reportedly was found on Frank Sturgis when he was arrested at Democratic National Committee headquarters in June.

The disclosure of the passport yesterday added a dimension to the case: The possibility that current CIA employees were involved in political espionage. The CIA has repeatedly assured Congress that its fake documents are kept under tight control.

Hunt and several of the oth-

ers under indictment have acknowledged they once worked for the CIA, but have asserted they were no longer in its employ at the time of the Watergate incident.

Hunt's wife was killed in the United Air Lines crash in Chicago on Friday. Her purse was found to contain more than \$10,000 in cash. Police reported that one of the bills bore the written inscription: "Good Luck, FG" — the same initials as Sturgis'.

Sturgis has never been iden-

tified as a direct employee of the CIA, but was known to have had extensive agency contacts in Miami. An ex-Marine, he fought with Fidel Castro in Cuba and was rewarded with the gambling casino concession in Havana after Castro won.

But the two men had an early falling out, and Sturgis went over to the Cuban exile community in Miami. He was once arrested on a boat off British Honduras in what he described as an attempted "commando

raid" on Cuba.

A soldier of fortune, he is believed to have used several pseudonyms besides that of Edward Hamilton. He was born Frank Fiorini in Norfolk, Va., but adopted the name of his stepfather.

Hunt was hired as a White House consultant by Charles W. Colson, special counsel to President Nixon. He openly

declares in his Who's Who listing that he has operated under a number of pseudonyms — Robert Dietrich, John Baxter and Gordon Davis.

The federal indictment charges that Hunt was present on the night of the Watergate break-in, but left before the police arrived and apprehended the five persons inside the Democratic headquarters. He

was linked to the case through a \$25,000 cash fund, a campaign contribution to the Committee for the Re-election of the President.

Investigators said the fake passport and the possible CIA role in the break-in would probably be explored at the trial scheduled to begin next month.

The CIA is prohibited by law

from conducting any operations within the United States and, of course, is proscribed from taking part in domestic politics. It is known, however, to have been involved with the Cuban community and with other anti-Communist exile groups in U.S. cities.

The investigators said they did not have a plausible theory as to why Mrs. Hunt was carrying so much cash.

WASHINGTON POST
5 December 1972

Judge Asks Broader 'Bug' Trial

By Lawrence Meyer
Washington Post Staff Writer

The judge who will preside at the trial of seven men charged in connection with the break-in and alleged bugging of Democratic headquarters at the Watergate said yesterday that the trial should cover a broader area than the narrow limits the prosecution has indicated it will cover.

"This jury is going to want to know what did these men go into that headquarters for?" Chief U.S. District Court Judge John J. Sirica said. "Was their sole purpose political espionage? Were they paid? Was there financial gain? Who hired them? Who started this?"

The comments by Sirica during a four-hour pretrial conference were the first indication that the trial may explore whether the seven men charged were operating on orders from higher authorities when they allegedly conspired to break in and bug the Democratic National Committee's Watergate headquarters June 17.

In the course of the white-ranging conference, lawyers also argued that:

• Sirica exercise some "control" over the press in order to prevent prejudicing the jury. Whittam O. Bittman, lawyer for former White House aide E. Howard Hunt Jr., told Sirica that the press "has had a field day writing prejudicial articles. I think it should come to a halt and your honor has a right to stop it." Sirica indicated, over defense objections, that he would deal with the

problem of trial publicity by sequestering the jury.

• The Los Angeles Times should be compelled, under the threat of contempt of court proceedings, to produce tapes and notes of an interview with Alfred C. Baldwin III, described by the defense as the government's key witness, Sirica, who made no ruling, indicated that a contempt citation was possible if the paper or its employees refused a court order to produce the materials.

According to federal investigators, the June 17 break-in was one incident in a year-long campaign to spy on and disrupt Democratic presidential campaigns on behalf of President Nixon's re-election. Besides Hunt, one other former White House aide, G. Gordon Liddy, is charged in connection with the alleged Watergate bugging. Liddy was counsel for the Finance Committee to Re-elect the President, until he was fired after refusing to answer the questions of FBI agents investigating the incident. James W. McCord Jr., security director of the President's re-election committee at the time of the alleged incident, also has been charged in the indictment with Hunt and Liddy and four others.

During the hearing yesterday, Sirica asked Earl J. Silbert, principal assistant U.S. attorney, if the government will present testimony concerning a \$25,000 check and another \$89,000 that turned up in the bank account of Bernard L. Barker, one of the seven defendants.

Silbert said the government will offer evidence on the \$25,000 check and will also trace the \$89,000, "not necessarily from its source, but part of its way."

To trace the \$89,000 fully, Silbert said, would require calling an alien to testify. The \$89,000, according to federal

investigators, originated in the bank account of a Texas corporation, went to Mexico and wound up in the form of four cashier's checks in Barker's Florida bank account.

The \$25,000 check that Silbert referred to is believed to represent a \$25,000 cash contribution made by Dwayne Andreas, a Minnesota investor, who gave the money last April to Kenneth Dahlberg, Midwest Republican finance chief. Dahlberg subsequently converted the money to a cashier's check and gave it to Maurice Stans, chief national fund raiser for the President. The check later also turned up in Barker's Florida bank account.

Silbert said there will be "some evidence" concerning these funds. Sirica asked if Silbert would show the motive and intent of the evidence. Silbert said he will present testimony "from which the jury may draw a variety of motives." Silbert said that circumstantial evidence will show a "prior association" by the defendants.

Although Bittman objected that testimony about the money should not be permitted since the indictment makes no mention of it, Sirica said that "on the question of motive and intent, the government should be allowed considerable latitude."

Later in the hearing, Pittman and other defense lawyers asked Sirica to reconsider his earlier announced decision to sequester the jury. Lawyers for both sides offered estimates that the trial could take from six weeks to three months. Defense lawyers argued that the defendants would be blamed by the jury for sequestration.

Bittman argued that there is "no other reason" for sequestering the jury if the "press will exercise some restraint in this case."

Silbert responded that under "the First Amendment and the right of a free press,

there is no way that the press can be restricted. . . . You can't ask the press not to print certain materials."

In October, Sirica issued a broad order drafted by Bittman and Silbert that severely restricted out-of-court statements by anyone associated with the trial. The order was criticized as too broad and too vague and Sirica relaxed it. Sirica yesterday said he would tell the jury that they were being sequestered on his own motion and he denied defense requests to simply instruct the jury not to read newspapers or watch television.

During a recess, Bittman told a reporter that he wanted Sirica to control the conduct of reporters in the courtroom. In addition, Bittman said, he wanted news stories about the trial limited to the evidence the jury actually hears. "Testimony out of the presence of the jury shouldn't be reported," Bittman said. With Sirica maintaining that the jury will be sequestered, however, Bittman said the whole question is "moot."

Sirica announced yesterday that he is making arrangements with U.S. Marshal Anthony Papa for accommodating the press.

Bittman also asked that Sirica immediately order The Los Angeles Times to turn over the tapes and notes of its interview with Baldwin, who has described himself as the man who monitored telephone calls coming in and going out of the Democratic headquarters. Bittman said that if the Times refused to produce the materials after the trial had started, appeals could delay the trial indefinitely.

Sirica asked both government and defense lawyers to present him briefs before he rules on a subpoena of the materials. Sirica said he was not threatening to hold anyone in contempt but he told a reporter that a contempt citation was possible if the Times resists a court order.

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
30 November 1972

Ellsberg Pins a Plot on Watergate Figure

By THEO WILSON
- Staff Correspondent of THE NEWS

Los Angeles, Nov. 29—A former CIA agent, arrested during the burglary-bugging attempt at Democratic headquarters at the Watergate complex in Washington also plotted to attack and "defame" Daniel Ellsberg at a public rally in Washington, defense attorneys at the Pentagon Papers trial here charged.

At a court hearing tomorrow, they will ask the trial judge to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine



Bernard Barker

whether the former agent, Bernard Barker, was working under government orders at so, to dismiss the time and if the conspiracy-espionage indictment against Ellsberg and co-defendant Anthony Russo Jr. The defense has also moved to dismiss the indictment "because of gross misconduct by the vice president of the United States" who made "highly prejudicial and inflammatory comments concerning the motives, the guilt and the patriotism of the defendant."

This was a reference to Spiro Agnew's remarks on a national

WASHINGTON STAR
11 December 1972

Police Holding \$10,000 Found On Mrs. Hunt

New York Times News Service

CHICAGO — The \$10,000 in cash found in the purse of the dead wife of one of the main figures in the Watergate case has been placed in the evidence section vault of the Chicago police. The police referred all questions about the money to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which declined to comment.

The police said they had found the money, a packet of \$100 bills, as they searched the wreckage of a United Air Lines jet in which 45 persons were killed Friday when it crashed into four houses in a Southwest residential neighborhood.

Police said the money belonged to Mrs. Dorothy Hunt, the wife of E. Howard Hunt, one of the seven men indicted in connection with the break-in and alleged attempt to bug Democratic National Committee headquarters in Washington last June. Mrs. Hunt was

television program, when he intimated that he saw no difference between the Watergate affair and the Pentagon Papers case.

Ellsberg's chief attorney, Leonard Boudin, said in his papers that "the strong inference exists from the facts now available that the responsibility for the said conspiracy and prejudice rests with the government."

New Jury Asked

U.S. District Court Judge Matt Byrne Jr. has scheduled argument tomorrow on a defense motion for a mistrial and for the swearing in of a new jury.

The defense lawyers contend that while the trial was delayed pending litigation over a government wiretap, the jurors could not avoid becoming prejudiced, since they were in recess during the political campaign. The lawyers said that the Vietnam war was an issue and the jurors had to become involved in the political debate over it.

They also noted that a new jury

among those killed in the crash.

Hunt, a former White House consultant, onetime Central Intelligence Agency operative and a prolific author of spy novels, flew here Friday night, but returned to Washington on Saturday.

Hunt, interviewed at his Potomac, Md., home, said the money was intended for a business investment which "had been under discussion for a long period of time."

"I've been unemployed for six months now," he said. "I have to look for work after the resolution of the so-called Watergate case. I have to find a way of providing for my family and my children."

He said his wife was taking the money to Chicago to be delivered to Harold C. Carlstead, a certified public accountant who has substantial investments in motels in that area, because "I have to get a court order" to leave the Washington area.

Carlstead was identified by United Press International as a cousin of Mrs. Hunt. UPI also quoted deputy Chicago Coroner Kyran Phelan as saying the cash, like other personal effects of those killed in the crash, would normally be turned over by police to the coroner's office, which would then release the effects to sur-

now could include persons in the 18-to-20-year-old group. When the present jury was sworn, this age group had not yet been included in federal panels.

Opposing the motion for mis-

trial and dismissal of the indictment, the government has contended that the jurors were under orders during the recess not to discuss or read about the case, and that selection of a new jury would create unnecessary delay and expense.

Judge Byrne has called the 12 regular and six alternate jurors to his court on Friday, when he is expected to question them about their ability to continue to serve.

He has set Dec. 6 as the tentative date for resuming the trial, with opening statements to the jury by Assistant U.S. Attorney David Nissen.

WASHINGTON POST
13 December 1972

Mrs. Hunt

The wife of one of the Watergate bugging suspects purchased more than \$200,000 in accident insurance before she boarded a United Airlines flight that crashed in Chicago last Friday, killing her and 44 others, according to an airline insurance official.

A spokesman for Tele-Trip company, a subsidiary of Mutual of Omaha, confirmed yesterday that Dorothy Hunt, wife of E. Howard Hunt Jr., a former CIA agent and one of seven persons indicted in the Watergate bugging case, took out an insurance policy for an amount between \$200,000 and \$250,000.

Both the Tele-Trip spokesman and William O. Buttman, Hunt's attorney in the Water-

gate case, declined yesterday to identify the beneficiaries of the policies.

According to the Tele-Trip spokesman, \$250,000 is the maximum amount of accident insurance that can be sold over the counter. However, he went on to say, "It is not all unusual for the traveler to take out the maximum coverage."

The spokesman said Mrs. Hunt was one of six passengers on the United jetliner who took out accident insurance. He said that as of yesterday, the amount taken out by the six totaled \$495,000. "But," he added, "it is not uncommon that more policies will turn up as some of the travelers may have bought policies that haven't reached us yet."

Such orders are routine, a safety board spokesman said.

WASHINGTON STAR
12 December 1972

Defenses Pushes For Subpoena in Watergate Case

The defense in the Watergate bugging and break-in case is pressing its attempt to subpoena from The Los Angeles Times records of an interview with an admitted participant in the incident.

In papers filed yesterday in U.S. District Court here, an attorney for defendant E. Howard Hunt Jr. claims that the newspaper has the only known records of an interview two of its reporters had with Alfred C. Baldwin, an ex-FBI agent who is expected to testify for the government at the trial, and that a recent Supreme Court ruling requiring newsmen to testify before grand juries makes it clear that the newspaper must produce the records.

Bought Big Policy

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BLITZ, Bombay (Communist)
25 November 1972

CIA & drug traffic in South-East Asia

Farewell to the American dream

By BOMAN H. MEHTA

FORTY YEARS AGO, the students in Berlin shrieked: "We spit on freedom". That attitude of mind of the German nation enabled Adolf Hitler to bamboozle the electorate and seize power.

In 1972, another facet of the diseased human mind led Mrs. Patricia Nixon and her hen-witted daughter, Julie Eisenhower, to proclaim in defence of Richard Nixon's Vietnam policy that they were willing to immolate themselves on behalf of the Saigon stooge, Thieu.

THAT EXPLAINS TO A CERTAIN EXTENT WHY THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE BROUGHT ABOUT A LANDSLIDE VICTORY FOR RICHARD NIXON, THE MOST CONTUMELIOUS, THE MOST UNLOVED FIGURE IN AMERICAN POLITICS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY.

BLACK RECORD

Richard Nixon's re-election as President of the US proves complete erosion of moral values in American society. What has been the record of this man as President of the US in the last four years?

Notwithstanding the pantomime ministry of Dr. Kissinger's secret negotiations with Hanoi, Nixon has intensified the Vietnam War. He has devastated North and South Vietnam with fifteen million tons of bombs and a million Asians dead. And one is inclined to agree with I.F. Stone, the celebrated American columnist, that the Vietnam War may go on until 1976.

Richard Nixon has lowered the respect for the United States Supreme Court by appointing non-entities ready to carry out their master's will.

He has bullied the national press into subservience and with his secret electoral funds of £45 million, provided by the military-industrial complex, bought television to portray him every night as a man of peace blacking his way to Peking and Moscow.

He has employed electronic devices to spy on his political opponents. The list can go on.

One would have thought that this repulsive record was enough for any decent man to renounce Nixon in disgust. However, the American ballot box turned out

Two tons of opium and morphine were seized aboard a junk in Hong Kong harbour. This was the second biggest seizure. The two-million-dollar worth of contraband narcotics is part of the CIA-masterminded drug traffic to South-East Asian countries to lull them into submission to the American will.

to be another idiot box. And the most affluent society in the world showed itself as the most sick society. Consequently one must say farewell not only to the American Dream but to freedom at large.

SICK SOCIETY

To advance my thesis I must turn to The New York Review of Books of 21 September, 1972, the sea-mail copy which has just arrived in Bombay. Before doing so I may be permitted a pertinent aside.

In the midst of all this, the "White Russians" of Indian society are up in arms as their originals were trying to attack and dislodge Lenin. The Indira Government is subjected to the most vicious attacks from the desh "White Russians." They seem to forget that drought is not an Indian phenomenon only. It prevails in the Soviet Union and in Maoist China as well as in India. It has compelled Russia and China to buy American wheat worth billions of dollars in hard cash.

Drought is not the only Indian calamity. Corruption at all levels in our society has brought about a state of affairs which can only end in chaos. We are a corrupt and degraded lot. There is no doubt about it. But who is there in our country today to replace Indira Gandhi?

The alternative to her seems to be chaos and not revolution. For revolution we require character and integrity. Alas, we cannot boast of these characteristics and we witness the dismal spectacle of politicians who blatantly defend

POLITICS OF HEROIN

It is in this connection I give below a summary of the account which has appeared in The New York Review of Books of 21 September 1972. A book entitled The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia by Alfred W. McCoy was to be published by the well-known publishers, Harper & Row.

On June 1, 1972, Cord Meyer, a CIA official, visited the New York office of Harper & Row and requested the management to provide him with a copy of the galley-proofs of McCoy's forthcoming book.

THE REASON WAS THAT IN THIS BOOK MR. MCCOY WAS SHOWING THE COMPLICITY OF THE CIA AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT IN ORGANISING SOUTHEAST ASIAN DRUG TRAFFIC SINCE 1950.

At this very time the author, Alfred McCoy, was testifying before the Senate Appropriations Committee his findings, into the Southeast Asian drug traffic. McCoy's researches included during 18 months of study more than 250 interviews with heroin dealers, police officials and intelligence agents in Europe and Asia.

It was Cord Meyer's contention that Mr. McCoy's book would be full of inaccuracies. It would embarrass the United States government and perhaps involve the publishers in libel suits. (As a CIA official, Cord Meyer had been in the past in charge of providing financial subsidies to organisations such as the National Students' Association, Encounter magazine, and the Congress for Cultural Freedom.)

CIA CENSORSHIP

The publishers got in touch with the author and informed him that they had decided to let the CIA if I mistake not, this is the first examine the galley-proofs. The occasion in a democratic country reasons given by the publishers, where an intelligence agency has not hesitated to exploit its authority and power and attempted to exercise censorship. Further comment is unnecessary.

(1) If the CIA was given an opportunity to read the galley-proofs they would find for themselves that national security was in no way endangered and consequently the CIA would not seek court injunction to prevent the publication of the book.

(2) As responsible publishers they felt that they had the right to show the book to any reputable critic for comment prior to publication.

The immediate reaction of the author was to object most strongly to the proposal. According to him, such a procedure would set a dangerous pre-

tutional guarantee of the freedom of the press.

Further, he was aware of the unscrupulous methods of the CIA in Southeast Asia and he was apprehensive that it would coerce his sources to retract their statements about the United States' complicity in the international drug traffic. This may compel the publishers to withdraw the book from publication.

However, Harper & Row remained adamant. Either the author agree to let the CIA examine his book or the book would not be published. Urgency in the exposure of the US's complicity was what weighed with the author as he could not find another publisher who could publish the book before the US presidential elections. Alfred McCoy capitulated to the demand of the publishers.

The triangular correspondence which ensued, and was published verbatim in The New York Review of Books, between the CIA, Harper & Row and the author, makes it evident that the CIA was unable to rebut McCoy's analysis of the sinister role it had played for almost a quarter of a century in the international drug traffic. I suppose it knew that it could not do so, and therefore, tried to frighten the publishers and attempted to impose censorship to avoid a public scrutiny of the book.

One is alarmed at the stand taken by Harper & Row and it indicates the dangerous trends taking place in American society. However after the CIA had sent its comments on the galley-proofs of McCoy's book, the publishers had the spunk not only to rebut them but to go ahead with the publication of the book.

Cord Meyer's threats boomeranged on the CIA itself. He should confine his activities to financing secretly the Congress for Cultural Freedom with its offshoots throughout the world. They had decided to let the CIA if I mistake not, this is the first examine the galley-proofs. The occasion in a democratic country reasons given by the publishers, where an intelligence agency has not hesitated to exploit its authority and power and attempted to exercise censorship. Further comment is unnecessary.

GENERAL

THE OBSERVER, London
26 November 1972

WHAT IS TERRORISM?

While the UN wrangles over how to deal with international violence,

CAN ANYTHING be done to curb international terrorism, or must we accept that it will simply continue to grow—and, if so, where can we expect it to end? These are the kinds of questions now being debated at the United Nations over a proposed convention to outlaw international terrorism.

Acts of terror by individuals, groups and States are, of course, as old as history. Between 1870 and 1914 assassinations included Tsar Alexander III of Russia, President Carnot of France, President McKinley of the United States, the Empress of Austria, and the King of Italy. Terrorists bombed the French National Assembly, blew up workers in a Paris cafe, and dropped bombs on peaceful religious demonstrations in Italy. The assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand finally brought on the First World War.

But the flare-up of international violence on the scale we are witnessing today is far more dangerous than anything that has gone before: because, thanks to modern technology, sophisticated weapons in the hands of both Governments and protesting groups pose a much greater threat to international law and peace.

It was left to Russia's delegate to warn the UN last week that the terrorists of the future might use bacteriological weapons, or even stolen atomic weapons, to blackmail Governments.

No air traveller is secure from attacks by politically motivated, or paranoiac, or simply criminal individuals; no letter can be opened in safety; diplomats can no longer go about their business without fear of being kidnapped or of losing their lives; nobody can be sure he is not a potential hostage; no international gathering, like the Olympic Games, is free from threats of violence.

Nor are the possible victims

restricted to any particular national or political group: 27 diplomats from 11 countries have been kidnapped (Arabs as well as Israelis are among the number), and three have been killed in the last five years; planes have been hijacked from Mexico,

Turkey, Czechoslovakia, Russia and Japan, as well as from the US; parcel-bomb victims have died or been wounded in Tanzania, Libya, Egypt as well as in Britain and Israel; letter-bombs travel in all directions from many parts of the world.

The controversial questions are: How can we hope to deal effectively with this kind of violence? How can we do so without running the risk of perpetuating existing grievances? How can we hope to get agreement over what constitutes terrorism?

To take this latter question first: do all acts of violence qualify as terrorism and, if not, where does legitimate force (i.e., violence) end and illegitimate force (i.e., terrorism) begin?

The South Africans, the Portuguese and, to some extent, the British support UN action against 'terrorism' on the grounds that everybody who engages in armed struggle are terrorists; the Israelis argue that all the armed Palestinians are terrorists yet, at the same time, offer aid to liberation movements in Southern Africa.

Many people (including myself) believe that the liberation movements in Southern Africa and in Portuguese Africa are legitimate forms of political struggle, and that the Palestinians have the right to take up arms so long as they attack military objectives to persuade the Israelis to negotiate directly with them instead of insisting on dealing only with Arab Governments supposedly acting

on their behalf.

But even those who support the cause of *Fatah* would regard its more extreme wings, such as Black September or the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), as terrorists. And in the case of Northern Ireland many who support the Catholic minority's right to fight for justice regard the Provisional IRA as terrorists.

The cynical view is that violence is justified when it is used by people or movements whose objectives one shares, and that the violence of those of whom one disapproves is terrorism. There is truth in this view, but it should nevertheless be possible to define terrorism more objectively.

The draft convention now before the UN, which is proposed by the US, does not seek international co-operation in defence of any particular State that happens to find itself challenged by internal forces. Its aim is restricted to the containment of violence within the narrowest feasible territorial limits, by curbing the spread of violence to countries not initially parties to it from areas involved in civil or international conflict, or internal disturbances. This, of course, is a traditional function of international law.

The kind of acts it seeks to limit involve unlawful killing, serious bodily harm, kidnapping or hijacking, and the protection of innocent people not themselves involved in a particular struggle.

These proposals would not curb the liberation movements in Southern Africa or the Portuguese territories; but they could affect the armed Palestinians, since the rationale of their struggle is that, deprived of their homeland, they have no other alternative than to operate within the international arena.

There are, at least, two crucial tests in deciding what should be acceptable to the international community. First, do the conditions that exist in any particular country offer any chance of redressing serious wrongs by other than violent means? Second, does a movement which embraces the need for violent opposition deliberately encourage indiscriminate killing or harming of innocent people?

Clearly no constitutional means exist for peaceful change in countries such as South Africa, Namibia, Rhodesia, the Portuguese colonies, or in Communist countries.

It is possible to argue, however, that in Northern Ireland constitutional change has always been possible through non-violent methods—as was originally envisaged by the civil rights movements. Even if one admits that the violence injected into the struggle by the Provisionals would have helped to speed up the pace of change, there are good reasons for rejecting their resorting to indiscriminate killing (blowing up people in pubs and shops), or such acts as the shooting of a father in front of his family.

The problem of the Palestinians is more difficult to define clearly because of the involvement of the Arab world in the conflict with Israel. Palestinians themselves are divided—not over their primary objective of securing a Palestinian State—but about the frontiers of such a State and about the kind of methods to be used in their struggle.

Yet even in those cases where the use of force can be legally and morally justified, there are some methods that should not be tolerated. The legitimacy of a cause does not in itself legitimise the use of

certain forms of violence, especially against the innocent.

But who are the innocents? This is a question that goes to the root of much of the present controversy.

'Il n'y a pas d'innocents,' exclaimed the French intellectual, Emile Henry, when accused in 1894 of blowing up innocent Parisians in the Café Terminus near the Gare Saint-Lazare. Anarchists, he explained, do not spare bourgeois women and children because the women and children of those they love are not spared either by the bourgeois, who allow them to die in slums.

The PFLP and their affiliate Japanese group, *Seikigun ha*, defended their indiscriminate shooting of passengers at Lod Airport by claiming that all visitors to Israel are accomplices of 'the Zionists.' Black September regards all 'Zionist Jews' as equally guilty of the 'crimes of Israel'—and so justifies attacks on prominent Jews in all parts of the world.

Some would argue that all whites in South Africa, Namibia and Rhodesia are guilty participants in the system of apartheid; yet this view is specifically rejected by all the liberation movements in Southern Africa. The anti-Portuguese guerrilla movements (after an initial phase of terrorism in Angola) now conscientiously insist on treating all Portuguese not actively engaged in military or official positions as themselves victims of their own oppressive regime.

These clear-cut differences of attitude suggest a line that can be drawn between what is legitimate and what is not: groups that try to justify indiscriminate violence by insisting that entire national groups or communities are equally guilty should be regarded as putting themselves beyond what is acceptable in international law.

What view should we take of the growing practice of taking hostages as a means of exerting pressure?

A clear distinction can be made between a hostage who is himself an agent of a particular regime, and a person who is wholly innocent but who happens to be 'a soft target'—one who can easily be kidnapped and whose Government, not being directly involved in the struggle, might be more willing to help the kidnappers to win some concession.

The difficult problem one faces here is what to expect, or demand, of Governments when faced with the choice of whether to submit to the kidnappers' demands, or to allow their innocent citizens to be

The Israeli view is that only if Governments refuse to submit to this kind of blackmail can the practice of holding innocent hostages be checked.

But the immediate practical question is whether Governments of countries which are not themselves involved in a warlike situation (as the Israelis are), can count on their own public supporting them if they allow their own innocent citizens to be killed rather than to submit to demands which do not immediately affect their own national interests.

The British, for example, faced this choice over the release of Leila Khaled when the alternative would have been the blowing-up of a plane-load of British hostages held on an airfield in Jordan; and the Germans had to decide between releasing Black September prisoners held, after the Munich massacre or losing German lives.

There have been only three cases of Governments refusing to bargain: when Sir Geoffrey Jackson, the British Ambassador to Uruguay, was held by the Tupamaros; when Mr Trudeau refused to negotiate for the release of a Minister, Mr Laporte, who was subsequently executed; and when the Turks refused to negotiate with local revolutionaries who had kidnapped an Israeli diplomat.

Mr Trudeau's inflexible stand did put a stop to a new trend in the growth of the violent Quebecois movement. Only in the Canadian example did the kidnapping involve a local hostage held by a local group trying to extract a local political reward.

In practice, one must accept that Governments not directly involved in a conflict will prefer to give way. Here one comes up against a clear conflict of national interest, which favours the exploitation of kidnapping 'third party' hostages.

Only when enough Governments share a community of national interests are we likely to achieve concerted international action in dealing firmly with certain aspects of terrorism. We seem now to be approaching this position over the scandal of the hijacking of planes and the use of their crews and passengers as hostages.

This year alone, 140 passengers and crew members were killed and 99 wounded in terrorist attacks involving 30 aircraft from 14 countries.

But so long as there is a single country willing to give asylum to hijackers it will be impossible to check this practice altogether. However, the

by ordinary criminals or mentally unbalanced individuals as well as by politically motivated groups has brought hijacking into disrepute.

Most nations are now ready to subscribe to the Montreal Convention outlawing hijacking and to consider imposing sanctions on Governments that refuse to do so. Even Cuba—the most favoured haven of hijackers—is now ready to discuss the problem with the US. Algeria, too, is now less willing to grant asylum to hijackers. Only Colonel Qadhafi's Libya remains adamant.

The real test for effective international action over hijacking is therefore likely to come over a confrontation with the Libyans; but in their case the problem of applying sanctions is not so easy since, unlike countries like Cuba, the oil-rich Libyans are in a strong position to damage the interests of a number of Western countries if they were to join in blacking the Libyan Airline.

Turning to another major question: how can we justify action designed to deny the use of the terrorist weapon to people with genuine grievances while not at the same time adopting more effective measures against regimes that systematically use terrorist methods to maintain their power?

Few nations are guiltless of having used terrorism when they thought it useful, both in times of peace and war when they simply swept aside international conventions. Britain used terror-bombing against Dresden, just as the Germans used it against Rotterdam. The Americans have been guilty of terrorism in Vietnam, so have the North Vietnamese. Palestinians can, and do, remind the Israelis of the massacre of over 200 Arab men, women and children at Der Yassin in 1948. The Israelis' defence is that the act was perpetrated by the dissident *Irgun* movement and was condemned at the time by the national movement of *Haganah*.

Although terrorism has been used so extensively, its main success has been in the way it can be applied by States rather than by revolutionaries: minority political groups have been able to use it with limited success in only exceptional cases; on the whole, it has proved self-defeating. It is the weapon of desperation rather than of serious revolutionary activists, and today it is rejected by the majority of the armed guerrilla movements.

The Chinese, while them-

selves rejecting 'adventurist acts of terrorism,' such as hi-jacking and assassination, refuse, however, to support the measures now being discussed at the UN because the proposals do not specifically deal with the terrorism practised by Governments. They do not accept that existing international conventions offer an adequate protection against 'official terrorism.'

The logical conclusion of this argument is that nothing should be done to combat international terrorism until we can effectively deal with all its major manifestations; this is clearly impractical.

However, it would be wrong to suppose that it is possible to act effectively against all forms of terrorism without changing the fundamental causes which have produced a climate of extreme violence in certain societies: nothing, for example, can put an end to the terrorist elements among the Palestinians more quickly than a just peace in the Middle East.

It should be recognised that terror breeds terrorists: State terror is often the cause of counter-terror which, in its turn, produces even greater terror: a truly vicious circle.

Wherever people are left to rot in despair, we can be sure that their conditions will make them amenable to inhuman acts of violence at the point where they feel themselves strong enough to strike back. And so long as authoritarian Governments feel themselves relatively free from world censure they will be prepared, where necessary, to behave as nastily as their local circumstances demand.

There are, of course, situations where political solutions (as in the Middle East) are not immediately available. History shows that extreme forms of violence most frequently occur during periods of very rapid social and industrial change. We are at present living through just such a period when the simultaneous growth of technology and of population combines to create fresh hopes and needs at a time when it is more necessary, yet more difficult, to match hopes and needs.

A UN Secretariat report on the underlying causes of terrorism makes the crucially important point that at a time when the peoples of the world have grown more interdependent, the solution of many of their problems (e.g., the terms of world trade and monetary policies, or the arrangements between big Powers when their interests are involved in local situations) no longer

hangs on any local ruler or Government, but on actions and decisions often taken thousands of miles away.

Men begin to think that their ills have been produced by some vast impersonal force that is deaf to their pleas for justice, or impotent to find solutions for their particular circumstances: this applies as much to younger people in affluent societies as to the peoples in the developing world.

Modern communications have transformed local incidents into world events, especially when the incidents have an international character. A terrorist act is more likely to focus attention upon the terrorist and the cause he serves than any number of less dramatic, non-violent actions. The sensational terrorist act is often a means of compensating for the inferiority of a movement's strength: by making their cause appear to be more holy than life itself, the terrorist hopes to make the world take himself and his cause more seriously.

This cry of despair needs to be understood, even though the act itself is repugnant.

A MISCELLANY OF VIOLENCE

1970

31 March. West German Ambassador Count Karl von Spreti kidnapped in Guatemala by left-wing guerrillas demanding \$700,000 and release of 25 prisoners. The Government refused to negotiate; Von Spreti was found murdered 6 April. 6 September. Three airliners captured by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP); one flown to Cairo, two to Dawson's Field in Jordan where the guerrillas demanded the release of prisoners in Switzerland and West Germany and Lella Khaled in Britain. 9 September. BOAC aircraft with 114 passengers captured en route from Beirut to London and taken to Dawson's Field. Demands were met, passengers were freed and planes were blown up. 5 October. Mr Jasper Cross, British Trade Commissioner in Canada, kidnapped by Quebec Liberation front, which demanded \$500,000 and release of 13 jailed separatists. 10 October. Mr Laporte, Quebec Minister of Labour, kidnapped by OLF. Government refused demands but held negotiations. They eventually offered five prisoners. Laporte found dead on 18 October. Cross released 3 December and his three kidnappers given safe passage to Cuba. 15 October. Soviet civilian airliner with 46 passengers hijacked to Turkey by two armed Lithuanians. Stewardess shot dead. Turkey refused extradition. The plane, crew and passengers went back to Soviet Union.

1971

8 January. Sir Geoffrey Jackson, British Ambassador in Uruguay, kidnapped by Tupamaros. He was released on 9 September. 18 May. Turkey: Turkish People's Liberation Army kidnapped Israel Consul-General in Istanbul and threatened to execute him unless their members in prison were released. He was murdered. 28 November. Wafsi Tel. Jordan's Premier, murdered in Cairo by Black September Palestine guerrillas.

1972

27 March. Three British radar technicians kidnapped by left wing Turkish guerrillas. The Government refused to negotiate and hostages were found killed after a gun battle in which all but one of the guerrillas were killed. 8 May. Arab guerrillas hijacked a Belgian airliner in Tel Aviv demanding the release of Arab prisoners in Israel. Israeli soldiers, disguised as technicians, stormed the plane. Two hijackers were killed. One passenger later died from wounds. 30 May. Three Japanese terrorists, organised by the PLFP, with grenades and machine guns, killed 25 people at Lod Airport. 5 September. Eleven members of Israeli Olympics team murdered at Munich by Black September. 29 October. West German Government released men responsible for Munich Olympics massacre in exchange for passengers and crew of Lufthansa Boeing 727 hijacked by Black September.

WASHINGTON STAR
9 December 1972

SMITH HEMPSTONE

Margaret Truman: Are Letter-Bombs Kosher?

That Zionist terrorists of the notorious Stern gang may have tried to assassinate President Harry S. Truman and various members of the White House staff with letter-bombs in 1917, as revealed in Margaret Truman Daniel's new biography of her father, "Harry S. Truman," comes as no surprise.

The Israelis did not invent the letter-bomb. That dubious distinction belongs to a Swede named Martin Eckerberg who killed himself in a London prison in 1910. But Zionist terrorists perfected the death-by-mail device — since apparently turned against Israel by Palestinian Arab terrorists — and tried unsuccessfully to assassinate at least eight prominent British politicians and military figures at about the same time Mrs. Daniel says they went after Truman (former Stern gang leader Nathan Yellin-Moreh denies that his group tried to kill Truman, but admits the attacks on the Britons).

On Sept. 3, 1917, a parcel-bomb addressed to a brigadier engaged in intelligence work at the War Office exploded in a London post office, injuring two men. Two days later, eight letter-bombs mailed in Italy were detected by British counter-intelligence.

It is known that Chancellor of the Exchequer Sir Stafford Cripps, Minister Without Portfolio Arthur Greenwood, Minister of Food John Strachey and Maj. Gen. Sir Edward Spears, former minister to Syria and Lebanon, were among those to whom the letter-bombs were addressed. Mrs. Daniel, who is the wife of New York Times Washington bureau chief Clifton Daniel, identifies Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin and former Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden as other intended recipients of the deadly missiles.

The attempt on Truman's life was first mentioned in a 1919 book by Ira R. T. Smith, a longtime employee in the White House mail room. But Mrs. Daniel's book, which will go on sale in a few days, contains the first public confirmation by anyone close to the former President.

With the establishment of the state of Israel in November of 1917, the flow of letter-bombs to Britain slowed but did not stop. The last one sent until this year was addressed to Gen. Sir Evelyn Barker, the former commanding officer of British forces in Palestine. It arrived and was disarmed in the summer of 1948.

The Israelis first used let-

ter-bombs in their continuing war against the Arabs in 1963. That was before the Arabs had begun to receive sophisticated hardware and advisers from the Soviet Union. In an attempt to bridge the technological gap between themselves and the Israelis, the Egyptians had employed a number of German scientists to help in the development of a system of ground-to-ground missiles. Four Egyptian technicians were killed and one was blinded by letter-bombs sent from Germany.

The head of Israeli Intelligence, Isser Harel, resigned after Prime Minister David Ben Gurion publicly denounced the terror campaign and ordered it halted. But by then the Germans, finding the climate in Egypt decidedly unhealthy, had sought other employment.

Israeli letter-bombs, according to Arab sources, were used shortly before the 1967 Six-Day War to liquidate two key Egyptian intelligence officers: Maj. Mustapha Hapaz, chief of intelligence in the Gaza Strip, and Col. Salah Eddin Mustafa, military attache in Amman, Jordan. Both had been linked to Palestinian guerrilla organizations.

The Arabs this year made use of letter-bombs for the

first time, apparently with technical assistance from East German or Czechoslovak intelligence agents, when 14 explosive packages were sent to Israel from Europe. All were detected, but a policeman was injured while dismantling one.

The Israelis struck back after the May massacre at Tel Aviv's Lydda airport in which three Japanese inmates associated with the Arab terrorist movement killed 20 Puerto Rican pilgrims in a shoot-out. The Arab who had recruited the Japanese was seriously injured by an exploding letter-bomb. Other guerrilla leaders also received "greetings from Tel Aviv."

In September of this year, in the aftermath of the Arab terrorist incident in Munich in which 11 members of the Israeli Olympic team were murdered, there came the most numerous and highly publicized rash of letter-bombs, this time directed primarily against Israeli diplomats in various world capitals. Of the 50 letter-bombs mailed from Amsterdam, only one got through. That one killed Ami Sachorl, the Israeli agricultural attache in London.

The assumption is — and there is some evidence to support this — that Arab terrorists of the Black September

group which staged the Munich massacre were responsible for the Amsterdam letter-bombs. But Black September has been uncharacteristically quiet about claiming "credit" for the letter-bombs, and Calvo's Center for Political and Strategic Studies charges that the Amsterdam letter-bombs were sent by Israeli agents bent on further discrediting

the Palestinian guerrilla movement.

The truth is not known. But anything is possible in the shadow-world of Middle Eastern espionage, in which both sides use terror-by-mail as an instrument of national policy, often without the knowledge or consent of responsible political leaders.

NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, DECEMBER 12, 1972

Shippers to Cuba Are Bombed Here, in Miami and in Montreal

By BARBARA CAMPBELL

Bombs went off yesterday morning at the Miami headquarters and a New York branch of a Cuban-owned freight company, and at a Queens travel agency. The freight company ships goods to Cuba and the travel agency also provides some freight service to Cuba.

In addition the police said that a fourth explosion, in Montreal might be related to the others. There were no reports of injuries in any of the explosions.

All of the blasts occurred within an hour. The first took place at 3:20 A.M. in the Miami headquarters of the Va-Cuba Forwarding Company. The police there said that the bomb, which wrecked the company offices, had been placed on a window ledge behind an iron-work grill outside the building.

At 4 A.M. in New York two explosions occurred almost simultaneously, one at a branch of the Va-Cuba Company in

Washington Heights and the other at the Calypso Travel Agency in Queens.

Heavy Damage

The explosion at Va Cuba here—at 3787½ Broadway, between 157th and 158th Streets—heavily damaged the ground floor and shattered windows in six buildings on the block, including the Toga Democratic Club on the second floor of No. 3787½.

The Calypso Travel Agency, at 40-22 82d Street in Jackson Heights, was also badly damaged, and windows were broken in a jewelry store, a show-repair shop and a computer school in the same building.

Va Cuba forwards medicine, clothing and other goods from Cuban exiles in the United States to relatives and friends in Cuba via Canada and Spain. The explosion in Montreal hit the offices of Michael's Forwarding Company.

Mrs. Anarda Falcon, owner of the travel agency, said

she had received telephoned threats recently warning that if she did not stop shipments to Cuba her business would be blown up.

A local Spanish-language newspaper, she said, had criticized her for sending parcels to Cuba, a service she provides in addition to her travel business.

Mrs. Falcon said she would reopen and would continue to send parcels of food, clothing and medicine to her clients' relatives in Cuba by way of Canada.

Ceferino Perez, the owner of Va-Cuba, supervised the clean-up of the long narrow shipping plant where numerous brown cardboard boxes of clothes and supplies were still stacked.

His daughter, Yara, who spoke for her father because he does not speak fluent English said they did not know who had set off the bomb. She added: "We are going to keep on going. Nothing is going to stop us."

Miss Perez said that her

family came to the United States from Cuba in 1959 and that her father started the freight-shipping business a year ago. Before that, she said, he published a Spanish-language daily called Mundo Americano, which folded in 1966.

Miss Perez said that it cost her customers \$175 to ship 22 pounds of goods to Cuba by plane and \$125 by boat. "Cuba used to have everything," she said and, picking up a sequined pink dress from one of the boxes, she added:

"To us this would have been a piece of dirt. But now Castro has taken over, and it's a communist country and they have nothing there."

Federal agents as well as the city police are investigating the blasts. A spokesman for the Police Department here said late yesterday evening that no arrests had been made in the case.

U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 11, 1972

WORLDWIDE TURMOIL HITS CHURCHES

It's not only the U. S. where militants in the pulpit are creating a stir. Elsewhere, too, they are being heard from on controversial issues. Result: Many are getting into deep trouble within the church—and on the outside.

Churchmen in many parts of the world are demonstrating that an era of religious turmoil and rebellion that began 10 years ago is far from over.

While church unrest in the United States appears to be waning somewhat, militant clergymen elsewhere are getting into trouble with religious and governmental authorities on a wide variety of issues.

This restive mood in world Christianity flows in part from controversies over innovations in Christian theology and ritual.

Perhaps the larger share of dissent, however, is developing over the concern of many clergymen—especially younger

ones—with political and social issues they see as deeply related to spiritual and moral teachings of the churches.

In Australia, the Anglican Archbishop of Sydney stirred up trouble with a pastoral letter blaming economic policies for much of Australia's high unemployment.

Churches in the Philippines find themselves under fire from one side for too close ties with the ruling class—and from the other for the support some priests are giving to agitation for land reform.

Goal: socialism. In Argentina, 140 liberal priests of the Roman Catholic Church urged "seizure of power by the people" leading to "national and Latin-American socialism." In South-West Africa, an Anglican bishop was ordered expelled—apparently for siding with striking workers in defiance of Government orders.

Such incidents come at a time when the world's church officials have other problems to ponder.

Everywhere, religious leaders worry over evidence that young people's interest in institutional churches is declining. The proportion of membership attending church on a fairly regular basis falls off steadily—to the point where fewer than 15 per cent of the Anglican Church's baptized membership

ing shortage of clergymen, especially in poor nations, leaves many congregations without pastors.

Whether today's dissent among churchmen will bring new vitality to Christianity or sap its strength is a question of rising concern to Christian leadership in much of the world.

EUROPE: "Maoists" and "Hijackers"

It was 10 years ago that the late Pope John XXIII summoned the world's bishops to the Vatican for an Ecumenical Council that was to produce a global "updating" of the Roman Catholic Church.

For millions of Protestants as well as Catholics, the Council became a major symbol—alongside the "freedom marches" of U. S. clergymen across the South—of religious agitation that came to Christianity in the 1960s. Today, with conservatism firmly entrenched at the Vatican under Pope Paul VI, churchmen's involvement with change—in the Church or on the outside—varies considerably.

In Britain, for instance, clergymen appear to create virtually no stir with their views on church discipline or on such social issues as immigration or inflation. In Eire, where Catholicism enjoys a privileged role under the Constitution, clergymen seldom speak up publicly on domestic issues.

A different story is found in Northern Ireland, where church loyalties run high, and where Protestants and Catholics are immersed in civil strife and terrorism.

Probably the top Protestant politician is the Rev. Ian Paisley, a Presbyterian—and other ministers are active in the fight to retain Northern Ireland's links with Britain.

On the other side, many rank-and-file priests more or less openly support the outlawed Irish Republican Army. Recently two monks were heavily fined and given suspended jail sentences for helping gamblers escape British Army patrols. Even so, each church's role as a molder of opinion appears to be minimal in Northern Ireland. Appeals from the pulpit—Protestant or Catholic—for an end of terrorism have not had noticeable impact so far.

Source of debate. On the Continent, "updating" of Christianity within the Church or in society at large stirs public argument on a somewhat broader scale. In Belgium, for instance, three groups of dissenting Catholics gained much attention in urging open revolt against papal rule which they describe as an "increasingly absolute monarchy." In less extreme terms, Belgium's Leo Cardinal Suenens has won a world audience for his criticism of papal elections, the Pope's disinclination to discuss the celibacy rule for priests and the Church's slowness to adopt changes.

Conservatives, too, press their cause. Recently, for instance, an Italian cardinal warned that spiritual "hijackers" in the Church were attempting to convert Vatican Council decrees into runaway change which, he said, would wreck the Church.

Fears of such change were most lively in the Netherlands, precipitating open conflict between Dutch Catholics and the Vatican.

Dutch bishops last August bowed to Vatican pressure and called off a planned pastoral council that would have given laymen a greater say in policy making for the Church.

The Vatican also has banned an experimental method of teaching religion as drawn up for use in Dutch parochial schools. Two years ago the celibacy rule became a major target of Catholic liberals in the Netherlands.

In the background of such unrest, Vatican prelates took alarm at a procession of stories telling of jazz Masses in Dutch churches, long-haired priests saying Mass, and sermons extolling the Cuban revolutionary, Che Guevara.

Shift to neutralism. In France, the Catholic hierarchy is moving from its traditional support of the "establishment"—including the Gaullist party—to a politically neutral position, while encouraging a wider variety of political activities by clergymen and laity.

Result: rising irritation among Gaullists. One, Minister of Interior Raymond Marcellin, recently accused the Catholic clergy in France of harboring "hundreds of Maoists."

Catholic militants—challenging what they see as injustices in French society—get support from clergymen and even some prelates. The Bishop of Orleans, for instance, has defended conscientious objectors, denounced French arms sales

to underdeveloped nations and espoused the cause of discharged workers.

Within the Church, some clergymen also want to do away with the celibacy rule and to "declergify" Church government. On the other hand, the Catholic Counter-Reform League has been launched with such objectives as the retention of the traditional Latin Mass and nonpolitical sermons.

Meantime, the total number of priests is declining by 600 or 700 a year—and Church attendance is falling off, too, to the point where thefts of art works from empty churches are becoming a serious problem.

Protestants also affected. Echoes of Catholic troubles are heard among France's 740,000 Protestants.

Last year the Protestant Federation published a statement calling the capitalist system and its ideology "unacceptable" and urging Christians to undertake "bold reformism" or "revolutionary opposition."

This document brought angry response from denominational leaders who saw it as an attempt by an articulate minority to push churchmen into political commitment for social change.

In West Germany, "radicalization" of Catholicism has not been great. But papal reaffirmation of the celibacy rule for priests stirred controversy—and almost 80 per cent of Catholics under the age of 40 have indicated disagreement with the Church's ban on birth control.

Among Protestants, rebellion is directed mainly at social issues. The most startling instance was the discovery that young pastors—10 in one German State alone—were joining the newly reformed Communist Party.

Ferment, too, is surfacing in the supposed strongholds of traditional Catholicism—Italy and Spain.

Within the past year, the majority of the Spanish hierarchy has denounced political and social injustice in that country, and called for an end to traditional ties of Church and state. In a Church poll, 48 per cent of Spanish priests said they were favorable toward socialism.

In Italy, an estimated 100 "progressive" movements, mostly small, have developed among churchmen. This has led to some scandals, such as the dismissal of one dissident, a Jesuit professor of spiritual theology, from the Gregorian University.

Even more worrisome to some prelates are these figures: 58.4 per cent of Italians favor the present law permitting divorce, despite Vatican opposition; and 62 per cent of Italians aged 18 to 45 see the papal ban on artificial birth control as an invasion of privacy.

LATIN AMERICA: The Church Militant

Several years ago Cuban Premier Fidel Castro predicted: "The United States shouldn't worry about the Soviets in Latin America because they are no longer revolutionaries. They should worry about the Catholic revolutionaries, who are."

Today his ironic prophecy is coming true in a vast area beset by illiteracy, political corruption and wide disparities between rich and poor.

In many places, priests and ministers—and sometimes bishops—are speaking out against capitalism, military governments and the arrest and alleged torture of dissidents, among them some clergymen.

A number of churchmen endorse socialism. Some say violent revolution is inevitable. In Buenos Aires, a Methodist layman complained: "At our Union Seminary here, Che Guevara is more of a hero than Jesus Christ."

Leftist agitation is turning up among Catholic churchmen in Colombia which a few years ago produced the "guerrilla priest," the Rev. Camilo Torres who was killed by Government troops in 1966.

Now the hierarchy reportedly is disturbed to learn that a "catechism of liberation" used in parochial schools has described the Virgin Mary as "the first revolutionary" and argues that "the Christian cannot judge Marxism lightly and cast it aside."

Earlier, Catholics were shaken when a U. S.-supported school was closed and some faculty members arrested on charges of co-operating with guerrillas. Several foreign priests accused of participating in terrorist movements were

deported.

Charges subversion. Recent reports from Paraguay tell of eight Jesuit priests being expelled for allegedly subversive activity. Sometime before that, the Archbishop of Asuncion announced the excommunication of more than 30 persons, including Paraguay's Minister of Interior and Asuncion's police chief. All were said to be involved in the arrest of a Uruguayan priest and an attack on a Uruguayan bishop.

Not long ago, about 400 priests and bishops from a half-dozen Latin-American nations met in Santiago to form a "Christians for Socialism" organization. Their final communiqué endorsed a "strategic alliance" with Marxists to achieve socialism and called for "revolutionary action by the proletariat and a strategy that leads to the take-over of power."

In Argentina, more than 500 priests belong to a "Third-World Movement" [associated with developing and non-white nations]. Included are some priests who have been accused by the Argentine Government of subversive activity. One was tried for complicity in the 1969 assassination of ex-President Pedro Aramburu and given a suspended sentence.

Brazil's military junta has jailed a number of Catholic priests, nuns and lay activists in recent years for alleged links to subversive groups. Some have charged that they were tortured while in prison—a charge denied by the Government. Meantime, some regional groups of Brazilian bishops have issued statements accusing the junta of ignoring the needs of Indians and impoverished squatters, and denouncing what they describe as arbitrary arrest and torture.

In other countries, however, church activists are proving irksome to conservative prelates as well as to Government officials.

Chile's bishops went so far as to warn leftist priests that they should reconsider their call to the priesthood if their vocation had become political.

This warning was issued at a time when concern is developing over dropouts from the priesthood. Defections aggravate an already severe shortage of priests in an area of the world where the supply comes to only 1 priest for every 4,800 Catholics, compared with 1 for every 920 in Spain.

Precise statistics on the number of dropouts in Latin America as a whole are lacking. Brazil, however, offers this hint at the dimensions of the problem:

In that country, between 1961 and 1968, an estimated 643 clergymen left the priesthood to marry. Between 1960 and 1969, the number of Brazilian priests dropped from 13,100 to 11,200.

Strangely, the political activists are not moving into the forefront of scattered agitation within the Church against Pope Paul's insistence on a celibate clergy. Typical is the attitude of a "Third World" priest who described celibacy as an "unhappy sacrifice but a necessary one."

In Buenos Aires, a Jesuit priest who holds a U. S. doctorate offered this explanation of leftists' relative indifference to internal issues within the Church:

Rebellious priests, he said, are less opposed to the hierarchy and the Church's internal discipline than to the social and economic structures prevailing in Latin America.

Few were seen as inclined to make big issues out of such questions as birth control, divorce and a married clergy—as many priests in the U. S. and Europe are doing. He added: "Priests here are concerned with the lowest of the lower classes—where life is a question of survival."

AFRICA: Growth and Conflict

As religious scholars ponder today's turmoil in Christianity, what travelogues used to call the "Dark Continent" draws their attention increasingly.

In the vast area of Africa south of the Sahara, where nearly two score nations have been carved out of former colonies, the Christian faith is growing faster than any other, bringing it into inevitable conflict with still new and shaky regimes run by black Africans.

Even stronger conflict is building up in what is left of white Africa where many if not most church leaders are at odds with official policies of racial separation.

In that situation, Christians are finding themselves on both sides of political conflict—and sometimes in the middle.

One example developed in Zaire, formerly the Belgian Congo, where outspoken Joseph-Albert Cardinal Malula, leader of the country's 7 million Catholics, had to go abroad for a time.

This happened after he opposed the entry of youth groups from the nation's single political party into the organization of the Church, including seminaries. Also bringing him into disfavor with President Joseph Mobutu was his criticism of what he called trappings of grandeur in the Government. At present, with the help of Vatican intercession, an uneasy truce exists between the cardinal and the President.

Beaten and stripped. Elsewhere in black Africa—

In Marxist-ruled Guinea, the Roman Catholic archbishop was beaten and undressed in public, then sentenced to hard labor by the Government.

In Cameroon, in the recent past a bishop was sentenced to death—a sentence later commuted to life imprisonment—on charges of conspiring with elements planning guerrilla warfare.

In the Malagasy Republic, formerly Madagascar, Catholic clergymen have supported the demands of anti-Government demonstrators. More recently, in Uganda, the Catholic hierarchy angered President Idi Amin, a Moslem, by refusing to condone or support his order expelling Asians from that country.

Such instances appear to be bringing the Church wide support. One reason offered by a white onlooker is that "they are the only ones who speak out publicly on issues like corruption."

Also noted is the fact that most denominations in black-ruled nations play down their white origins and connections. Established denominations are "Africanizing" their leadership and, to some extent, their ritual and style of worship.

Additional support comes to Christian denominations because of the social services they are providing to new and impoverished nations.

States within states. In most of these countries, the bigger denominations operate as states within states, providing much or most of the educational and health services through church-run schools, hospitals and clinics.

Conflict between church and state is even sharper in white-ruled Africa.

Clergymen and Government officials in Rhodesia have been locked in combat since that nation declared its independence from Britain in 1965. At the center of this conflict: the Government's drift toward a racially separated society in a country where blacks outnumber whites 21 to 1.

As elsewhere in Africa, churches operate many services. As one example, 90 per cent of all primary education in Rhodesia is church run, creating a major area of conflict as the Government seeks to impose restrictions and regulations on mission schools.

On another battleground, Methodist Bishop Abel Muzorewa and the African National Congress which he heads persuaded blacks to reject the 1965 Declaration of Independence, the 1969 Constitution and the 1971 terms of settlement reached by Rhodesian and British negotiators.

Many white laymen disagree with opposition of church leadership to Government actions. There was strong controversy within white congregations when the Christian Council of Rhodesia in 1970 voiced its support of the World Council of Churches' allocation of funds to African guerrillas in white-ruled areas.

Opposing positions. Nonetheless, a majority of church leaders in Rhodesia appears to support the view expressed by a Catholic priest, the Rev. R. H. Randolph:

"The Government in Rhodesia, by its legislation, is committed politically to a policy of racial separate development. The church is committed divinely to a policy of nonracial free development. These two policies are fundamentally opposed."

Just as bitter is the confrontation between church and state in South Africa over the Government's policy of strict apartheid or separation of the races.

This opposition flows largely from English-speaking churches, both Protestant and Catholic. The Afrikaans-speaking Dutch Reformed Church continues to back the Government overwhelmingly in its programs to keep the races apart—though some individual churchmen are beginning to question this support.

What has developed among dissident church leaders is anything but a united front. One observer said: "The church in South Africa contains white radicals, white compromisers and white racialists—cohabiting in a state of near schism."

Growing fight on race policy. Even so, church expressions of opposition to *apartheid* appear to be stiffening—partly because churches are among the few agencies with effective contacts abroad, and partly because worry grows over the rising rate of desertions of black worshippers to African-run sects.

In retaliation, the Government in the past 18 months has deported or imprisoned individuals, withdrawn or denied passports, or imposed restrictions of movement—in cases involving 68 persons. Among them was the Anglican dean of Johannesburg, who was charged with terrorist activity.

During recent months, churchmen have accused security police of stepping up their surveillance of clergymen and congregations through informers. At the same time, the Government is pressing South African denominations belonging to the World Council of Churches to leave that organization.

NEW YORK TIMES

3 December '72

A Guts Find the Gains Weren't Worth the Efforts

By AMITAI ETZIONI

The most hopeful epitaph for Project Apollo might be: This was the last gasp of a technologically addled, public-relations-minded society, the last escapade engineered by an industrial-military coalition seeking conquests in outer space, while avoiding swelling needs on earth.

And what a gasp it was! Never before had so many taxpayers spent so many billions, and so many thousands of talented technologists and scientists labored so hard on a civilian project that yielded so little. Apollo's irrationality stands second only to one—our inclination to get involved in far-off wars, at even greater cost and distraction from our domestic problems.

Both tendencies are part of our difficulty in turning toward self-reform as the area of exploiting nature and dealing in other people's lands come to an inevitable end. Little wonder the moon was billed as our last potential colony.

The astronauts set out to investigate the moon, but their journeys told us more about ourselves than about that arid pile of orbiting rocks. They told us that in the decade in which poverty, social injustice, pollution, mental illness, subquality housing, inadequate education and crime went untreated, we invested more new public resources and scarce research-and-development manpower staggering amounts of our muscle and mind, in a combination of a

technological superstunt and a geological excavation.

Project Apollo reveals both the how and why of decisions which set the course of the nation. The commitment to put Americans on the moon was made by President John F. Kennedy during a few days in late April and mid-May of 1961 following brief staff reviews of the social, economic and international implications of the project. And a good part of the review available was opposed to the emphasis on expensive, probably unnecessary, manned flights. Among those questioning such a venture was a task force headed by Jerome B. Wiesner and the outgoing President's Scientific Advisory Committee. We do not reflect long before we jump, often disregarding our experts' advice.

The underlying motives for the go-ahead included the public-relations notion that the prospect of a moon voyage would provide a new topic for a nation despondent over the failure of the Cuban invasion; that Apollo would demonstrate to the world that we could match recent Soviet technological feats (the Russians had just put Yuri Gagarin in space); and that the giant project would help revitalize a recessed economy.

Arguments in favor of other domestic projects were pushed aside, then and since on the ground that they would not "sell" as well as lunar flights. Mundane, unphotogenic dispersed activities, such as the collection of garbage in thousands of streets, arrests of muggers on myriad corners, and the read-

One Government official said: "The time has come for them to show whether they are really loyal to the country—whether they are for or against South Africa."

Despite the eruption of such conflicts across Africa below the Sahara, Christianity is growing there as nowhere else in the world. Recently, in the "Kenya Churches Handbook," the Rev. David B. Barrett, an Anglican missionary, advanced this estimate:

Africa now has more than 100 million Christians—and their number is increasing at the rate of more than 5 per cent a year, double the growth of the population as a whole.

Many of these new Christians are found in the more than 5,000 independent sects that have sprung up under African leadership, often mixing paganism with Christianity.

Even so, Dr. Barrett pointed out, a continuation of this trend would mean that by the end of the century Christians will outnumber Moslems in Africa. Perhaps more importantly, this growth could enable "Third World" Christians of Asia, Africa and Latin America to outnumber those of Europe and the United States.

If such a projection is anywhere near the mark, some religious leaders see turmoil in Christianity continuing into the indefinite future, with rebels trying to push the church into an expanded role in the world and, in that process, colliding with authority both spiritual and temporal.

ing and writing habits of kids all over America, it was said, do not compare to the Apollo spectacles on TV.

Once the space coalition was formed, every value dear to man was emblazoned on its banners. Only now we begin to see how absurd most of that razzle-dazzle was. Generals argued that the moon was essential to national security as a "high ground," for observation and fire purposes, disregarding those who pointed out that our reconnaissance satellites would soon be able to gather more detailed information about "the enemy" than we know what to do with, and that it would be rather silly for the Russians to shoot missiles at us from the moon, when they could fire them from much nearer bases.

The promise of economic "spin-offs" from the lunar gear into other areas was touted by NASA, and indeed there were some. If you burn 27-odd billion dollars, you generate some heat, but pitiful little it was. It turned out that most outer-space products, fucs and alloids, geared to extreme temperatures, vacuums, acceleration and weightlessness, have no use in our earthly schools, hospitals and bedrooms.

Finally, we were informed Apollo would provide a peaceful outlet for the world's superpower contest, unite the nation, and enrich the human spirit. But at the cost of keeping one of NASA's missiles from catching a cold. Nixon achieved more for peace through his

Ping-Pong diplomacy with Mainland China and in SALT talks, than a decade of space jumps.

The nation surely was divided more over these years than in the preceding decade, among other things over the objectives of the space race, which polls show about half of America never came to accept. The notion that this spectator sport, which reaches the people of the world seated before their TV sets, would humanize them, is so simplistic it rebuts itself.

The space coalition is still drawing more per year for its space antics than many domestic missions (most recently, it got us committed to buying Skylabs). The space budget should be cut below the half-billion mark, focused on near space and economical nonmanned efforts (weather control, communication satellites). Every school child, citizen and inchoate politician should be required to study what Apollo taught us. Then we can cease chasing moons in the quest for a new America.

Dr. Etzioni is professor of sociology at Columbia University and director of the Center for Policy Research. He is the author of "The Active Society" and "The Moon-doggle."

WASHINGTON POST
10 December 1972

Chalmers Roberts

Closing the Books on SEATO

SEN. MIKE Mansfield intends to ask the new Congress to pass a resolution calling on President Nixon to serve formal notice that the United States will withdraw from the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), he told me the other day. The result is likely to be a new round of debate over the shaping of American foreign policy in Asia in the post-Indochina War period.

Most people have forgotten that the Montana Democratic senator himself was a signatory to the SEATO treaty in Manila back on Sept. 8, 1954. Indeed, of the 14 men who signed the document on behalf of the eight member nations, Mansfield is the only one still in a position of power. The two others who signed for the United States are dead: Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Sen. H. Alexander Smith, Republican of New Jersey.

The SEATO treaty, which the Johnson administration used, on and off, as a legal basis for escalating the Vietnam War, was designed to "remain in force indefinitely" but it permits any member nation to "cease to be a party one year after its notice of denunciation" has been filed with the Philippine government, the official depositary nation. Only the Executive Branch can take this step, as Mansfield knows, but the senator's intention is to give Mr. Nixon a push in that direction. So far there has been no sign that the President intends any such move; indeed, Secretary of State Rogers recently said that the treaty still has value.

Of the eight original members (and none others subsequently joined) France has been totally inactive and Britain highly negative for a long time. The new regime in Pakistan has said it is withdrawing and the new governments just elected in Australia and New Zealand seem headed in the same direction. The Philippines pay little attention to SEATO. Only Thailand, where SEATO has its formal headquarters and its multi-national bureaucracy in Bangkok, seems to have any real interest in keeping the organization alive. The Thais, however, long ago (1962) got Secretary of State Dean

NEW YORK TIMES

3 December 72

Bormann A Nazi Ghost Stirs Again

Is Martin Bormann alive in South America, or isn't he? That was the speculation all last week as The Daily Express of London published a series of articles on the latest story about Adolf Hitler's wartime deputy.

Since he disappeared in 1945 and was found guilty in his absence, of war crimes by the Nuremberg tribunal, there have been dozens of reports on

Rusk to state in a formal document that the United States would act under the SEATO treaty "in case of Communist armed attacks against that country" (Thailand) without having to obtain approval of other SEATO signatory nations. Despite some notions to the contrary, Dulles made it clear at the 1954 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on the treaty that the agreement permitted such a move; hence Rusk was correct in contending that his 1962 statement was simply a reaffirmation of an American obligation.

What it comes down to today, then, is this: SEATO as an organization has fallen apart, save for the Parkinson's law that keeps the bureaucrats on the payroll. It serves no useful purpose save one: It provides the tie between Thailand and the United States. Thus, if the Congress is to follow Mansfield's lead and pass a resolution urging American withdrawal from the treaty, the Congress ought to face up to the future of Thai-American relations. That it has yet to do and it is a matter of some considerable importance if only because the United States has several thousand airmen using American-built, Thai-controlled, fields in Thailand to attack the enemy in neighboring Indochina.

The origins of SEATO should not be forgotten. Dulles initially sought in early 1954 to round up a group of nations, especially including Britain, as part of his proposal to intervene in the First Indochina War to save the French just prior to their debacle at Dienbienphu. It was the British, both Anthony Eden and Winston Churchill, who killed that scheme. So after the Geneva accords later that year Dulles turned the scheme into a permanent organization in hopes of deterring the Communists "by our mobile striking power" rather than by sending in "American manpower" . . . to try to fight a ground war," as he told the senators. It was Dulles' theme that if there "should be open armed attack in that area the most effective step would be to strike at the source of aggression . . ."

All of this, of course, related to the

Dulles view, concurred in by President Eisenhower, that "international Communism" was trying to take over Indochina. The SEATO treaty, said Dulles, would help protect South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia because it "throws over those new nations a certain mantle of protection" by means of a protocol. Laos formally opted out from under the protocol at the time of the 1962 Laotian agreement and Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk denounced the protocol as far as his country was concerned. But every Saigon regime has relied on the SEATO protocol as an important tie to Washington. The Tonkin Gulf resolution passed by Congress in 1964 stated that the United States was "prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO) requesting assistance in defense of its freedom."

Congress has repealed the Tonkin Gulf resolution and it is time now to dismantle SEATO. Australia and New Zealand are bound in mutual defense to the United States by the ANZUS treaty and there is a separate U.S. defense treaty with the Philippines. Britain and France, of course, are allies in the North Atlantic Treaty though France has opted out of the military organization. Only Thailand would lack a tie to Washington if SEATO dies. Pakistan wants no such formal relationship with the U.S.

Getting rid of a treaty will be a new experience for the United States. The Rio Treaty of 1947 is pretty much a dead letter, given the changed American relationships with Latin America, but it is still on the books and it never directly involved the U.S. in a war. NATO is very much alive though it has major problems. Treaties with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan all also are still in force and probably will be for some time yet.

Assuming the United States will soon be finally and fully out of the Second Indochina War, it is time to close the books on SEATO. And Mike Mansfield, as one of the original signatories, is just the man to start the process.

saw the end of the Nazi regime coming.

After 1955, when Mr. Perón went into exile, Bormann lived in Chile, the account said. Mr. Farago said that Bormann had entered Argentina last Oct. 5 from Chile under the alias of Rleardo Bauer and went to a ranch in the extreme northwest corner of the country.

The reports were viewed with skepticism by the press and officials in Argentina and elsewhere. But that didn't faze Mr. Farago, who said he had tape recordings and documents to support his account. "I couldn't care less," he said. "By around next May my book will appear and it will pro-

Bormann's whereabouts. Most of the stories have emanated from South America. So far authorities have not turned up anyone confirmed as Bormann.

The Daily Express account, written by Ladislav Farago, a Hungarian-born author, said Bormann went to Italy after the war and then, using the name of Eliezer Goldstein, he entered Argentina in 1948 on a passport issued by the Vatican Office of Stateless Persons. The account said he bought his way to freedom and safety with the aid of Juan D. Perón and his wife, Eva, and with \$500-million in Nazi loot that Bormann had shipped to

WASHINGTON POST
9 December 1972

Wheat, Famine and Foreign Policy

India, now approaching the reality of the famine long predicted, is beginning to purchase American wheat. Fortunately, this country still has some grain left to sell. But the enormous sales of the past half-year are raising unfamiliar questions for American agricultural policy.

This country has always taken it for granted that its highly productive farms would always grow more than anyone needed, and that its grain surpluses were as inexhaustible as the ocean. A generation of agricultural economies has been devoted to the mechanisms for maintaining reasonable prices in the face of constant oversupply. But this year, to our national astonishment, we discover that world demand is straining the limits of our capacity.

Last summer, in the matter of a few weeks, the Russians bought one-fourth of our annual wheat crop. Then the Chinese, for the first time, bought wheat from us. Japan is a large and steady customer. India is coming onto the market. The United States has become the supplier of last resort for the rest of the world in a year when, through a series of unrelated coincidences, crops have been far short of normal throughout most of the world. The withered harvests in Russia and India are common knowledge, but it has also been a year of low yields in such major wheat exporting countries as Australia and Argentina. The rice crop has been less than expected in some of the areas that depend on it, forcing them to turn to wheat.

The United States can probably meet this demand but only by running down its huge stocks. We shall not be able to match this year's exports again next year. The dilemma is a recurrent one for farmers and governments. If crops are good next spring in other parts of the world, from South America to the Ukraine, demand abroad will drop sharply. Surpluses would then pile up in our Midwest, and prices would fall for American farmers. But if the rest of the world has another bad year, the United States will not be able to supply the quantities of grain that it is shipping this year.

Last spring, before the harvest began, this coun-

try had stocks of almost 900 million bushels of wheat on hand from the previous year. This year's crop was 1,550 million bushels, for a total of about 2,450 million bushels. Out of this total, we shall consume about 800 million bushels at home. Foreign purchases may run as high as 1,200 million bushels. That leaves us a little over 400 million bushels to carry over as reserves for next year, less than half this year's level. In the types of wheat commonly used for bread, we shall be fairly close to the minimum reserves necessary to protect ourselves against the possibility of a bad harvest here. The domestic market is already getting very tight, a point illustrated by the continuous rise in the price of wheat.

Most of next year's wheat crop is already in the ground, and beyond the power of government to affect it greatly. On present indications, it will be about 10 per cent larger than this year's crop of about 1,700 million bushels. Setting aside 800 million bushels for domestic use, we would have about 900 million bushels for export. That would be more than enough for a normal year, but far too little for a year like the present one.

Wheat exports are now a significant part of our foreign policy. The massive sales of wheat to Russia supported our policy of detente. But it made wheat more expensive to the Japanese, who are not only more consistent buyers but are our allies as well. Wheat to China helps build a new relationship, wheat to India helps repair an old one. The real limit on our sales this year will be our shipping capacity—whether we can physically deliver, through overtaxed rail and port facilities, as much as we can sell. But next year we shall have much less to ship.

It remains to be seen whether we shall have enough wheat to serve our national purposes abroad. Traditionally, our grain policy has been largely a matter of trying to dispose of the surpluses that our domestic price supports have created. But rising world demand may soon require us to set our wheat production in terms of the new foreign policy of trade and an alliance against famine.

WASHINGTON POST
7 December 1972

Israel's Outlays For Arms Are High

United Press International

Israel spends more money per citizen on defense than any other country in the world—a total of \$477 for every man, woman and child in Israel in 1970, a sum that was one-quarter higher than U.S. per capita spending on the military.

The statistics were contained in a recently released

document, World Military Expenditures, in which the U.S. government's Arms Control and Disarmament Agency compiles figures on military spending around the world.

The figures showed that after Israel, the United States was second, spending \$379 per person in 1970, the Soviet Union third at \$270 and Sweden fourth at \$139.

The report notes that it is difficult to give precise statistics for many countries which do not choose to make statistics public or which use different accounting methods. It said in a recent year estimates of the Soviet military budget varied from \$40 billion to \$84 billion and calculations of Peking's outlays as a portion of China's gross national product (GNP) ranged from 5 to 15 per cent.

The report generally took the middle ground, putting China's outlays in 1970 at \$10 billion or 1.3 per cent of GNP, and the Soviet military budget at \$63 billion or about 6 per cent of GNP—an imprecision due to accounting problems.

That compares with the American budget of \$77.8 billion or 7.5 per cent of GNP in 1970. U. S. defense spending this year has dropped to \$76.5 billion or 6.4 per cent of GNP, which is the lowest proportion devoted to defense since before the Korean War. No more recent figures for China or the Soviet Union were published.

Other data revealed in the 58-page report included:

• The United States spends well over one-third of all the money spent on defense throughout the world.

• After discounting inflation, worldwide military spending actually dropped in 1971 as it had in 1970.

• The countries which devote the greatest proportion of their national wealth to the military are in the Middle East and Indochina. South Vietnam, which spent 34 per cent of its gross national product on defense in 1970, topped the list for the second year in

a row. (Before that North Vietnam had headed the list for eight years running.)

Second is Israel at 25.1 per cent, followed by Jordan with 20.5 per cent and North Vietnam with an estimated 20.0 per cent. Other nations which put more than 10 per cent of

their GNP into the military are in descending order: Laos, Cambodia, North Korea, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Albania and Iraq.

The low spenders are mostly in Africa, Latin America and around the Caribbean. Those countries which devoted less

than 1 per cent of their GNP to defense in 1970 were: Malawi, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Nepal, Ceylon, Japan, Ireland, Luxembourg and Iceland.

WASHINGTON STAR

2 December 1972

SMITH HEMPSTONE

America's Energy Crisis and Geopolitics

The vision is apocalyptic: Pittsburgh's furnaces are cold; Detroit's assembly lines are silent; Manhattan's docks are deserted. A blacked-out America, barely 200 years old, ekes out its twilight years at a subsistence level, unable to produce or import the energy necessary to fuel its industrial base.

The odds are, of course, that this will never happen. New domestic sources of conventional energy will be found, technology will devise new methods for exacting energy from other substances and the development of reserves of oil, natural gas and coal in friendly foreign countries will assure the United States sufficient supplies to keep the economy turning over at an acceptable rate, even if the consumption of energy for nonessential uses has to be curtailed.

But even if the United States, through a superhuman effort — and it will require such an effort — manages to meet its basic energy requirements for both the short and long terms, the odds are that, well within the lifetimes of many of us, the Soviet Union will replace the United States as the world's affluent nation, simply because its energy resources are so much greater than those of this country.

Of all the nations of the world, the Soviet Union is by

far the most self-sufficient in the natural resources which are the bricks and mortar of a modern technological society: Timber, water, iron, coal and minerals. Moscow has these resources in abundance, not only absolutely but in comparative terms where it matters most. In comparison to the United States.

Take petroleum: Russia, a nation of 240 million, consumes only about 60 percent as much oil as do we, a nation of 210 million. But her oil reserves are believed to be about four times as large as ours. While our capacity to produce oil is leveling off at about two-thirds of our requirements, the Soviet Union's capacity is increasing at a rate of about 8 percent annually. By 1978, Soviet production will surpass our own. Our oil shortage is here and now; Russia's will not take place for 30-50 years.

The Soviet Union has about three times as much (3,000 trillion cubic feet) natural gas as we do, although we consume more than three times as much as the Russians. At the present rate of consumption, America's natural gas reserves will be exhausted by 1986. Even given a sharp increase in consumption, the Russians will experience no shortage of this important fuel until after the year 2000.

The Russian edge over us in terms of coal reserves is on the same order as that in natural gas: Three-to-one. At a time when no new American underground coal mine of any importance has been developed in the past decade, Russian coal production has overtaken ours, 690 million tons to 600 million tons.

In terms of hydroelectric potential, the Soviet Union, with its great rivers, has reserves 50 percent greater than our own. Russia's hydroelectric output has increased from 16 billion watts in 1951 to 170 billion watts today.

The men in the Kremlin are aware that energy production equals world political power. The Russians have scored major advances in magnetohydrodynamics (the generation of electricity from coal), fusion research and the development of high-pressure, large-diameter natural gas pipelines which will make it possible to tap the huge gas fields of Asiatic Russia.

A study of the projections indicates that the most dangerous decades for the United States will be the 1980s and 1990s, the years before nuclear power and synthetic fuels will be available in sufficient quantities to take up the slack in our conventional energy

production system.

It is possible — just possible — that by working hard we may be able to avoid a major economic collapse and maintain our standard of living at approximately its present level. But in these belt-tightening years, the Russians will be experiencing a rapid annual growth in energy deployment higher than our own.

The irony of this developing scenario is that Russian predominance, if it does take place, will have been achieved not because of communism but despite it. The Russian resources always were there. Had the Kerensky government survived in 1917 and Russia gone on to develop as a liberal democracy, she might today have achieved the standard of living which not even Soviet mismanagement will be able to delay much beyond the year 2000.

But this fact may escape the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America, who may draw other ideological conclusions from the Soviet success story, conclusions which could be decidedly distasteful to the United States and other democracies.

The time has come. In short, for the United States to pull up its technological socks, develop a coherent national energy policy and get back into the power race.

side the embassy.

The bug was secretly placed in the heel when the diplomat's maid took the shoes out for "repair." A U.S. security officer, presumably using modern detection gear, soon discovered his colleague was a walking broadcasting station.

• A miniature transmitter tucked into an innocent-looking binder holding curtain samples.

Gentile said this spy device, which turned out to have a broadcasting range of 400 yards, was spotted before it got into any embassy room where secret information was

Gentile, who is responsible for safeguarding U.S. missions overseas.

The deputy assistant secretary, while crediting modern safeguards with being able to pretty well protect against uninvited listening at U.S. embassies, stressed that continuing vigilance is needed.

"You can never be sure," Gentile said.

In an unusual interview dealing with the continuing undercover-intelligence struggle, Gentile disclosed that in the last year or so his scouts have uncovered at U.S. embassies in Communist East European countries:

• A tiny radio hidden in a heel of a shoe of a senior U.S. diplomat. It had good sound pickup and could transmit 300

By LEWIS GULICK
Associated Press

Spies Using Latest Devices In Bugging U.S. Embassies

The era of attempted eavesdropping on U.S. diplomats abroad through cumbersome wire-connected microphones is over. Hostile agents are trying more advanced devices, small enough to be dropped into a marlini or planted in a shoe.

So reports the State Department's deputy assistant secretary for security, G. Marvin

Both devices fit Gentile's definition of "drop transmitters" — tiny radio transmitters, usually battery-powered, which can be easily hidden and quickly implanted in an office or on a person.

A Popular Tactic

A popular spy tactic used to be to hide microphones in U.S. embassies and link them by wire to outside listening posts. This reached a high point in 1964 with the removal of 52 microphones from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and 53 from the Embassy in Warsaw.

Gentile said such eavesdropping installations were possible in the first years after World War II, when U.S. diplomats moved into buildings which had not been under U.S. guard.

"The technological advances of electronics and miniaturization have made these wired systems obsolete" and "round-the-clock guarding of U.S. embassies prevents hostile agents from maintaining them," he said.

Under a recently completed U.S.-Soviet agreement for new embassies in each other's capital, U.S. negotiators insisted on control over constructing the interior of the new building in Moscow and on guarding the premises during construction.

"Over the years since the second World War," Gentile said, "technical espionage has become an increasing hazard to the security of our diplomatic missions overseas."

He said the spying attempts continue regardless of changes in the international political climate and that espionage devices "are uncovered with alarming regularity."

WASHINGTON STAR
1 December 1972

WASHINGTON CLOSE-UP

A Different Kind of Integration

By GEORGE SHERMAN

Integration is the name of the game these days in world affairs.

It is not integration of races, as in the searing struggle inside the United States. It is integration of politics and economics inside the transatlantic community, and between that community and Soviet Europe. The aim: To prevent those sudden shifts in the life of nations which lead to power confrontations.

For this job, the power managers have taken over, the master manipulators who are pronouncing requiem mass to the age of ideology. Men like Richard M. Nixon and Leonid I. Brezhnev are left to build what Nixon had grandly christened a "new structure of peace."

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The base of that structure still is exceedingly fragile. It rests on something so unpredictable as the leadership makeup inside the Soviet Union. Today Brezhnev and his Communist brand of technocrats obviously are in control.

But who in the outside world knows how long they will last? Brezhnev's health, for instance, is a matter of increasing concern. At 65, he is reported to have cirrhosis of the liver and to have suffered two heart attacks. This week he has paid a visit to Hungary which was postponed from September, partly due to a three-week hospitalization this autumn.

To insure against sudden shifts, with or without Brezhnev, Nixon is moving at a measured pace to engage the Soviet Union in a fabric of co-operation any future leader will find hard to break.

That is the political meaning from the spurt of economic deals with the Russians this year — the opening of 40 Soviet and U.S. ports to each other's shipping, the new trade



LEONID BREZHNEV

pact, the presidential order to make Moscow eligible for Export-Import Bank credits, the first stimulation of American industrial exports to the Soviet Union, the move toward a multibillion-dollar U.S. investment in producing, shipping and buying Siberian natural gas.

All of these deals have their own economic justification. The Soviet economy is seriously in need of a boost, and U.S. capital and knowhow have been itching for years to get into this huge market.

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But the steady interlocking of the two superpower economies is as much a part of the Nixon recipe for peace as limiting nuclear weapons or avoiding confrontation in the Middle East.

The problem is how to mesh this game of Soviet-American integration with the crying need for greater integration of politics and economics inside the Western alliance. Nixon fervently believes the NATO "position of strength" is key to guaranteeing Soviet restraint in Europe. Yet his separate dealings with Moscow

threaten the cohesion of NATO.

The recent North Atlantic Assembly of American and European parliamentarians in Bonn dramatized the problem. The final resolution warned of "grave stresses and strains" in the alliance caused by private dealings between Moscow and Washington. Sen. Edward M. Kennedy called for a return to transatlantic consultation "if we are to avoid a slide into jungle politics and jungle economics."

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The administration has moved quickly to counter these charges of neglect. On Dec. 6 Secretary of State William P. Rogers goes to the semiannual talkfest of NATO foreign ministers in Brussels to work out final plans for the talks which the United States and a nucleus of allies open with the Soviet Union and its allies in January on reducing NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Europe.

But even these first East-West talks on European arms levels threaten to run up against a separate Soviet-American nuclear talks already under way in Geneva.

The Nixon administration must decide where to discuss, if at all, the so-called "forward base systems" — the medium-range nuclear forces that both superpowers maintain in Europe.

If reduction of these forces is to be agreed, should Washington and Moscow do it between themselves in Geneva, or with their allies as part of mutual and balanced force reduction in Europe?

The answer may not be of world-shattering consequences. But details like these determine the course of intricate engagements Nixon is building between the superpowers, and between each of them and the new Europe.

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
30 November 1972

Was the Cold War Really Necessary?

By ARTHUR SCHLESINGER JR.

Who among us could have supposed that Richard M. Nixon, the relentless Communist hunter of our youth, would end exchanging jolly toasts with Chou En-lai in Peking and sleeping peacefully at the Kremlin in Moscow? Who could possibly have imagined that both Soviet Russia and Communist China would end backing Mr. Nixon for reelection as President of the United States?

It almost seems as if Mr. Nixon has turned out to be the star pupil at what, in youthful exuberance, he used to call "Dean Acheson's College of Cowardly Communist Containment." Containment was cowardly in 1952, of course, because it implied the possibility of living with communism rather than erasing it from the face of the planet. Now Mr. Nixon himself has become Number One Co-exister.

Given Mr. Nixon's impressive switch, it is hardly surprising that many people are beginning to wonder whether the Cold War itself was absolutely necessary—whether the emotion and the expense of those brave old days when America was manning the battlements

fered so ferociously in the Second World War, as the Russians; none had such urgent reasons to safeguard their own frontiers and especially to make sure that the historic invasion corridors through Eastern Europe would not be used again by hostile armies. This concern underlay the Soviet determination to make Eastern Europe a Russian sphere-of-influence and therefore to regard Western efforts to shape the politics of Eastern Europe as a threat to Soviet security.

The Wilsonian Tradition

The Americans came out of the war with a different and incompatible theory of the post-war world. Steeped in the Wilsonian tradition, we opposed what Roosevelt called "the exclusive alliances, the spheres of influence, the balances of power, and all the other expedients that have been tried for centuries—and have always failed." By this universalist view, all nations had an equal interest in all the affairs of the globe (except Latin America, where we deemed ourselves more equal than the rest). The security of each nation was to be provided for by a universal peace organization, the United Nations.

The universalist and sphere-of-influence approaches to the peace were bound to collide. Each superpower believed that its own safety as well as world peace depended on the success of its own peculiar conception of world order. Each superpower, in pursuing its own clearly expressed and ardently cherished principles, only confirmed the fear of the other that it was bent on aggression. Ideological differences charged the structural argument with moralistic and eventually messianic fervor. So the Soviet Union, seeing itself as wounded and vulnerable, persuaded that capitalism was by definition out to do communism in, moved after 1945 to strengthen and consolidate its own position.

In retrospect it seems possible that Soviet policy in the forties was, initially at least, one of rather limited objectives, and it seems probable that the Soviet Union was acting more on defensive grounds and on local considerations than the West realized. The revisionists have helped us understand this. But does this mean that the Soviet Union posed no threat at all?—that, if there had been no Truman Doctrine, no Marshall Plan, no NATO, no rearmament, no response to the Berlin blockade or to the invasion of South Korea, Western Europe could have relied on the self-restraint and compassion of a Stalin who, as described by his daughter and his successor, was growing more paranoid every day? Had the democracies not rallied, would not the temptation dangle before Moscow to keep enlarging its sphere-of-influence, always on the pretext of rendering its own borders more secure, have been irresistible?

What of the other part of the revisionist argument—that the United States was the aggressor, required by the internal needs of American capitalism to establish world hegemony? Certainly it is hard to contend that America in the forties planned extensive military action or saw the Soviet Union as a military threat. Even as the Cold War intensified, the United States cut back its military establishment until the armed forces were reduced

to almost one-eighth their wartime size. In 1917-50 national security expenditures averaged \$13 billion a year—\$13 billion! By 1919 the Army was down to ten active divisions. This was hardly the military posture of a nation contemplating world empire. Nor did Washington heed those like Bertrand Russell who urged the use of the atomic bomb to compel the Russians to good behavior.

An 'All-Purpose Explanation'

As for the economic interpretation of American policy, this rests on the all-purpose explanation applied by the dean of revisionist historians, William Appleman Williams, to all American history—that American foreign policy has always been determined by the need of capitalist expansion to enforce an "open door" for American trade and investment everywhere on the globe. Unquestionably Washington after the war sought a freely trading world. But it was plainly not this desire that prompted American concern about Soviet policy in Eastern Europe, where the American stake in markets, investment outlets and raw materials was negligible. That concern rose rather from the fear that, as the Russians hardened their grip on Eastern Europe, they would use their zone as a springboard from which they could, through the local Communist parties, dominate Western Europe, lying economically prostrate and politically vulnerable before them.

One has only to reflect on the fact that the Socialist leaders of Western Europe, who could not have cared less about an "open door" for American capitalism—men like Attlee and Bevin in England, Blum, Ramadier and Moch in France, Schumacher and Reuter in Germany, Spaak in Belgium—were at the forefront of the opposition to the Stalinization of Europe. Indeed they regarded Washington's response to this threat as unduly tentative and slow. Nor, for that matter, were American leaders in the forties all that obsessively anti-Communist. In China, for example, Truman sent the most venerated of Americans, General Marshall, to work for a coalition between Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung—a futile mission but not one that corroborates the revisionist thesis.

Revisionists often cite the Bretton Woods agreements as a first step in the master plan of American capitalism to dominate the world. Yet the architect of Bretton Woods was Harry D. White, who, whatever his precise relationship to communism (and this was doubtless overstated in the McCarthy days) could hardly be described as a tool of capitalism or as an enemy of the Soviet Union. The one American to talk much in those days about the open door ("we cannot permit the door to be closed against our trade in Eastern Europe any more than we can in China"—1947) was not Truman nor Acheson nor any of those wicked fellows but Henry A. Wallace. The fact that Wallace simultaneously demanded an open door for American capitalism and opposed the policy of containment conclusively demonstrates that belief in the open door could lead equally to containment or to appeasement. It was the belief that Sta-

Board of Contributors

of freedom against the wicked Communist hordes were not to some degree misplaced. In the universities a new historical school has arisen dedicated to a reexamination of the Cold War and a reinterpretation of the respective roles of the United States and the Soviet Union.

The original thesis was, of course, that the United States was responding to an unprovoked policy of expansion by the Soviet Union. Under the theological touch of John Foster Dulles, this more sober formulation escalated into the apocalyptic view that America was selflessly lending what was then officially designated in capital letters as the Free World against the Communist master plan of world conquest; it was, we were instructed, good against evil, light against darkness.

The revisionist reaction, elaborated in a series of minutely-footnoted books and articles, is that the American people were systematically deceived by their post-war Presidents; that the United States rather than the Soviet Union was the aggressor; that the American government churned out anti-Communist propaganda in order to cloak its real intentions, which were to establish American political, economic and military hegemony throughout the world; and that (in the view, at least, of the more extreme revisionists) the American government had no choice but to pursue this course because it was the instrument of a capitalist system compelled to expand in order to survive.

How at this point would one assess the revisionist critique of the official theory of the Cold War? One part of this critique will have, I think, a lasting influence. That is the revisionist insistence on looking at post-war problems from the Soviet as well as from the Western viewpoint. For the Soviet Union at the end of the war had its clear and legitimate concerns—above all, the concern to assure its own national security. No people suf-

linism posed a grave threat to democratic societies which led uniquely to containment. The issue in Europe, as the American government saw it in the forties, lay not between capitalism and socialism but between democracy and Stalinism.

Some Unscrupulous Manipulation.

The open-door wing of the revisionists (this includes, so far as I can see, most of them) is committed to reducing everything to economic motives. Unable to find much concrete evidence of commercial motivation, they have on occasion resorted to what can only be called an unscrupulous manipulation of the documents. Professor R. J. Maddox of Pennsylvania State University has undertaken the tedious task of tracing footnotes back to sources in revisionist history; and the result of his labors, soon to be published by the Princeton University Press under the title "The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War," is a quiet but devastating indictment of revisionist scholarship. Eugene V. Rostow in his recent book "Peace in the Balance" (Yale University Press) deals cogently with revisionist distortions of Soviet-American economic relations in 1944-1946. L. A. Rose in "After Yalta" (Scribners) effectively revises revisionism in a number of particulars. All these works cast further doubt on revisionists of the economic school.

Revisionists of this school must be especially hard put now to explain President Nixon's conversion to Henry Wallaceism. Why should American capitalism require tension in one period and detente in another? Or, pos-

sibly, are economic considerations less potent than political? And does the devotion our President has evidently melted in Peking and Moscow mean that the Cold War is over?

Obviously the Cold War has vastly changed since the days of Stalin. Then the West confronted a coordinated international movement responsive to Soviet control. This confrontation, as interpreted by men like Dulles and the early Nixon, led to a gross fallacy—the fallacy that ideology is more powerful in international affairs than national interest. This fallacy beguiled many Americans into assuming the indivisibility of communism—into supposing that, if two nations declared themselves Marxist-Leninist, they would forever after act in harmony; that the extension of communism automatically meant the extension of Russian, or of Chinese, power. Too many Americans persisted in this fallacy long after Yugoslavia, China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and Cuba showed how foolish it was. President Nixon has finally learned better. For this he deserves credit.

The fragmentation of the Communist world has reduced the danger of nuclear war. It has created new opportunities for American diplomacy. But it is hard to say that it has ended the Cold War. For issues will continue between democracy and communism so long as the Communist powers reject what they call "ideological coexistence"—the free exchange and discussion of ideas. Diplomatic accommodation with Russia and China is excellent and necessary; but diplomatic cordial-

ity should not delude us into repeating wartime error and believing that, because countries become our allies, they are different from what they are.

Russia and China remain very tough societies, based on the infallibility of the man who happens to be chief of state (other men, other infallibilities). Nor does it seem likely that detente will temper despotism. On the contrary: Andrei Sakharov, the physicist who is fighting so courageously for civil liberties in Russia, recently described the effect of the Nixon visit to Moscow: "The authorities seem more impudent because they feel that, with detente, they can ignore Western public opinion, which isn't going to be concerned with internal freedom in Russia." Government-to-government detente may well stimulate Soviet and Chinese leaders to clamp down all the harder at home in order to guard against the new prestige of un-Communist ideas. Whatever the diplomatic arrangements great powers may find it convenient to make among themselves, the Cold War in a quite vital form will still continue—at least for those who believe in intellectual freedom as a value for all humanity.

Mr. Schlesinger is Albert Schweitzer professor of the humanities at the City University of New York and winner of Pulitzer prizes in history and biography. He is also a member of the Journal's board of contributors, four distinguished professors who contribute periodic articles reflecting a broad range of views.

WASHINGTON STAR
28 November 1972

CROSBY S. NOYES

Arms Negotiations: Now Comes the Hard Part

Phase II of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) has now opened in Geneva amid official expressions of hope and profound misgivings in other quarters. If things go well, it could be one of the most fateful negotiations of all time. If not, it could be a complete bust.

Certainly the talks with the Russians will be long and difficult. Phase I of SALT—the easy part—took about 30 months, ending with the agreements signed by President Nixon during his visit to Moscow last May. The present series could go on for three or four years.

The first phase had very limited objectives. It produced a permanent treaty limiting the deployment of defensive nuclear weapons to 200 on each side and a five-year interim agreement setting ceilings on land-based offensive missiles and missile-carrying submarines.

The goal of the present negotiation is to extend the interim agreement to all forms of strategic weapons, including heavy bombers, but it also will try to set limits to technological improvements of existing

weapons systems, such as multiple warheads on offensive missiles. If successful, it will take the form of a treaty of indefinite duration that will freeze the balance of nuclear power between the United States and the Soviet Union once and for all.

There is some reason to believe that the talks may succeed. Phase I of SALT provided fairly solid evidence that the Russians are as anxious as we are to put some limits on the enormously expensive and probably futile race for strategic superiority. It also showed that, given a reasonable amount of good will, the most complex technical problems eventually can be resolved.

But there is reason, too, for the misgivings about what was accomplished in the earlier round of negotiations and what may be expected in the future. The basic principle of the exercise, in Nixon's words, is that neither side in the negotiation should seek "unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly." And there are some critics who contend that this is

exactly what the Russians are, in fact, trying to do.

The most articulate and expert of these critics is Sen. Henry M. Jackson of Washington who believes, quite simply, that the United States was taken to the cleaners by the Russians in SALT I. The main reason, he contends, is that American strategists never have managed to develop a coherent strategic doctrine to guide them in their negotiations on arms control. As a result, the American negotiators conceded a 50 percent advantage to the Soviet Union in land and sea-based missiles under the terms of the interim agreement. In Jackson's view, "the history of the American position is one of unimpeded deterioration."

The senator takes sharp issue with the concept of "minimum nuclear deterrence" that is now fashionable in the arms control community and which is an offshoot of Nixon's doctrine of "nuclear sufficiency." Essentially, this concept limits the role of the American strategic force to one of striking back at Russian allies after a direct attack against the United States. All that is nec-

essary for deterrence is a capacity to destroy a certain percentage of Soviet cities and industry. According to this school of thought, as long as this capacity is maintained, it makes no real difference how great the numerical advantage of the Russians in nuclear weapons may be.

The critics, including Jackson, vehemently disagree. The Russians, they argue, are perfectly capable of building a nuclear arsenal of such size that a small part of it would represent a grave threat to the survivability of the American retaliatory force. The existence of a large Soviet reserve force would greatly reduce the likelihood of any American retaliation and destroy the credibility of the nuclear protection which the United States extends to its allies.

If the theory of minimum deterrence and the acceptance of the present Soviet quantitative advantage are carried over into the next phase of the SALT negotiations, the critics fear, the United States would be condemned to a permanent state of strategic inferiority to the Soviet Union. Whatever qualitative edge the Ameri-

cans may hold today in terms of multiple warheads and more advanced submarines, it is certain to be overcome by the Russians in a relatively short time.

The only basis for a permanent agreement on offensive arms limitation, therefore, must be one of close numeri-

cal equality between the two superpowers. And since this will mean a drastic reduction in the size of the Soviet strategic reserve permitted under the interim agreement, the dimensions of the difficulty for Phase II of the SALT negotiations are quite clear.

WASHINGTON POST

Tuesday, Nov. 28, 1972



Marquis Childs

Cold Warriors Aim at SALT II

WITH A SUCCESSION of diplomatic triumphs in his first term, President Nixon seemed to write an end to the cold war. The promise of a "generation of peace" was certainly one reason for the huge victory he scored.

While they may be only the remnants of the once formidable ranks of cold war warriors, holding out in the last redoubt, there is an articulate and well-heeled opposition to the arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union. It will zero in on any new limitations on offensive missiles coming out of SALT II, the second round of arms negotiation with the Soviets just opened in Geneva.

The American Security Council talks the language of the cold war of the '60s. But more important than rhetoric is the council's muscle in men and money. Listed as co-chairmen of the propaganda organization are three former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a gaggle of former commanding generals of the Air Force, former ambassadors,

notable physicists, including Edward Teller ("father of the H-bomb") and corporate executives who in some instances have large defense contracts.

THE CURRENT DRIVE of the council and its brother organization, the Institute for American Strategy, is to push for showing on the nation's television screens a 27-minute film, "Only the Strong." It calls for greatly increased defense spending, with the charge that the United States is rapidly falling behind the Soviet Union if it is not already second in nuclear striking power.

Even those who challenge its accuracy agree that the color film is a brilliant piece of work. Produced by the Institute, which stresses its tax-exempt privilege, it was written and directed by Harry Treleven. He directed the Nixon television operation in the 1968 campaign and is the *deus ex machina* in that implish book, "The Selling of the President." Two active-duty Air Force generals are interviewed to support the thesis that the United States is hopelessly slipping behind

in the nuclear arms race.

The film has already been shown on 260 of the nation's 940 television stations. On some stations the showing has been sponsored, which means since the sponsor puts in his plug that it is tax deductible. More often it has been shown as part of so-called public service programming.

TO WHAT DEGREE this conditions the climate of opinion no one can say. Those who have studied the film and audience response believe the effect is more subliminal than direct. That is to say a viewer may not remember any specific statements but he comes away with a feeling that disarmament is somehow dangerous and that we'd better go ahead and build everything on the drawing board.

This could be important when and if the new round of SALT talks produces what are certain to be more complicated and perhaps controversial agreements. The fear of Soviet superiority surfaced, thanks to Sen. Henry M. (Scoop) Jackson (D-Wash.), when the agreement to limit antiballistic

missiles and the five-year limitation on offensive missiles came before the Senate.

Jackson succeeded in putting through, by a vote of 58 to 35, an amendment stating that in any future treaty the United States should not agree "to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union." Involved was an extended argument over numbers of missiles as against deliverable destructive megatonnage force.

THE COLD WAR credo of the council and the institute will have greater weight in the debate certain to arise in the new Congress over reducing the \$77 billion defense budget. The new Trident long-range missile-bearing submarine with nearly \$1 billion in the budget, the \$450 million for the new manned bomber and other gadgets will be stoutly defended by those who insist America must "catch up" with the Soviet giant. And in this interpretation these must be part of the American arsenal and not merely "bargaining chips" at the SALT poker table.

Far East

The New Leader

November 27, 1972

The Nixon Doctrine

A FEW WEEKS ago, when Richard Nixon attacked "the so-called opinion leaders of this country" for not supporting his bombing and mining of North Vietnam, liberals had no difficulty in discerning that the man suffers from a grievous misunderstanding of the function of a free press. According to the President, "the leaders of the media" are supposed to grasp "the necessity to stand by the President of the United States when he makes a terribly difficult, potentially unpopular decision." The leaders of both South and North Vietnam, not to mention Spain and East Germany, would cry a heartfelt Amen to that principle; most professional journalists at home, we may be grateful, are likely to prove less responsive. As Orwell emphasized, however, inhibitions on open discussion do not come exclusively from the government.

If we set aside bribes and jails, nothing is more inhibiting of candor than partisanship. That rule has been forcefully demonstrated in the controversy over the American prisoners of war held by North Vietnam and the possibility of a "bloodbath" in the South following an American withdrawal. Both issues are spurious. We have not been in Vietnam all these years to prevent a bloodbath or to get back our pilots; these are the last of a long line of justifications, and their exploitation by the Administration to pardon every military action has been revolting.

When President Nixon told the POW families, "Your loved ones have and are paying a price for their choice, and those who deserted America will pay a price for their choice," he was pandering to their emotions and insulting their reason.

Unfortunately, the Administration's crooked line has been countered by disingenuous behavior from the antiwar camp. The peace partisans who were permitted by North Vietnam to bring back a few prisoners played to the hilt their role as message-bearers for North Vietnam; indeed, that was their main job. They were attempting their own manipulation of people's emotions. No word of criticism was forthcoming from David Dellinger on the failure of the North Vietnamese to permit Red Cross observers to visit their prison camps. We knew pretty well what Ramsey Clark and Jane Fonda would say before they returned from their trips.

On the argument over the possibility of a postwar bloodbath, the large figures used so loosely by the President have been rebutted by assurances from the Left that the North Vietnamese rulers are reasonable folks who can be counted on to do their killing selectively—just officials and landowners. Richard Barnett tells us that when he discussed the matter of reprisals with Premier Pham Van Dong of North Vietnam, the latter "stated flatly, 'There will be no reprisals.'" Barnett reminds me of those people who used to assure the world that the Russians could never persecute Jews because the Soviet Constitution forbade anti-Semitism.

WASHINGTON STAR

1 December 1972

Laos Narcotics Case Moves at Snail's Pace

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE
Star-News Special Correspondent

VIENTIANE — Laos has so far failed to prosecute one of the highest ranking alleged heroin traffickers caught here. He is Mou Seu, a Laos National Assembly deputy for the northern Laos province of Xieng Khouang.

In May, Laos narcotics squad officers led by squad chief Gen. Khammu Boulsarath raided Mou Seu's house in Vientiane and said they uncovered 13.2 kilos of Grade 4 heroin stowed away in the roof.

Deputy Mou Seu, however, could not be brought to trial at the time as he claimed immunity from arrest as an assembly member while the Assembly is in session.

Later in the session Mou Seu and his co-deputy from Xieng Khouang, Chao Sopsasana who also has allegedly been involved in heroin traffic after an incident in which police in Paris found a suitcase full of heroin among his luggage, tried with other deputies to get the Laos anti-narcotics laws revoked but failed to receive enough assembly votes.

The Assembly session ran from May 11 till November 11. When the assembly closed, Mou Seu as of Nov. 11 was no longer immune to prosecution.

But nothing has happened yet and U.S. officials are now keeping watch on the case as a feeling of disquiet grows in U.S. circles that Mou Seu may wiggle out of being prosecuted.

The Laos National Assembly

ly has proved rambunctious for Premier Souvanna Phouma's government, holding back its vote for government policies to force government release of funds to Assembly members, diplomats say, and the government could be under pressure to drag its feet on the Mou Sou case to avoid problems in next year's session.

However, informed sources say that in response to inquiries Lao judicial sources have said that Mou Sou will shortly be brought before a Lao tribunal in Vientiane to face heroin possession charges.

THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS
Washington, D. C., Friday, November 24, 1972

Jailers Amicable, Freed POW Says

LOS ANGELES (UPI) — American prisoners get along well with their North Vietnamese jailers — playing games, joking, swapping family anecdotes and gardening — according to a released POW.

An interview with Navy Lt. (j.g.) Norris Charles, describing life in a North Vietnamese POW camp, was published yesterday by the Los Angeles Times.

Charles and two other prisoners were released two months ago in a move Charles said "was just to show the American people that if the war is ended, the North Vietnamese will release all the POWs."

Norris said one of his first surprises came as he floated to earth below his parachute after his plane was knocked out of the sky by a missile that exploded about 90 feet away, and he found his captors were not hostile.

Pride of Conquest

"As they run up to me, they were laughing. I could see no animosity on their faces. I think their apparent happiness was a combination of jubilation and pride of conquest. They take pride in shooting you down, but they're not hostile really, even though we bomb their houses every day."

Charles described the POWs as well fed, getting three nourishing meals a day even on days when camp routine is disrupted by U.S. bombing raids.

"One of the most important things in the life of a POW," he said is that on six holidays — the American holidays of Christmas, Easter, July 4th and New Year's Day plus Vietnamese Tet (New Year's Day) and North Vietnam's National Day — the prisoners are given large festive meals.

es.

On Sept. 18 in Washington, President Nixon was reported as telling the Conference on International Narcotics Control "A government whose leaders participate in or protect the activities of those who contribute to our problem should know that the President of the United States is required by statute to suspend all American economic and military assistance to such a regime."

"I shall not hesitate to comply fully and promptly with this statute."

New Year's Day, he said, to a meal of "boiled eggs, a nice salad, duck and a whole bunch of other stuff. I couldn't believe it. It was like something in the movies, but hardly what I expected in an enemy prison camp.

Guards Show Interest

"My guard and I would talk all the time," even when he was in solitary confinement for his first 36 days, Charles said. "He would walk in and just talk. The guards are just as interested in the American people as we might be in them under different circumstances. We talked mostly about our families, our kids, they weren't interrogating. Just passing the time... We used to make jokes with the guards. They never gave their names but we would make up names for them like 'Smiley' and 'Champ.'"

"There was one guard we thought was crazy but he was a good guy and watched over us well. In fact, he even shaved one prisoner who had a broken arm and couldn't shave himself."

"There was no animosity between prisoner and guard. The guards watching over us were very human and humane."

Charles said the prisoners were given playing cards, chess sets and so much literature, including American books and clippings from periodicals, that "I read more there than I had in college." They also had a small plot where they could grow vegetables and raise chickens.

NEW YORK TIMES
3 December 72

Indonesia Rice Yield Down; 60 Said to Die of Starvation

JAKARTA, Indonesia, Dec. 2 (AP)—Indonesia's rice crop, plagued by drought, is expected to fall about 425,000 tons, short of the 12-million-ton demand and already about 60 people have reportedly died of starvation.

Rice prices have more than doubled in the last three months in some areas, including central and eastern Java where more than 50 million people live.

President Suharto, just back from a trip to Western Europe where he sought aid, discussed the crisis today with the chief of his national planning board, but there was no word of Government plans.

NEW YORK TIMES
1 December 72

An Earlier Bloodbath

By Max Gordon

The Nixon charge of a "bloodbath" in North Vietnam after the 1954 Geneva Conference has been widely debated but silence shrouds the bloodbath which did occur in the South at the time. This is curious and unfortunate, since the conditions which gave rise to the savage repressions of the Diem regime have persisted in Saigon and the peril of repetition is not small.

Reports of murder and torture in South Vietnam's jails have not been lacking throughout the war. And recently, the Provisional Revolutionary Government has let it be known that it has seen official Saigon instructions to prison authorities to do away with unregenerate political prisoners before any settlement which would free them. The information has stirred Amnesty International to try to protect these prisoners, reportedly numbering well over 100,000, from being transformed into voiceless corpses.

The Pentagon Papers tell us that former Vietminh cadres—Communist and non-Communist activists in the independence war against France—were virtually wiped out in the "Anti-Communist Denunciation Campaign" initiated in the summer of 1955. They had placed all reliance upon peaceful political competition to culminate in the mandated 1956 military elections. The Pentagon account maintains that some 50,000 to 100,000 were tossed into "detention camps" in 1955-56. While giving no figures on deaths, the account says many were killed. Others have estimated the killings at 75,000 or more.

An Indian in the service of the International Control Commission set up to police the Geneva Agreements, B. S. N. Murti, reported that even before this the peasantry had been subjected to police and troop terror. Most rural hamlets (estimates have run as high as 90 per cent) had associated themselves with the Vietminh in the anti-French war. Diem dispatched

troops to break the Vietminh hold. Murti, who was there, reports that peasants were shot down and arrested "indiscriminately."

This indiscriminate terror, Murti tells us, was only the first stage of the Diem repression. It was followed by a more deliberately planned effort to "weed out undesirable elements." The targets were ex-Vietminh cadres in positions of local leadership. Large numbers were imprisoned "without any trial." Murti writes that the International Control Commission, though barred by Saigon from moving into affected areas, did manage to investigate some arrests and concluded that there was a deliberate plan to sabotage the antireprisal provisions of the Geneva Agreements.

The "Anti-Communist Denunciation Campaign" was the third stage of Diem's expanding repressions, and was also marked by "large numbers" of murders and arrests of both Communists and non-Communists. In the North, Murti observed, there were no such reprisals against the other side because France's sympathizers had been few and these had gone south

under the Geneva proviso for voluntary departure.

Philippe Devillers, leading French historian of modern Indochina, reported that the Diem regime in effect outlawed those who had fought for Vietnamese independence against France. In 1957 still another series of "manhunts" was launched against both Communists and all others who disagreed with Diem's oligarchic rule. Round-ups were frequent and brutal. Large numbers were sent to concentration camps and torture was common. Devillers maintains that there are "serious reasons" for supposing that these repressive measures were "encouraged" by American advisers in Saigon. "The de facto integration of South Vietnam into the American military defense structure," he has written, "implied that the regime ought to be . . . purged of anything which might, however remotely, serve the Red Cause."

In the end, Diem's bloodbaths and detention camps brought war to America and all Indochina. As the Pentagon account and other serious studies of Vietnam have concluded, these re-

pressive measures gave birth to an indigenous southern rebellion against the Saigon Government which matured into full-scale war.

After eighteen years of relentless, costly, bloody effort, Washington has failed to change the nature of Saigon regimes as alien-imposed, politically isolated autocracies. In case of a truce, Thieu is thus likely to attempt the same measures as Diem—the physical extermination of those capable of organizing an effective political opposition. Washington is hardly likely to oppose him in this any more than it had opposed Diem. This, after all, has been its primary objective in many years of warfare. It is left to America's antiwar elements to spur popular domestic and worldwide pressures on Washington and Saigon in order to prevent a new wave of bloodbaths in the South.

Max Gordon, a writer on scientific matters, is a former editor of *The Daily Worker*.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, DECEMBER 1, 1972

'The Terms Amount to Surrender'

By Francis L. Loewenheim

HOUSTON — President Nixon has described the cease-fire terms, first reported by Hanoi radio on Oct. 25 and discussed by Mr. Kissinger at a press conference the following day, as "peace with honor and not peace with surrender" and as ushering in what he has called "a generation of peace."

On the contrary, it seems clear that, stripped of Mr. Kissinger's obfuscating rhetoric, these terms amount to nothing less than a thinly disguised surrender to Communist terrorism and aggression. They are surrender on the installment plan, the most shocking betrayal of its kind since Britain and France, with President Roosevelt's indirect support, agreed to the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in September, 1939.

If the manner in which the cease-fire agreement first became known was not sufficiently disturbing, it is appalling to note that the American people have still not been told by their Government the specific terms of that agreement, and strangely enough it seems not to have occurred to any journalist or newspaper — including those most anxious to publish the purloined Pentagon Papers — to demand the full and immediate publication of these terms.

The terms of the agreement that have already been disclosed, however,

are bad enough. In the first place, the tens of thousands of North Vietnamese troops, who crossed the so-called "demilitarized zone" set up by the 1954 Geneva Conference, are to be permitted to stay where they are. All American troops and advisers, on the other hand, are to be withdrawn within sixty days of the signing of the agreement, and so are all South Korean and other allied forces still in South Vietnam. Since the Nixon Administration has issued no maps or statistics, it is not known how large an area or how many people will be left under Communist control, but we may be sure that both are considerable — living proof that aggression does indeed pay.

Next, although South Vietnam remains largely dependent on continued American logistic support, the United States has apparently agreed to send South Vietnam only replacements of weapons previously supplied. What will the United States do if the North Vietnamese and other Communist states including China and Russia illegally resupply the Communist forces remaining behind in South Vietnam?

The cease-fire agreement establishes a so-called "Council of National Reconciliation of Concord" for the avowed purpose of conducting "free and democratic" elections. Recalling what happened in East Germany, Poland and various Balkan countries after 1945, do President Nixon and Mr. Kissinger really believe, and expect the Ameri-

can people to believe, that the Vietcong and North Vietnamese will permit "free and democratic" elections in the areas under their control?

At his press conference Mr. Kissinger suggested that once a cease-fire had gone into effect the United States would "contribute significantly" to the reconstruction of North Vietnam. Such promised assistance — and its likely glowing results — may be compared with the assistance the United States extended to Germany and Japan after 1945. The United States did not, however, extend economic aid to Hitler and to the Japanese Government that gave us Pearl Harbor.

Since the Vietnamese conflict was the result of the determination of successive Congresses and Presidents — Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon — that South Vietnam should be permitted to decide its own destiny, it seems incredible that the United States should, in effect, have agreed to cease-fire terms with the enemies of South Vietnam largely against the wishes of that Government.

If the South Vietnamese Government should now refuse to sign the proposed cease-fire agreement, among other things, on the ground that North Vietnamese troops will continue to occupy parts of its territory, will the United States find ways and means to coerce its ally into signing, will the United States sign alone, or will the United States recognize the justified

objections of the South Vietnamese?

It seems apparent that the cease-fire terms, or what we know of them up to this time, make no provision for what is to be done in the not unlikely event that the cease-fire breaks down. Suppose that, after a respectable interval, Communist-backed subversion, terrorism and open aggression resume against what remains of South Vietnam? In that event, will the United States stand by and watch South Vietnam be destroyed much as the

Western democracies watched helplessly as Hitler took over what remained of Czechoslovakia six months after Munich?

Finally, it may be understandable that big-business-oriented newspapers, with visions of a lucrative postwar "China trade" dancing in their heads, should entertain hopes of some sort of peace settlement in Indochina and a relaxation of tensions in Europe and the Pacific. It is more difficult to understand, however, why President

Nixon, who coasted to an overwhelming re-election victory, should try to persuade the American people that the nature and objectives of international Communism, whether directed from Moscow and Peking or not, have changed significantly from what they were in 1917 or 1945, 1956 or 1968.

Francis L. Loewenhardt is associate professor of history at Rice University.

NEW YORK TIMES

6 December 72

The View From Hanoi

By Tom Hayden

HANOI, North Vietnam—There is growing skepticism in North Vietnam about Washington's willingness to sign the nine-point peace agreement—or to implement it, if signed.

I found in my third trip here since 1965 that the peace agreement is viewed as a major step forward in a long struggle against American intervention in the South. Since they wrote and proposed the agreement themselves, it can be assumed that Hanoi's leadership finds the accords favorable.

In substance, indeed, the agreement represents more of the Hanoi-N.L.F. position than that of Washington or Saigon. Complete U.S. military withdrawal, agreement on the principle of a three-segment administration in the South, recognition of the unity of Vietnam: these points embody the long-standing demands for an end to U.S. involvement and for self-determination, after eighteen years of a U.S.-dominated regime in Saigon. Compared to Geneva in 1954, when they had to demobilize their armed forces and enter into a political process organized by the U.S.-Diem regime, the Vietnamese view these pending accords as a major victory.

They consider the agreement part of their "military, political and diplomatic" offensive which began in March with battles in Quang Tri Province. Even by Western press accounts, they have destroyed more than half the conventional armed forces of Saigon, and the spectacular desertion rate of that army has jumped by 50 per cent to 22,500 per month since August. The liberation forces control virtually all the countryside and contend there

are even greater military moves to come if the agreement is not achieved.

The issue for the Vietnamese revolutionaries is how to win the cities, where four million people live, perhaps a million of them "middle class" with fears of Communism, the rest impoverished and without civil liberties. If the forces of the Provisional Revolutionary Government were to attack Saigon, the U.S. probably would bomb and kill tens of thousands of people. If President Thieu was assassinated, the U.S. would likely replace him with a new dictator. If urban demonstrations were attempted, as in Danang in May, Thieu's response would be more of the same brutal repression which has taken 15,000 people monthly since May, including most of the urban opposition groupings.

The agreement contains a solution to this problem from the Hanoi-P.R.G. viewpoint: a period of guaranteed political struggle in the cities after the U.S. departs. With the U.S. military power gone, they feel, Thieu would find it hard to continue police and military repression in the face of a popular desire for peace.

Given their position of strength, the Vietnamese believe they can modify their insistence on an immediate coalition government in the South. Instead, believing they have defeated Vietnamization through their offensive, they propose to allow the weakened Saigon regime to exist until after its U.S. military support is withdrawn, giving Henry Kissinger the "fig leaf" or "decent interval" he has so long desired to cover a U.S. departure.

This outlook is entirely different from that of Washington, and this is why the agreement may be delayed to

the point of collapse. President Nixon confuses damage with defeat. In pounding Vietnam's cities to rubble, making refugees of millions, he thinks Hanoi's war-making capability has been broken.

He is even more liable to think so when the terms of the other side become more conciliatory or appear to be compromised. The tendency is to confuse Hanoi's flexibility with weakness, then to intensify military escalation instead of taking the opportunity to negotiate.

If the illusion persists, the war will continue and, as the 1976 elections approach, will become a heavier burden for the incumbent government.

Mr. Nixon must know how badly hurt his allies have been, but seems to believe his enemies have been hurt even more. Therefore the President may feel that Hanoi has to have the agreement, but he wants to delay signing in order to rebuild "Vietnamization" or obtain a guarantee that Thieu can rule for four more years. But the Vietnamese will certainly not allow the rebuilding of the same "Vietnamization" apparatus which they have shed so much blood to destroy this year. Mr. Nixon cannot have the agreement and Vietnamization as well. If he thinks he can, he will either lose the agreement or, signing it, have to resume the bombing when the Saigon regime begins to collapse afterwards. He can only have the agreement work if he wants a face-saving retreat from Indochina.

Tom Hayden is a member of the Indochina Peace Campaign. He spent ten days in North Vietnam in mid-November.

WASHINGTON POST
3 December 1972

The Vietnam Talks: Ambiguity, Please

By Leslie H. Gelb and Anthony Lake

Gelb is a visiting professor at Georgetown University and a senior fellow at The Brookings Institution. Lake is currently working on foreign policy books for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Council on Foreign Relations.

PRESIDENT NIXON and Henry Kissinger are facing a genuine dilemma on the Vietnam negotiations. On the one hand, they are committed to a negotiated settlement. And that can be achieved only by agreeing to leave certain key issues (North Vietnamese troop withdrawals and political settlement) ambiguous. Without ambiguity, either Washington or Hanoi would have to admit defeat.

On the other hand, the President and Kissinger want a peace that will not break down quickly and lead to American reinvolved. That would require a high degree of precision on settlement terms. Without this precision, Hanoi and Saigon soon will set to quarreling and fighting. And reinforcing this latter horn of the dilemma is the desire in the White House to increase the chances of the survival of the Thieu regime.

Thus, no settlement without ambiguity and no "lasting" peace without precision. This is the crux of the negotiating problem today. This is the reason for delay.

Three attention-grabbing issues have obscured this problem from the public's view. Two of these are remnants from the presidential campaign, and the third is one of those pieces of Washington gossip that possess the plausibility to pass for fact.

First, could the same settlement terms have been negotiated in 1969? While we believe that a simple U.S. withdrawal in return for the release of U.S. prisoners would have been negotiable and would have saved three more years of death and suffering, this is not the present point. The October, 1972, agreement, a more comprehensive agreement, was made possible only by new concessions on both sides. Washington finally made explicit its acceptance of a standstill cease-fire which did not require North Vietnamese troop withdrawals from the South. Hanoi relented on a number of matters, including its insistence on a cease-fire only following a political settlement, and a political settlement based on a coalition government and the removal of President Thieu.

In sum, the answer is we probably could not have had the same agreement in 1969—but any improvement in terms has not been worth the awesome cost in lives lost.

Second, was the whole negotiating affair an electioneering fraud foisted on the public by the President? The answer must be no. It was Hanoi, not Washington, which brought the matter to a head with a new proposal in early October. It was Hanoi, not Washington, which first revealed in any detail the terms of the agreement that was then reached. There should be no doubt about the seriousness with which both parties treated the exercise. Of course, the breakthrough was tied to the November elections—but more on Hanoi's side when faced with the prospect of another four years of Mr. Nixon than on Mr. Nixon's efforts to find a substitute for Watergate.

Third, is there a Nixon-Kissinger split on what to do? According to the gossip, Nixon feels he has Hanoi on the ropes and now wants to drive a harder bargain than he got with the October accords. Kissinger supposedly is willing to push hard, but at less risk of losing what he has already accomplished. Few know whether the gossip is true or false, but whichever, it is of little consequence. The operational result is the same. Kissinger returns again to Paris tomorrow

not merely to dot the i's and cross the t's, but as part of an effort to reopen the basic terms of agreement.

Endangering the Accords

IN OTHER WORDS, the United States position has moved from acceptance of ambiguity to pressing for greater precision. This is documentable on the public record. At his Oct. 28 briefing, Kissinger struck the ambiguity theme by calling the arrangement "a compromise settlement in which neither side achieves everything, and in which both parties have the necessity of posturing themselves for their constituency." On Oct. 31, the President began the move to precision when he said he would not be rushed into an agreement that did not offer "the best hope for a lasting peace." Then, on Nov. 2, Mr. Nixon drove the point home: "There are still some provisions of the agreement which must be clarified so that all ambiguities will be removed."

In the process of moving from one horn of the dilemma to the other, the President is endangering the October accords. Both sides are stepping up military activities. Washington has flooded South Vietnam with massive new military equipment. There is evidence that Hanoi has instructed its forces to take advantage of the period

between an agreement and the actual cease-fire to launch a series of attacks in the South. Since late October, Thieu has been jailing "suspect Communists" at the rate of hundreds daily.

Negotiating positions are hardening all around. Saigon is insisting, for example, on total and explicit North Vietnamese troop withdrawal from South Vietnam, not just an understanding on partial withdrawals. It wants to see the proposed National Council of Reconciliation and Concord stripped of any power at all.

Washington seems to be supporting the thrust of Saigon's claims, although it is unclear how far it is pressing them. And, according to reports, Hanoi has refused to become less ambiguous on these points. Indeed, it has hardened its terms on other issues. For example, Hanoi now seeks the release of its political supporters in Thieu's jails at the same time it returns the Americans it holds captive—a point not previously covered, and a terribly sticky point, since Thieu would then hold the key to the release of U.S. POWs and have an interest in not using it.

The American effort to bring about greater precision serves several purposes. It is a way to keep Thieu happy, or make him less unhappy, by tilting the terms of agreement more in his favor. If Thieu is screaming about an

American sellout, it may spark some serious questioning of the agreement—particularly from the American right wing, but also by those who find instinctive pleasure in criticizing anything this administration does. It is also a way of narrowing the chances that any near-term disruption of the agreement by either or both Saigon and Hanoi will necessitate U.S. military reintervention. The period of maximum danger of reinvolverment is the first two years after the agreement. During this period, the President may still feel that American prestige and responsibility remain committed to enforcing the settlement.

Ambiguity Is the Price

MANY WOULD ARGUE that these purposes are worthy ones. But we should face the fact that whatever our desires for precision, there must and will be important ambiguities in a Vietnam agreement—if there is to be one. Indeed, all Americans should welcome an agreement that is ambiguous on some key points. The imprecision is the price of agreement.

Why? The reason is that there are two kinds of negotiations. One, for example on arms control, involves identifying mutual interests; a high degree of precision is then possible. The other, like the Vietnam negotiations, seeks to strike a balance between interests which are in irreconcilable conflict.

Hanoi still seeks the eventual reunification of Vietnam, that is, the completion of the Vietminh revolution of the late 1940s. The Saigon government remains unalterably opposed.

It seems to be a law of diplomacy that in such cases, successful negotiations depend on agreement about carefully devised ambiguities. Any Vietnam agreement which both sides can countenance will have to provide each with some chance for gaining its ends. Indeed, each would want to be able to interpret an agreement as giving it a better than even chance of ultimate success, or it won't go along. Hence, the necessity of ambiguity about the future.

This means that Hanoi must insist, at the least, on retaining some measure of imprecision on such key questions as the status of its forces now in the South and the future of the political process there. Anything less would be surrender. While Kissinger may gain some concessions on these or other points (such as a simultaneous Indochina-wide cease-fire and the reinstitution of the DMZ), he will get no iron-clad understanding on the troop withdrawal and political issues. So the "right" agreement on which the President is insisting may not be negotiable. An effort to achieve the "best" may be the enemy of what is good and achievable.

Some of Both

THUS, THE administration, Saigon and Hanoi should make sure that in their negotiating minutiae they do not allow their bargaining on precise terms to destroy the chances for agreement itself. For an agreement such as that worked out in October is in the interests of all concerned.

It gets the United States out of a barbaric war. It gets Hanoi out from under American bombs and the diplomatic pressures of Peking and Moscow, while leaving the future open. And it is the best negotiated agreement that Saigon is likely to get. Saigon's interest is admittedly at variance with that of the United States and North Vietnam: It would prefer no agreement at all and continued military protection by massive U.S. military forces. But such protection is not in the cards, and an agreement that leaves the future uncertain is better than no agreement and no protection.

In short, in this "final" effort to achieve precise agreement, the President should not risk what is already accomplished by attempting to achieve more than is possible. He cannot escape from the dilemma between the necessity for ambiguity and the benefits of precision. He will have to settle for some of both. In pressing too hard for a "lasting peace," he could risk getting no peace at all.

NEW YORK TIMES
5 December 72

Vietnam: A Lesson From History

By O. Edmund Clubb

The Presidential adviser, Henry A. Kissinger, flies to Paris, to Saigon, to Paris, and always back to Washington, saying, "peace, peace," when there is no peace. The war in Indochina goes on, for there can finally be only one victor and one vanquished force in that struggle, and neither yet concedes defeat.

To judge the potential for the future, reference to historical example can be instructive. In November, 1944, Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley, intervening to effect a peaceful compromise between the Nationalists and Communists in China, worked out together with the Communist leaders at Yenan a draft agreement that provided for a legal status for the Chinese Communist party and for creation of a coalition government. Hurley thought the plan good, and confidently submitted it to the Nationalists at Chungking, only to be rebuffed. Chiang Kai-shek would consent to no coalition govern-

ment, to no infringement of his autocratic power.

In January 1946 the successor to Hurley, General George C. Marshall, was instrumental in bringing the warring Chinese Nationalists and Communists together in a cease-fire arrangement, to be implemented by a tripartite (Nationalist, Communist, American) executive headquarters set up in Peking. It was provided that "All hostilities will cease immediately." However, hostilities resumed in full fury six months later; and in the end the Communists won.

The agreement reached in October 1972, between Mr. Kissinger and Hanoi's Le Duc Tho proposed in general a resolution of the military aspect of the Vietnam imbroglio. On its face, it gave the Nguyen Van Thieu regime in Saigon, with its million-man army and mountains of American ordnance, the long-prescribed "reasonable chance of survival." But in essence, by recognizing the National Liberation Front's political existence and its right to share in determination of South Vietnam's future through participation in free and democratic elections," and by stipulating a cease-fire in place op-

erative with respect to North Vietnamese as well as N.L.F. forces, it projected fundamental changes in the political structure of South Vietnam.

President Thieu has made it abundantly clear all along that he has no interest in a "compromise" settlement that would give adversaries equal opportunity of political (or military) contest. Mr. Thieu knows well how to exploit the tactical vulnerability of the nation that poses as savior of peoples "menaced by Communism." He quite naturally turned thumbs down on the agreement, and now demands in effect that the United States remain engaged until there might be achieved a political settlement that would consolidate, not eliminate, his dictatorship. That, he would say, using President Nixon's term, would be a settlement that was "right."

Washington confronts a compound dilemma. Whose war? Thieu says that it is ours, for did we not choose to combat "Communist aggression" in the first instance? Whose the future peace? Thieu says that it must be his, for is not South Vietnam, by American definition, a sovereign state? Washington is not to be permitted to "impose" a settlement.

It remains to be seen whether the Nixon Administration will enter upon a compromise agreement with Hanoi in defiance of the Saigon autocrat's veto. On the other hand, it can be anticipated that Hanoi and the N.L.F. will not make the surrender demanded by Thieu. They don't have to. For continuation of the war progressively weakens further the political and eco-

nomic fabric of South Vietnam, and by that much nurtures revolution; whereas if the military action stops, and the revolutionaries are accorded a legitimate political role, both principle and practice of dictatorship will have been undermined. In South Vietnam and in Cambodia and Laos. In war or in peace, the revolutionaries stand to win in Indochina.

The big question at this critical juncture is whether the United States will in fact permit the Indochinese peoples to determine their own political destiny, even a revolutionary destiny, or whether it will continue fighting anti-insurrectionary wars in service of the petty dictatorships it has cultivated in Saigon, Phnompenh and Vientiane.

O. Edmund Chubb is author of "China and Russia: The Great Game."

WASHINGTON STAR

30 November 1972

CROSBY S. NOYES

Everyone Is in the Soup in Viet Peace Talks

With the Paris peace talks suspended, the question is: Who is in the soup? The answer seems to be that everyone is in the soup, but some are in deeper than others.

No one, certainly, is claiming at this point that a breakdown of the talks — even a temporary one — represents a victory for his side. The pressure to reach a settlement of the war is stronger than ever on everyone concerned. And despite the setback, the prospect is that a settlement will yet be achieved.

For the Nixon administration, the failure to reach agreement during the last round of negotiations in Paris represents, to say the least, an acute embarrassment. In the light of what happened, and what is now known of the obstacles that remained to be overcome, the public confidence of the Americans before the last Paris session seems little short of incredible.

By this time, Henry Kissinger should have learned the dangers of setting deadlines in diplomatic negotiations. His flat prediction that a settlement could be wrapped up in one more round of talks lasting no more than three or four days was a mistake that no experienced negotiator would be likely to make. The deca-

ration that "peace is at hand" in Vietnam has put the administration in a box from which it may find it impossible to escape.

The administration, to be sure, is not without options. It indeed has an agreement in hand which it can live with, even if the government in Saigon cannot. If worse comes to worst, Kissinger presumably could return to the original nine-point draft agreement and ignore President Thieu's charges of an American sell-out. Under these conditions, however, the chances of anything resembling genuine peace in Vietnam would be extremely remote.

Thieu's own position, therefore, is equally uncomfortable. He has succeeded for the time being in blocking the nine-point agreement and getting the United States to make additional substantial demands on North Vietnam, including the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from the South.

These demands not only have been rejected but reportedly have provoked a number of counter-demands from the North Vietnamese negotiators. Kissinger is now in a position to inform Thieu that he tried hard and failed, leaving Thieu facing a painful dilemma. He knows perfectly well that he

has no permanent veto over an agreement between Washington and Hanoi. His strategy is to play for as much time as possible, but he is well aware that time is rapidly running out.

It seems probable, however, that Hanoi's grim negotiators are in the most uncomfortable spot of all. It is they, quite apparently, who are in the most urgent need of a settlement in South Vietnam. Their threat to break off the negotiations in Paris and resume full-scale warfare in South Vietnam is a transparent bluff that no one takes very seriously.

The leaders in Hanoi have made their supreme effort and it has failed. They have blown their entire army in a military offensive that started eight months ago and has yet to achieve any significant results. American intelligence estimates rate Hanoi at the point of military exhaustion. A further significant delay in reaching a settlement would mean more destruction to North Vietnam and, in all probability, an increasing deterioration of the military situation.

It is hard to say how the negotiators from Hanoi read the present turn in the peace negotiations, but it is most un-

likely that they take much satisfaction from it. Undoubtedly, they are furious about the efforts of the Saigon regime to delay a settlement, if only because they are now being made aware that Thieu is not quite the puppet and lackey their propaganda has always insisted he is. The fact that Washington has gone along with Saigon's demands probably is read as a hardening of the Nixon administration's posture in the wake of the recent elections.

What they may do about it is anybody's guess. Clearly, however, the leaders in Hanoi do not share the unshakable belief of American liberals that, once the Americans leave South Vietnam, the regime in Saigon will quickly collapse. They know that to accede to Thieu's demands would be to give up any hope of taking over South Vietnam for the indefinite future. But considering the squeeze they are in, they may have little choice.

And so the pressures on all parties to the Paris talks are enormous. We are the middle-man in a classic oriental bargaining session in which both sides try to appear to be in no hurry to settle and continue to make extreme demands. The actual terms on which a settlement may emerge still are unclear.

The weakness of the American position in this contest has been the exposure of our acute anxiety to reach a settlement in the shortest possible time. Given the pressure on the administration — much of it self-created — the impatience is understandable. But in bargaining with the fate of 15 million people, patience is a virtue — and not necessarily an Oriental one.

lean and North Vietnamese forces, leaving the conflicting parties in South Vietnam to work out the political future. That would meet the crucial objective of "ending the war honorably."

Four years later, it appears that the terms of any agreement finally made with Le Duc Tho would meet Kissinger's 1969 ideas only in part. There has been no mutual with-

NEW YORK TIMES
11 December 72

Kissinger Then and Now

By Anthony Lewis

LONDON, Dec. 10—At what we hope is the brink of success for Henry Kissinger in his long search for peace in Vietnam, it is fascinating to look back at the paper in which he roughed out his approach to the negotiations. That was his article of January, 1969, in Foreign Affairs.

Unlike many American officials before and since, Kissinger did not deceive himself about a military victory around the corner. He saw that the United States commitment had to be limited. He was realistic about the strengths and weaknesses of the two sides, perceiving with particular force-

AT HOME ABROAD

sight that the international situation was "precarious" for Hanoi.

He was skeptical of the two most widely discussed possible negotiating objectives, a coalition government or a ceasefire. The latter, he warned, would make South Vietnam "a crazy quilt, with enclaves of conflicting loyalties all over the country." A ceasefire would also raise severe problems of verification, enforcement and control of guerrilla activity.

Kissinger concluded that the United States should seek not a negotiated political solution but a limited military one—a "staged withdrawal" by Amer-

drawal of forces, and there is little likelihood of a formal promise by Hanoi to pull her troops out. The United States has accepted the idea of a ceasefire, necessarily. At this point it is even doubtful that there will be any agreed map of territorial control in South Vietnam, a lack that will make the job of policing a truce more formidable.

On the other hand, Kissinger did succeed in separating the two tracks, military and political. The peace terms tentatively agreed in October would allow the United States to pull all its forces out of South Vietnam with the political future there still open—and with our man, Nguyen Van Thieu, still in power in Saigon.

What Kissinger did not foresee, or did not project in Foreign Affairs, was the cost of meeting some of his aims.

He did not tell us that we would have to drop another four million tons of bombs on Indochina to achieve our negotiating objectives in part. Or spend another 20,000 American lives. Or send another 50,000 soldiers home with serious wounds.

Nor did Kissinger have, or convey,

any idea of what it would cost the people of the two Vietnams, Laos and Cambodia to have his minimum negotiating aims reached. He did not tell us that South Vietnam alone would suffer upwards of 80,000 soldiers killed and 240,000 wounded, 165,000 civilians dead and 400,000 wounded, an estimated 1,850,000 made homeless.

It is fair to say that Kissinger probably did not envisage costs of that kind when he published his negotiating formula. For he wrote that he did not believe a "prolonged" negotiation was possible. What, then, went wrong, so far as we can identify it, on the American side of the talks?

By all appearances, the Nixon Administration for a long time was still chasing the illusion of victory, whatever Kissinger may have said in Foreign Affairs. It was not prepared to settle for the status quo in South Vietnam, with power divided between Saigon and the National Liberation Front. Only after a time did realism set in.

Cyrus Vance, Paris negotiator in 1968-9, was the first to take up the ceasefire idea. He wrote in 1969 that

it was important because it recognized the status quo—and that was necessary for serious peace talks. It was not until October, 1970, that President Nixon made a ceasefire proposal.

More broadly, the Nixon Administration attempted for years to do two inconsistent things. It tried to settle with Hanoi by persuading her that the political future in the South would be open. At the same time it was helping to build Thieu into a figure with enormous military and autocratic political power.

After these four years South Vietnam has one million men under arms—the equivalent of twelve million in the United States in terms of population. President Thieu's police force numbers 119,000, 15,000 or 20,000 of those in the special branch. Thousands of civilians are held in prison without trial, among them some of the independent non-Communists with whom Americans would naturally identify.

It is too late to avoid the costs now, or to start negotiating on a different formula. We can only hope that Kissinger and his principal remember what has happened during the last four years as they weigh peace in the balance now.

NEW YORK TIMES
3 December 72

Vietnam

Soldiers Leaving, Civilians Arriving

SAIGON—Wanted: aircraft mechanics, radar operators, data processors for highly classified material. Immediate openings. Must be United States citizens.

Ads such as this filled the back page of the English-language newspaper The Saigon Post last week, as a number of American civilian firms began to get secret new contracts from the Defense Department for work in postwar South Vietnam.

Washington's plans, knowledgeable sources here say, call for leaving about 10,000 American civilian advisers and technicians in South Vietnam after a cease-fire, many of them taking over jobs formerly done by the military. The civilians would do everything from teaching Vietnamese Air Force pilots how to fly to operating the sophisticated computers in Saigon's General Staff headquarters and repairing the complex country-wide communication

system left behind by the United States military.

Some 5,000 civilian workers are already in South Vietnam. Others are beginning to arrive almost daily. In addition, it is understood, several hundred military attachés and about 1,000 members of the Agency for International Development, many of them on local provincial teams, will stay behind.

The United States military command, known as MACV, has been hurriedly awarding these new contracts in recent weeks because it sees little alternative. For, as MACV packs for its expected exit from Vietnam, it leaves behind a South Vietnamese military heavily dependent on advanced equipment the Americans never trusted or trained the Vietnamese enough to handle by themselves.

Moreover, MACV, with what one official United States official termed its "can-do attitude," seems to think that the best solution is the American one. "If the Vietnamese want a rock quarry, then MACV just sends them a United States rock-crusher adviser," the official remarked. "It's like 1961 or 1965 all over again. Send in the Americans to take care of the job."

Few United States officials seem to believe that such a major American postwar civilian presence will conflict with the draft peace accord worked out with North Vietnam. "In my view, it violates neither the letter nor the spirit of the peace settlement," said one ranking diplomat last week.

Asked if Washington had informed the Communists about its postwar planning, the official replied curtly, "We have been doing fine right along without consulting the Communists on everything we want to do here, and we're not going to change that policy now."

However, officials in both the Embassy and MACV have refused to disclose any details of these postwar contracts with civilians. As a spokesman for MACV explained, "It might upset the Paris negotiations and it's just not in the national interest to have these known."

As far as can be determined—and that leaves a wide margin for error—MACV intends to withdraw all United States military personnel, apart from the civilian contract workers and Air Force units in Thailand and Navy ships stationed offshore, there will be no disguised "advisers" left behind, with Vietnamese troops. That would make the postwar situation somewhat different from that of the early 1960's, when American advisers with Vietnamese combat troops gradually turned into full-time soldiers.

In any case, almost all American military officers here, even ranking career officers, have long been waiting for the final day of departure from this messy, painful war that the United States could not win. "You just couldn't find enough warm Army bodies to stuff into civilian clothes, and bring back here as advisers," said one disgruntled colonel who has been packing up the vast files in his office.

—FOX BUTTERFIELD

NEW YORK TIMES
11 December 72

Saigon Reign of Terror Doubted

By CRAIG R. WHITNEY

Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Dec. 7.—Despite daily assertions by the Communists that the Saigon Government is planning a campaign of mass arrests and assassination of political prisoners, a series of interviews with sources in close touch with the national police as well as with Vietnamese opposition political figures has disclosed no evidence to support the charges.

The accusations, made recently by both the Vietcong and by the North Vietnamese, have been aimed at demanding the immediate release of what they claim are hundreds of thousands of political prisoners held by the Government.

The number of persons detained in South Vietnamese jails, according to police sources, is 35,000. Independent authorities vouched for the accuracy of that figure.

According to the draft agreement made public by Hanoi in October, the release of "all people of all sides who have been captured and detained" would be carried out parallel to the withdrawal of United States troops within 60 days of a cease-fire. Henry A. Kissinger's discussion of it two days later said, however, that the fate of civilian prisoners in South Vietnam would be a matter for negotiation between the Vietnamese sides.

Hanoi Stresses Release

The Hanoi radio has been saying—most recently, for example, in an editorial from the Communist party newspaper, Nhan Dan, broadcast on Tuesday—that "the release of prisoners of all sides and the guarantee of the people's democratic liberties are important conditions to end the U.S. war of aggression and resolve the internal problems of South Vietnam."

"The agreement already reached clearly guarantees the release of all those arrested and detained by all sides, parallel to the withdrawal of the U.S. troops," the editorial added.

Both Hanoi and the Provisional Revolutionary Government proclaimed in the South have recently broadcast claims that the Government of Pres-

dent Nguyen Van Thieu has "drawn up lists of several thousand political detainees considered the most dangerous to be urgently assassinated before the cease-fire."

An independent source close to the national police said that he knew of no such plan and categorically denied that any such killings had taken place. Vietnamese opposition elements in touch with prisoners have also professed ignorance of such activities, although no one denies that there is brutality in the prisons.

Military prisoners are held in prison camps. Civilians are detained in five major national prisons near Saigon and on the island of Con Son, which has 8,500, and in 35 small correction centers in the provinces.

The least rigorous of these prisons, Chihon, in Saigon, houses the best-known political prisoners—men like Truong Dinh Dzu, who ran unsuccessfully against Mr. Thieu on a "peace" platform in 1967, and Tran Ngoc Chau, who was accused of being a Communist agent while he was a prominent legislator. Mr. Chau is being even though the Supreme Court declared his trial unconstitutional two years ago and annulled his sentence.

No Signs Found of Plans for Killings or Mass Arrests

Press, Edith Lederer, who visited Chihon without official approval last month, said that she saw Mr. Dzu and heard from other prisoners that Mr. Chau was well. Both get extra food from their families and have comfortable quarters and freedom of movement within the prison.

The Communists have been charging that the Government has initiated "a campaign of white terror," indiscriminately arresting political suspects before a cease-fire and holding other prisoners longer than their sentences.

The South Vietnamese police, which numbers 119,000, of whom 15,000 to 20,000 are in the "special," or secret, branch,

have been carrying out numerous arrests since the beginning of the Communist offensive last April, but, according to police sources, most of the detentions have been short-term.

The sources say that the prisons are fuller now than they have ever been—the current figure of 35,000 is 5,000 more than the peak last year—and that overcrowding has forced the authorities to transfer some from one facility to another. But they say that despite the tens of thousands of arrests since spring, the total held for long periods has gone up by only a few thousand.

Service on Repression

Discussing the future, an independent police expert said: "The police realize that after a cease-fire they will be the Government's main weapon in the political struggle. They could be an instrument of service to the people or an instrument of repression. Their tradition was colonialist and oppressive, but they are trying to change that."

The source said that those—presumably suspected Vietcong—who were picked up under the martial-law measures decreed by President Thieu since the offensive began are categorized separately. They apparently number 5,000, and, the source said, "logically the Government would probably have to release some of them at least in the event of a cease-fire."

Arrests have been much more numerous in recent months because the police have been on special alert since April and have been detaining draft-dodgers, common criminals and people without just the right identity papers.

"I am sure many of those arrests have not been done exactly according to law," the source said. Most of the thousands arrested have been released within a few days, it is said.

An opposition Deputy, Ho Ngoc Nhuon, recently complained in a letter to Premier Tran Thien Khiem that prisoners received only 40 piasters, a day for food, or about a dime, and that many were ill and mistreated. He said his niece was arrested recently for

buying some blue cloth because the police suspected that she wanted to make a Communist flag.

"Her hamlet chief is a relative of hers, and even he could not get the police to let her out for several days," Mr. Nhuon said in an interview. "He said he had not posted a notice warning people not to buy cloth. It was the day after President Thieu had spoken on the television warning about Communist plots."

Rumors About Arrests

Some opposition figures have circulated rumors that the police will arrest them, too, as soon as a cease-fire is announced. They have said there is a "secret plan for arrests under the name X-18." "I have never heard of X-18 and have never heard of plans for a purge from the Vietnamese police," an informed source said. Some American officials have said that they had heard of such a plan, but its existence seems to be almost impossible to authenticate.

Prisoners often relate stories of torture and mistreatment during interrogation. The truth of such allegations does not seem to be in doubt, and it may be one of the factors contributing to the Communist propaganda campaign on prisoners.

An independent Vietnamese investigator of prison conditions, Prof. Nguyen Van Trung, said in a recent interview, "We have heard the rumors about killings, but really, I do not think it is true. The prisoners say they must be very careful though, but I do not believe the Americans want it to happen and the National Liberation Front would have no interest in having it happen either."

Vietnamese sources informed about the secret negotiations between Mr. Kissinger, President Nixon's adviser on national security, and the North Vietnamese in Paris said last week that the Vietcong had asked for unconditional release of civilian prisoners as part of the cease-fire accord but that the final agreement would probably take neither their nor most of Saigon's demands into account.

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Bloodbath? That's what we are causing now.

Richard Barnet is a co-director of the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington.

By Richard Barnet

Several years have passed since Presidents have dared to look voters in the face and proclaim the Vietnam war either a "fight for freedom" or an indispensable commitment to the defense of San Francisco. In this election year the principal argument for prolonging the American war in Indochina is that "we cannot abandon our friends." Sir Robert Thompson, President Nixon's chief guerrilla war consultant, recently amended his prediction of the number of probable victims of deliberate Communist revenge in South Vietnam from "several hundreds of thousands" to "well over one million." President Nixon has also matched his escalation of the air war over the last three years with escalating predictions of massacres to come if the U.S. fails to keep the Communists from taking power in Saigon. In the Orwellian age, the daily saturation bombings of Indochina are defended as missions of mercy.

Anyone in the heat of debate on war policy who makes hard and fast predictions of what will happen in Vietnam, as the President has done, deserves to be reminded of the official United States record of prediction in Indochina over the last 20 years. It is as futile to paint a rosy picture of a Vietnam free of American domination, although that would no doubt make some Americans feel better about leaving, as it is to use atrocity stories to justify our staying. There is only one humanitarian question for Americans: "Does the continuation of the present bloodbath make a future bloodbath more or less likely?"

The term bloodbath is, if anything, inadequate to describe what has gone on in Indochina during the last four years. From January 1969 to the end of September, 1972, 3,829,992 tons of American bombs were dropped on Indochina, well over one million in excess of all the bombs dropped in World War II. In June 1972, the latest month for which precise figures are available, the United States dropped 112,460 tons. That is the equivalent of two tons every 60 seconds or 5½ Hiroshima-strength bombs a month. Senator Edward M. Kennedy, chairman of the Subcommittee on Refugees, reported in August that there had been 165,000 civilian deaths and 410,000 civilians wounded in the last four years. According to the estimates of the subcommittee, almost four million refugees have been created by the war in the last four years.

The Administration's argument is that the "other

side" has marked more than a million South Vietnamese for murder and that these murders will occur unless the power of the Communists is broken. The White House bases its argument on the use of political terror by Vietnamese Communists in the past. In his Nov. 3, 1959 speech announcing Vietnamization, President Nixon said that after 1954 when the French withdrew, 50,000 people were killed in reprisal for what they did in the first Indochina war. The historical record does not support this repeated charge. The International Control Commission set up under the Geneva Accords reported 55 incidents of political reprisal in the North (as opposed to 1,404 such incidents in the South). But no policy of reprisal was reported. Indeed, amnesty provisions similar to those contained in the present National Liberation Front program were put into effect in 1954, and today hundreds of individuals who previously supported "the other side" are serving in the Hanoi civil service.

However, after the war, according to the late French historian Bernard Fall, 50,000 may have been killed in connection with their resistance to a sweeping land reform program. Many American politicians rely heavily on his accounts since he was one of the few well-known authorities on recent Vietnamese history living in the United States. It was not uncommon for American officers in Vietnam in the nineteen-sixties to have his complete works in their command posts. Fall's 50,000 figure is repeated in other writings but Fall himself turns out to be the source, and he cites no authority for the figure. National Security Council sources admit that President Nixon's statement that "half a million people were exterminated" is based on a book by Hoang Van Chi, a North Vietnamese exile who was in North Vietnam at the time of the land reform. His book, which was financed by U.S. intelligence agencies, is not supported by the original Hanoi documents on which it purports to rely,

according to the Cornell scholar Gareth Porter, who reads Vietnamese and has made a thorough study of the land reform.

Hoang Van Chi recently told The Washington Post in an interview that the half-million figure was "just a guess" based on a projection of what happened in his own village of about 200 people. He said one person was executed and about nine others died of starvation for which he blamed the Communists.

The 5 per cent death rate in his village supported by other general impressions became the basis for declaring that 5 per cent of the total population was killed. Hoang Van Chi's methodology was quite scientific enough for a White House propaganda campaign. It should also be noted that information, or misinformation, about the period has ultimately come from defectors from the North, most of whom represented upper classes and yearned for the overthrow of the Communist Government because they felt comfortable with the old French colonial way of life, the old schools, the old culture. So, of course, their objectivity must be questioned.

The North Vietnamese have admitted that executions took place, and they have denounced the killings as "serious errors." Whatever the numbers of victims, it is true that the North Vietnamese once attempted to break domestic resistance by terror. This was undeniably a human tragedy. Nothing about the forced land reform suggests that the executions were part of a policy of political reprisals, however, and there is no other evidence of any such policy.

The most dramatic evidence for the "bloodbath argument" is the alleged "massacre" at Hue during the Tet offensive of 1968, where, according to Sir Robert Thompson, the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese executed 700 persons (President Nixon's figure is 3,000). The

White House is advertising the Hue occupation as a "prelude of what would happen in South Vietnam" if the Americans really left. The President's account of what happened in Hue is contradicted by a number of witnesses to the events. Tran Van Dinh, who had once been an official in the Government of Dlem, received official word shortly after the occupation of Hue that his brother and nephew were "Vietcong victims," only to learn from his family that they had actually died under an American bombing attack. Len E. Ackland, a student of Vietnamese who had worked and lived in Hue in 1967, returned shortly after the Tet offensive to conduct interviews among the people. He later wrote: "When on the first day of the attack, about 20 Vietcong entered Gia Hoi (a precinct of 25,000 residents in Hue) in order to secure the area, they carried with them a list of those who were to be killed immediately as enemies of the people." According to Le Ngan, director of Hue's special police, "the list consisted of five names, all those of officers of special police." The local Catholic priest reported that "none of his clergy or parishioners were harmed by the N.L.F." According to Stewart Harris, a correspondent for The Times of London, who was in Hue in March, 1968, the Police Chief in Hue, Doan Cong Lap, estimated the total number of executions at 200. (He also estimated the total civilian casualties caused by the United States in its effort to "liberate" the city to be 3,776 killed and 1,909 wounded). These figures are in line with the recent reports of allied intelligence officials that somewhere between 250 and 500 Saigon Government officials were executed by the Communists over a three-month period when they took over northern Binh Dinh province earlier this year.

There is no doubt that the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese have used terror for political purposes in this war, just as, it must be said, the United States has done. But because the political purposes of the two sides are different, so also are the uses

of terror. The United States has bombed villages and dikes, destroyed crops and despoiled the land of Vietnam so that the leaders in Hanoi might feel enough "pain" to stop the war. We do not know whether President Nixon's planners employ the torturer's idiom used so liberally in the Pentagon Papers ("one more twist of the screw"), but the purpose of the military escalation in this Administration, particularly the air war, is the same. "Everyone has his breaking point," Administration officials have told private visitors who ask how the Vietnamization strategy can end the war.

In the hands of the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese, terror becomes a much more selective weapon. A number of the recent assassination victims for example were, according to The New York Times correspondent Joseph B. Treaster, "policemen who had worked as counter-intelligence agents trying to kill and capture key political and military figures in the Communist organization." From the earliest Vietcong assassinations of village chiefs in the late nineteen-fifties, the pattern of deliberate killings has been the same. Certain symbols of authority, particularly those who have themselves engaged in repres-

sive acts, have been marked for death. Under the United States-sponsored Phoenix program, which was undertaken in conscious imitation of Vietcong tactics, more than 40,000 Vietnamese civilians, according to official United States estimates, have been killed on suspicion of being "Vietcong cadre." The "other side," partly because they have a keen political interest in trying not to alienate the population and partly because they have much better information about who's who in a Vietnamese village than American intelligence officers, have been more selective and more accurate in distinguishing "cadre" from bystanders. True, the North Vietnamese have engaged in some shelling of civilian areas which are almost as indiscriminate as air attacks. But can the North Vietnamese and N.L.F. con-

A different bloodbath?

When the Rev. William Sloane Coffin was in Hanoi recently with the group that brought back three American prisoner-of-war pilots, he asked whether there would be a bloodbath in the South if there were a settlement on North Vietnamese terms.

"Yes, there will be a bloodbath . . . and it won't be our side causing it," replied Hoang Tung, who is North Vietnam's official spokesman after Premier Phan Van Dong.

Hoang Tung said that when the North Vietnamese overran Quang Tri province, they captured a document from a village chief which he claimed gave detailed plans that provide, in the event of a cease-fire, for cadres in the Saigon Government's United States-sponsored Phoenix program to pinpoint the Communists and exterminate them. He gave the Americans a copy of the purported document.

tribution to the ongoing bloodbath of noncombatants compare with the executions from the air carried out by American pilots?

Distinguishing Vietcong terror from United States violence in Vietnam is important primarily because it helps us to understand not only what we might expect will happen to the civilian population of South Vietnam after the war, but also to understand whether the present United States military operations are putting that population in a better or worse position when the Americans finally leave. Based on past history, two kinds of deliberate killings are likely to occur. South Vietnamese police officials who worked actively in the Phoenix program, or who were otherwise identified with repressive activities of the Saigon Government, are, I believe, in danger. Some may be marked for execution;

more for "re-education." The North Vietnamese have made it clear that they encourage anyone who would feel unsafe in postwar Vietnam to leave the country. But the numbers are nothing like the hundreds of thousands or millions in the scare stories being circulated by the White House. Point 2 of the Provisional Revolutionary Government's seven-point program provides for "guarantees so as to prohibit all acts of terror, reprisal, discrimination against persons having collaborated with one or the other party." Taken literally, it would exclude all reprisals. But it seems too much to expect that such language would protect the most notorious Saigon police officials, although the pressure to deal summarily with them would be much less after the war than in the midst of a military campaign as in Hue or Binh Dinh.

When I discussed the matter of reprisals with Premier Pham Van Dong of North Vietnam three years ago, when Nixon first raised the bloodbath argument, he stated flatly, "There will be no reprisals," and then went on to ask, "Why should Vietnamese go on killing Vietnamese once we have our independence?" The Communists know that they cannot impose a Communist Government on the South without a continuation of the civil war even after all the Americans leave. The primary task of the Vietnamese after the war is survival, and survival demands cooling the passions of war, not continuing the bloodshed. There is nothing in recent Vietnamese history to suggest that a government bent on killing hundreds of thousands of people in South Vietnam can keep peace. That is why the other side knows that it must go slow in building a postwar Vietnamese society, and has proposed a coalition government which is two-thirds non-Communist.

A more serious problem is likely to be the outbreak of individual acts of revenge—against, not in furtherance of, official policy. After a generation of civil war, passions

run high on all sides. Some old scores will be settled. The United States has no power to prevent spontaneous killings in Vietnam after the war. It can, however, increase their likelihood by further tearing at the social fabric of Vietnam. The only effective restraint on popular revenge is the Vietnamese social structure itself. Almost every family has members who have fought on both sides. It is in traditional Vietnamese family feelings which transcend politics, and whatever survives of the strong Vietnamese sense of national community, that the best hope for minimizing postwar

bloodshed lies. By continuing to split Vietnamese society and to set Vietnamese against Vietnamese, the United States is fanning the very hatreds from which spontaneous violence erupts. As Senator Kennedy told the Senate recently the bloodbath argument is a "cynical hoax — an excuse that has allowed this Administration to prolong the agony of Vietnam and to maintain and escalate a policy of war." The bloodbath argument is, indeed, put forward as a justification for continuing the American war in Indochina. It is, on the contrary, the most compelling argument for stopping it now. ■

WASHINGTON STAR
7 December 1972

CROSBY S. NOYES

Separate Peace Could Be Secret Wish of All

Why not a separate peace agreement between the United States and North Vietnam?

As the negotiations in Paris approach a climax, the question is being asked with increasing urgency. Indeed, a separate peace could be the solution that everyone secretly favors. The protests against the idea heard in Saigon recently have been less than convincing.

Henry Kissinger is in Paris ostensibly to tie the final knots on an elaborate peace package that would provide, among other things, for a cease-fire, a complete American withdrawal from Vietnam, the release of American war prisoners and an end to American bombing and mining of the North. It also sets up the machinery for an eventual political solution of the Vietnamese conflict, based on negotiations between the parties involved.

In fact, it would not be very surprising if the result of the present meeting were to break the whole peace package down to its component parts — to null down the provisions of the agreement involving Washington and Hanoi, leaving the question of a future political settlement up in the air.

The reason for dismantling the package, of course, is the continuing resistance of the government in Saigon to a number of features included in

the over-all deal. President Thieu quite naturally opposes an indefinite cease-fire that would allow North Vietnamese troops to remain in the South and exert political control over the areas that they occupy.

He is equally opposed to any settlement which will give the Communists a legitimate role in the political life of the country. To Thieu — and to most South Vietnamese — the Communists, whether from North Vietnam or homegrown, are the enemy. For a quarter-century, they have inflicted untold misery and destruction on his country and his people.

Thieu puts no faith whatever in Communist undertakings to abide by reasonable solutions to a war which they have pressed with unparalleled ferocity for so many years. He is quite sure they will take the first opportunity to exploit any settlement to their advantage and will continue to try to seize power by every means possible. He is determined to make no concessions in the name of an illusory peace that will make the job easier for them.

Thieu also knows very well that he cannot permanently block a settlement between Hanoi and Washington that extricates the United States from its involvement in the war. He also knows that he cannot carry his resistance to

a settlement to the point that it would jeopardize continuing American economic and military support in the years to come.

His performance up to this point has been skillful and also typically oriental. By resisting a settlement, he has hardened the American terms to some extent. But he has also — and probably more importantly — increased the American obligation to see to it that the settlement which is eventually forced on him works in his favor. Had he agreed immediately to the terms of the proposal worked out between Kissinger and the North Vietnamese negotiators, the sense of obligation would have been considerably less.

Thieu has read the proposed settlement shrewdly and realistically. As the Saigon radio put it recently: "A treaty, if reached could not grant victory to one side or the other. A treaty would have to bring peace without creating a victorious party."

This is Thieu's dilemma. He believes that, one way or another, the conflict will continue. He also believes that the "settlement" that is being proposed to him will seriously compromise his chances of being the victorious party in that continuing struggle. It is possible that in the end he will settle for the best terms he can get under an over-all pack-

age agreement. But it also is possible — in fact, more probable — that he would prefer a separate settlement between Washington and Hanoi that would relieve him of any obligation to compromise with the Communists.

For the Americans, a separate agreement with Hanoi presents no very great problem. If Thieu can be persuaded to go along with a temporary cease-fire — long enough to accomplish an orderly withdrawal and the prisoner exchange — there is no compelling reason to demand much more of him. In fact, from the outset of the negotiations, the American effort has been to reach a military settlement, leaving a political solution of the conflict to be worked out later between Saigon and the Communists.

The position of the North Vietnamese is more problematic. They have always insisted on a simultaneous military and political solution in South Vietnam. But oddly enough, they have never demanded that the Saigon government sign an agreement worked out between Kissinger and Hanoi's Le Duc Tho. The implication may be that a cease-fire and prisoner exchange can be worked out without any specific commitment made toward a political solution by either side.

After all, it would not be the first time that the leaders in Hanoi have ended a phase of the long war with a highly ambiguous "settlement." They did precisely that in the Geneva agreements of 1954 which the Saigon government did not sign, and indeed specifically repudiated. It is quite possible that something of the sort may happen again.

BALTIMORE SUN
6 December 1972
Russell Kirk

Worst foe of Vietnam GI's: drugs

Now that nearly all American ground forces have returned home from Vietnam, it is high time for a sober assessment of American military performance in Indochina. We had more than half-a-million men there at the height of our involvement, and some 50,000 American troops died in South Vietnam.

The worst adversary of American soldiers was not the North Vietnamese units, nor the Viet Cong, nor the advanced weapons with which Russia supplied Hanoi. For the factor that demoralized many Americans was addiction to narcotics. For the first time in history, on any major scale, heroin, opium, and other drugs were employed deliberately as weapons in a war, and they did more mischief than massive use of toxic gases could have accomplished. Corruption of American military personnel by narcotics was a deliberate strategy of Peking and Hanoi.

In 1965, according to Mohammed Heikal, the powerful Egyptian editor and publisher, Chou En-lai, the premier of China, told President Gamal Nasser of Egypt, "The more troops the United States sends to Vietnam, the happier we shall be, for we feel we shall have them in our power, we can have their blood. . . . Some of the American soldiers are trying opium, and we are helping them. We are planting the best kinds of opium especially for Americans."

Many of the details of this grisly strategy were revealed last September to the Senate's subcommittee on Internal Security, in lengthy testimony by Gen. Lewis W. Walt, . . . USMC (Ret.). He explained to the subcommittee the control of opium production and the drug traffic in Southeast Asia by Communists in Vietnam, Burma, Laos, and Thailand who had seized the richest opium-producing territories. These various Communist groups were directly influenced by Peking.

"In June of 1970," General Walt said, "Immediately after our Cambodian incursion, South Vietnam was flooded with heroin of remarkable

purity — 94 per cent to 97 per cent — which sold at the ridiculously low price of first \$1 and then \$2 a vial. If profit-motivated criminals were in charge of the operation, the price made no sense at all — because no GI who wanted to get high on heroin would have batted an eyelash at paying \$5, or even \$10. The same amount of heroin in New York would have cost \$250.

"The only explanation that makes sense is that the epidemic was political rather than economic in inspiration, that whoever was behind the epidemic wanted to hook as many GI's as possible, as fast as possible, and as hard as possible."

This Communist involvement in the narcotics traffic, extending to the continental United States, involved some people in high places. General Walt described briefly the curious episode of Oscar Squella Avendano, an eminent and ardent supporter of the Marxist president of Chile, Salvador Allende. Squella Avendano was arrested in Miami, in the summer of 1970, and convicted of transporting 203 pounds of Chilean cocaine to the United States—the biggest shipment of cocaine ever seized. Chilean and Cuban Communists have made strenuous endeavors to get Squella Avendano out of prison—offering to exchange for him four American air pirates and a captive American ship's captain.

The full story of this employment of narcotics as a means of waging war is not yet revealed, although much has been told in "The Peking Connection" by my journalistic colleague, Allan C. Brownfield. Communist leaders and organizations made immense sums out of the narcotics traffic, and at the same time succeeded in diminishing the effectiveness of American troops by selling the stuff to them. One question that ought to be asked is this: Why was it that a good many American soldiers were so easily lured into an addiction ruinous to themselves and very hampering to their country's military effort?

THE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, Nov. 21, 1972
The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Soviets Protest Saigon Buildup

By Jack Anderson

The Soviets have protested bitterly to Washington over the rush of military supplies to South Vietnam in anticipation of a cease-fire.

This has put the Soviets on the spot, since they gave Hanoi a guarantee of U.S. good faith. The Soviets also quietly pressured Hanoi to end the fighting. They went so far as to imply that Soviet military aid might be curtailed if the war drags on.

Strictly speaking, the U.S. has not violated any understanding. Not until the shooting stops does the proposed agreement call for a halt of military shipments (except for replacements) into South Vietnam.

In an obvious effort to strengthen President Thieu's hand before the cease-fire goes into effect, the U.S. has macy isn't exactly uncommon. swamped Saigon with supplies. The deliveries of warplanes and helicopters, in particular, has transformed the South Vietnamese Air Force into one of the world's largest, with a new total of 1,850 aircraft.

The Soviets have charged this violates the spirit of the truce negotiations. They point out that the North Vietnamese can't match the sudden U.S. buildup and, therefore, have been placed at a last minute disadvantage. This has caused Hanoi to question the Soviet guarantee of U.S. good faith.

Footnote: U.S. reconnaissance flights and electronic monitors have detected no equivalent movement of supplies from the north into South Vietnam.

Secret Deal—Informed sources claim President Nixon reached a secret understanding with Premier Chou En-lai last February that the U.S. won't pull its forces out of Europe. The Chinese are eager to have the U.S. maintain a military presence in Europe to stockholder in General Ocean draw Soviet forces away from

the tense Chinese-Russian border. The President assured Chou there would be no American military withdrawal from Europe, although reductions are being considered. Our sources say the President's assurance can't be described as a secret agreement but, more accurately, a secret, informal understanding.

U.S. Bribery?—It has been whispered around the White House that bribery was used to overcome President Thieu's opposition to a cease-fire. There is absolutely no indication he was paid off, himself. But our sources have official knowledge that other South Vietnamese leaders were slipped money to help persuade Thieu to go along with the U.S. cease-fire agreement in Saigon.

This sort of black-bag diplomacy isn't exactly uncommon.

Our sources have heard Philip Habib, for one, tell privately how he bribed opposition leaders when he was the top political officer at the U.S. Embassy in Saigon in 1965-67. Now Ambassador in Seoul, Habib was heard to say he used to carry "a little black bag" in Saigon. "From that little black bag," he is quoted, "we bought out any opposition." While Henry Kissinger was trying to sell the cease-fire to Thieu, Habib left his post in Seoul for a rush trip to Saigon. A spokesman denies that bribery played any part in these Saigon negotiations. He would say only that Habib flew to Saigon to discuss "Vietnamese matters" with Kissinger. Habib couldn't be reached for direct comment.

MUST Mustn't—An important scientist in the Manne Undersea Science and Technology Office, part of the Commerce Department, is also a principal officer of a company which furnishes MUST with midget submarines. MUST rents submarines for undersea research. One of the half-dozen "science coordinators," who participates in the decision on whether to rent a midget sub is Dr. Robert F. Dill. He also happens to be a founder, director and major stockholder in General Oceanographics, a Newport Beach,

Calif. firm. MUST's deputy director, James Miller, admitted to us that he was aware of Dill's relationship with General Oceanographic but claimed Dill "exerted no undue influence" on decisions to rent the company's subs. Mr. Dill was unavailable for comment.

Naval Sabotage—Sabotage in the fleet has become so serious that Navy security engineers are studying ways of locking on the metal plates which cover inspection holes. Sailor saboteurs have removed the plates and thrown in dirt or metal shavings to foul gear boxes and other moving parts.

The damage slows or stops the ships and costs thousands to repair.

CIA Echoes—CIA agents accused of fostering the opium traffic in Southeast Asia can take consolation from a precedent set 30 years ago in the same area by the old Office of Strategic Services. In a book soon to be published, called "The OSS in Work War II,"

author Edward Hymoff writes that OSS agents parachuted into Burma with silver coins and opium to pay anti-Japanese Kachin irregulars. "If there was any moral considerations," writes Hymoff, an ex-OSS man himself, "they were overcome by the realities of war and military operations."

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WASHINGTON STAR

8 December 1972

RICHARD WILSON

Hanoi Pullout Provision Worth Waiting For

Impatience with delays in a Vietnam cease-fire and prisoner return is understandable but imprudent. For, unless this negotiation truly succeeds in preventing a Communist takeover in the South, President Nixon will suffer a failure of such proportions that his place in history will be severely damaged.

The President's Republican successors may as well kiss good-bye their hopes for continuing in power if a Vietnam settlement now has the same result George S. McGovern advocated. If in 1974 or 1976 all that Nixon accomplishes is shown to be roughly the same as the "surrender" he imputed to McGovern, but coming six or eight years late, the Nixon policy will be exposed to attack as one of the greatest frauds in history.

In 1972, it can be said that the American public has shrugged its shoulders about the Vietnam outcome and said to the President, get it over with as best you can and we'll stand behind you. But if in 1974 or 1976 it is shown that all Nixon stood for was a form of madness that added 20,000 to the list of American dead

without preventing in inevitable Communist takeover, what he is doing now will appear in an entirely different light.

Nixon evidently realizes that as well or better than anyone else. The public relief which will be expressed when the cease-fire agreement is signed can rapidly turn sour if next year or the year after the entrenched Communist forces in the South emerge to reopen the job and finish it.

So it is doubly important now that those entrenched forces numbering more than 100,000 are not permitted to fade into the Viet-Cong military apparatus under the protection of an internationally supervised cease-fire arrangement.

A few more weeks, or a few more months, would not be wasted if continued negotiation meant added assurance that the Communists would not be left in a position to destroy the non-Communist governmental structure of South Vietnam. It is not unreasonable at all for President Thieu to take this position, and he could scarcely be respected as a serious leader if he did not.

Nixon does not have as much to lose as Thieu if the cease fire is a preliminary to South Vietnam's ruin, but this does not mean that Nixon does not have a great deal to lose.

The end to be achieved is the withdrawal of North Vietnam's forces from the South and the demobilization of Thieu's million-man army to appropriate proportions. Otherwise the United States will have to support a military stalemate for many years to come, and, as a political reality, will find this increasingly hard to do.

The cease-fire will not be an end but the beginning of a new phase in which Nixon will find himself under continuous political harassment. He is under a strong compulsion to make the cease-fire work. That is to say, he will not be able to wash his hands after finishing a grimy job and enjoy a respite as long as the presence of the North Vietnamese troops in the South continues.

Violations, not merely of the cease-fire in localized areas, but the whole purpose

of the settlement, will be impelled so long as the North's troops remain in the South. They cannot remain there unless supplied and that in itself raises questions about Hanoi's intentions with respect to the rest of Indochina. The supply lines now are across the Demilitarized Zone and through the Laotian trails. If those routes remain open it is certainly doubtful that any kind of a settlement in Indochina will last.

In the long run, the future of Indochina does not rest with a cease-fire per se, or whether or not it is signed this month or next year. Indochina's future rests more critically on whether or not Russia and China will be willing to supply Hanoi with the weaponry and requirements for breaking the cease-fire and renewing the war.

This is why it is necessary to tie down now as tightly as possible provisions for the withdrawal of the North Vietnamese forces, and if that takes a few more weeks or months it will be time well spent.

say they are extremely optimistic that a final settlement will be reached soon.

It is difficult for outsiders to make a judgment, not least because the leaked pessimism and optimism may themselves be negotiating tactics, aimed at a particular party or section of opinion. But it may be useful to canvass various theories on what is obstructing the peace that Kissinger said on Oct. 26 was "a matter of weeks or less."

One theory is that Kissinger negotiated the October terms without the approval of his principal. Both the

right-wing paper, said quickly that President Nixon was "displeased." The Saigon radio accused Kissinger of "contradicting the President's thinking."

Is it conceivable that Kissinger acted in ignorance or disregard of the President's views? No. Nixon of course kept in the closest touch with developments in the crucial October negotiating sessions.

Then there is the theory that the American Administration never really intended to agree, that it was all a political trick. Once the draft terms leaked out, under circumstances that are still not clear, Kissinger did try to put the best political face on them; he certainly exaggerated the imminence of peace. But I find no reason to believe that he was party to a cynical deception for election purposes.

What, then, has been the problem

AT HOME ABROAD

American right and the South Vietnamese Government have been promoting that view. Human Even, the

In the Way Of Peace

By Anthony Lewis

LONDON, Dec. 1—As Le Duc Tho and Henry Kissinger approach another round of talks, there are the most directly conflicting estimates of the prospect for agreement. Pessimistic reports from Paris say that the United States has attempted to reopen basic issues in the draft Vietnam peace terms published in October. But Washington officials, privately and publicly,

since October? It can only be that Kissinger, and Nixon, underestimated the strength of President Thieu's likely objections to the draft agreement—and overestimated their ability to bring him along. Confronted with the reality of his opposition, Nixon evidently felt that it would be politically dangerous to try to resolve the problem before Nov. 7. Afterward, with his immense victory achieved, the President could take his time.

The indications are that Nixon has now made his decision. We shall learn from the orders to Henry Kissinger: Is he going back to Paris to insist on changes of substance in the draft agreement—changes to meet Thieu's demands? Or is he instructed to negotiate but in the end, after showing that he has tried, to sign on roughly the October terms if they are the best available?

The difference could be one of war or peace. Kissinger must know that, for no American can be more aware than he of the immense difficulty of moving the North Vietnamese on what they regard as basic issues. His whole negotiating effort for four years has

been to try to avoid such confrontations when possible.

A good example is the issue of North Vietnamese troops in the South—troops that they do not admit having there and in any case regard as legitimate. As long ago as May 31, 1971, the demand for a specific pledge of North Vietnamese troop withdrawal was dropped from the American negotiating terms. Again, last May, President Nixon offered a complete American withdrawal without a mutual pledge from Hanoi. To press the demand again now, at Saigon's urging, would be to put the whole agreement in jeopardy.

In short, the decisive question is what it always has been: Will an American President be willing to take the political risk of signing peace terms that do not have the active approval of Nguyen Van Thieu?

The danger is of falling into the old delusion that just a little more war, a little more bombing, will improve the situation enough to satisfy Thieu. It is a delusion because Thieu has

made very clear that nothing will really satisfy him except total victory—the destruction of all forces in South Vietnam opposed to his regime. He will agree to compromise peace terms only when he sees that the United States is ready to sign without him.

Critics, seeing the familiar choices for American policy today, would say that it has been devastating folly all along to make that policy dependent on Thieu. Devastating, that is, for the Vietnamese. In the month of October alone, during the apparent hold-up of peace on Thieu's behalf, American planes dropped 94,364 tons of bombs on Vietnam, North and South. That brought the total for the Nixon years to more than four million tons.

Whatever the rights or wrongs of the past, can it really be that Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger would carry that terror and destruction into the indefinite future rather than differ with Nguyen Van Thieu? It is on the belief that the answer to that question must be no that one's hope for peace in Vietnam now rests.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

8 December 1972

Why it won't be easy to police Viet cease-fire

*Choice of team is narrow;
sad memories of ICC 'troika'*

By Charlotte Salkowski

Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

As talk mounts in Paris about an imminent Vietnam accord, there are no visible signs of movement on one major component of that agreement—the supervisory peace force.

According to diplomatic sources, the four countries invited to participate in such a force—Poland, Canada, Hungary, and Indonesia—are still waiting to receive a detailed "protocol" under which they would function in Vietnam. Already skeptical about getting involved, they will not commit themselves until they have studied the protocol.

Given the complexity of the issues involved, it is taken for granted by officials here that such a force could not be put together and on the ground in Vietnam at the outset of a cease-fire. If an accord is indeed initiated this month. And, if in the end one or more of the four nations refused to take part, the Paris negotiations would face a knotty problem of finding other alternatives.

'Peace' Constitution

The choices, as knowledgeable analysts view it, look to be narrow.

Japan, to take one possibility, has never

sent troops abroad because of its "peace" Constitution; agreement to take part in an international observation force would represent a major departure of policy. North Vietnam, moreover, is highly suspicious of Japanese penetration of the area.

Australia, for its part, was a combatant in South Vietnam. New Zealand also was involved. North Korea, because of the Sino-Soviet rivalry, probably would not be acceptable to both the Russians and the Chinese. South Korea likewise had combat troops in Vietnam.

Thailand, which has played a significant role in the Vietnam war effort and wrestles with its own Communist-led insurgency, would be out; India presumably would not be plausible for the U.S. because of its pro-Hanoi stand.

Yet the United States is known to favor a "regional" element in the supervisory body—hence the choice of Indonesia. Of the countries of Asia, only Malaysia perhaps might also be acceptable to both sides, say these analysts.

'Troika' problems

The general principle behind the choice of the seven quartet apparently was to get two nations on each side of the fence instead of copying the "troika" International Control

Commission (ICC) which came to be hampered by as supposedly "Neutral" India.

But whether the four powers would act in concert or independently, how inspection teams would be constituted, what mechanism would be fashioned to enable the parties to reach a decision — these are but a few of the questions with which American negotiator Henry A. Kissinger and his North Vietnamese counterpart must deal.

Meanwhile, the historical record of the old ICCs explains why the selected four have their misgivings.

In May, 1954, the French surrendered at Dien Bien Phu. A month later the nine-nation Geneva Conference established that Vietnam was to be divided at the 17th parallel, while Cambodia and Laos were to be recognized as neutral. Elections were to be held in Vietnam in two years and tripartite ICCs, composed of Poland, Canada, and India, would supervise the agreements in the three countries.

In Vietnam, the ICC's task to the regroupment of the Vietnamese and French forces, the exchange of prisoners of war and civil internees, the movement of refugees, and the ban on introduction of foreign military personnel or supplies.

Troop regrouped

From mid-1954 mid-1956, when the French were still there, the ICC worked reasonably well. Cease-fire orders were obeyed and carried out on schedule. There reportedly were no violations of the demilitarized buffer zone.

North Vietnamese forces moved north of the demarcation line while French forces regrouped in the South. Also, an enormous exchange of refugees took place, with some 900,000 Vietnamese leaving the North and about 5,000 the South. The ICC helped get food and medical supplies to tens of thousands of northern refugees who floated out to foreign ships in boats and rafts.

Then the real difficulties began.

Problems arose in the South because Saigon insisted it had not signed the Geneva agreement and was not bound by it. The ICC was supposed to wind up its work after elections, but since none took place it had to function without any sanction in the area under Saigon control.

In July, 1955, a demonstration took place in Saigon against ICC personnel, with little intercession by the Diem government. In 1957 the ICC charged Saigon with introducing fresh military personnel and equipment, a charge that went unanswered. It also complained that the North Vietnamese Army was frustrating its operations.

By 1961, with Ho Chi Minh orchestrating large-scale guerrilla warfare, the ICC reports became a tedious rehearsal of viola-

tions by both sides and failure to cooperate. Such lack of cooperation included refusal to provide transport, drivers, or even lodging for the mobile teams. For alleged security reasons, the North and South Vietnamese often posted armed guards outside ICC premises to keep the local population away from the commission.

Recalling the difficulties of deploying mobile teams, a diplomat here who served on the ICC in those days said that on one occasion a team had been assigned to the airport at Cap St. Jacques. When the airport was relocated, Saigon refused to let the team move as well.

Among the internal worries of the ICC was a lack of money. For the first several years the French accepted financial responsibility for the international teams. But later they said they had paid more than enough. In 1965 they voted to cut off funds. India picked up the tab but also grew tired of doing so.

"We were so strapped for funds that I used to get my paycheck for three days at a time," remarked the diplomat.

Communication difficulties

Lack of reporting procedures was another frustration. The Geneva conference did not provide the commissions with an international secretariat to guide them; efforts to communicate with the nine signatory powers through the Geneva Conference co-chairmen, Britain and the Soviet Union, proved ineffective. Moreover, the co-chairmen could not act on ICC reports without calling another conference.

Most importantly, however, the political balances broke down as the relationships changed in the international sphere. India decided that it had to be on good terms with the Soviet Union as a mainstay against China, so after 1962 it began siding with the Poles. The Canadians tried to be impartial, voting at times for findings of violations against South Vietnam.

But the Communist Poles never agreed with a decision against Hanoi. The last regular report of the ICC, signed by the three commissioners, came in September, 1961. Eight months later the Canadians and Indians, in a special report that aroused the ire of the Soviet Union, condemned North Vietnam's infiltration into the south. The Poles took objection to the report.

Thus, the ICC — today in a state of limbo — played a useful role in the initial period of the cease-fire, when the two sides had an interest in cooperating. But over the long haul it could not help prevent aggression or subversion.

The lessons of this sad history must certainly be on the minds of the men in Paris as they hammer out the guidelines for the new commission.

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 11, 1972

AFTER VIETNAM: CHANGED ROLE FOR U.S. IN ASIA

History's course is about to take some dramatic turns in a vast region where America's power and influence have been dominant for many years.

Reported from WASHINGTON AND ASIAN CAPITALS

Changes of profound significance lie ahead for the U. S. in Asia.

For America, the end of its role in Vietnam—a role now rapidly fading even without a formal cease-fire—means also the end of more than 30 years of intense and direct military involvement in the Far East.

That involvement started with World War II, carried through the Korean conflict, and went on to 18 years of participation in the affairs of Indo-China.

Costs of those 30 years are incalculable. Money costs alone total hundreds of billions of dollars. The toll of Americans killed in battle is close to 200,000. No price tag can be placed on the psychological drain, the diversion of U. S. efforts from other areas, the effect on social programs at home, the angry divisions and bitter disputes.

Key questions. Of increasing concern now are these questions:

As the Vietnam war fades away, are U. S. interests in Asia also to fade?

Just what role will the U. S. play in a part of the world where U. S. activity dates back to the beginning of American trade with China in 1784?

What happens after a Vietnam settlement is seen by many officials as a crucial test for the Nixon Doctrine, which in effect rules out direct U. S. armed intervention in Asian confrontations.

Some analysts warn that the U. S. must continue to maintain a strong military presence in such places as Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines or face loss of prestige and influence—and, with that loss, a weakened trade position.

Alarms are being sounded by a number of top military men.

For example, Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., who recently retired after serving his last four years of active duty as U. S. commander in chief in the Pacific, told "U. S. News & World Report" that he fears a steady deterioration of the American position in Asia—military and economic.

- Political pressures, domestic and foreign, will, the Admiral predicts, cause the U. S. to give up its bases in Japan, Okinawa and the Philippines.

- Admiral McCain anticipates that the U. S. defense line then will be pulled back to Guam and other islands in the Western Pacific.

Such a pull-back, he asserts, would have a great impact on political alignments in the Far East and would be, in his view, a "colossal blunder."

- It is the veteran naval strategist's contention that in the absence of a formidable U. S. military presence in the Far East, Japan would dominate the scene economically and draw closer to Russia, which, he feels, would become the chief military power.


Not so, say civilian analysts who re-

ject any idea that the tide of history is sweeping the U. S. out of Asia.

These experts say that the U. S. role in Asia after Vietnam can be even wider ranging—though less intensive—than during the Indo-China fighting. And they believe that planners in Washington are determined to demonstrate that the Nixon Doctrine is no smoke screen for total withdrawal, but a formula for maintaining an American presence across a vast area at an economically and politically acceptable cost.

It is being emphasized that despite President Nixon's summit meetings in Peking and Moscow and the resultant new relationships with the Communist giants, the U. S. is not about to create conditions favorable for Communist domination of the Far East. In Asia,

CHALLENGES U.S. FACES IN A TROUBLED PART OF THE WORLD



many analysts think that Mr. Nixon, once free of the Vietnam millstone, will work to promote a "balance of power."

In Washington, as well, some top-level strategists are counting on a four-power equation involving the U. S., Japan, Russia and Communist China to provide the balance that will prevent any one power from gaining dominance.

The prime objective of American diplomacy in Asia is increased stability, with no power vacuum developing that could be exploited by any nation—most notably, Russia.

Problems are manifold. In Asian capitals, top officials give this picture, area by area, of what they see shaping up for the nations of Asia and for the U. S. in the wake of the Vietnam war—

FAR PACIFIC: Don't Go Home

Concern about U. S. intentions is growing. In Japan, the degree of U. S. interest in Asia is openly questioned. Worry about American military withdrawal is growing. A Japanese diplomat put it this way:

"A U. S. military presence in Asia is

a must, minimum insurance against emergencies and an irreplaceable security guarantee."

Experts feel that Red China, too, wants the U. S. to maintain a significant presence—and that the Chinese share the uncertainty about American plans.

Peking, analysts say, believes that the U. S. as a powerful force in Asia has a vital role to play as a moderating influence on both China and Russia, to deter a war between the Communist antagonists.

As for Nationalist China: Some Asian leaders foresee the U. S. eventually ending its commitment to Taiwan in return for diplomatic ties with Peking.

But Asians don't expect the U. S. to abandon its "two China" policy precipitously. Nor do they expect Communist China to make a hot issue of its claim to Taiwan at a time when Sino-American relations are being nurtured.

In South Korea, President Park Chung Hee is making every effort to keep the U. S. presence in his country strong.

Although starting moves toward reunification with North Korea, South Korea



"NEVER AGAIN!"

still professes fears of a Communist take-over and considers U. S. troops essential to survival.

For the U. S., the Republic of the Philippines poses special problems. President Ferdinand Marcos has declared repeatedly that he wants American business interests and U. S. military bases to stay in his country. Yet both are endangered by rising ultranationalism and economic disputes.

INDO-CHINA: More Headaches

Peace will not come easily for Indo-China—and, officials say, new headaches await the U. S.

This point is made in Saigon: There is no guarantee that a cease-fire will be effective in ending guerrilla warfare. The South Vietnamese keep asking what the U. S. will do if Communist guerrillas continue to fight.

Saigon—and Cambodia and Laos, as well—want the U. S. to be ready and willing to respond quickly to any violation of cease-fire terms. This could create big problems.

Postwar-reconstruction plans already are causing friction. The U. S. is under fire for its proposal to include 2.5 billion dollars for North Vietnam in a 7.5-billion-dollar economic-rehabilitation program for Indo-China. This is being called a "reward for guilt."

The peoples of Indo-China do not expect a cease-fire to bar further unrest.

Many Cambodians, for example, are wondering if expulsion of their former ruler, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, was such a good thing, after all.

Some contend that the country is far

SOVIET UNION: Moving to become the dominant military power in Asia if U. S. pull-back creates a vacuum.

CHINA: Nervous about the Russian threat, wants U. S. to stay as a moderating influence.

JAPAN: Worried about withdrawal of American military presence, seen as essential to Japanese security.

TAIWAN: Some Asians look for U. S. to end ties with Nationalist China—but not in the immediate future.

SOUTH KOREA: Still fears Communist take-over and urges that U. S. troops not be pulled out.

PHILIPPINES: Rising nationalism and economic disputes imperil American bases and business interests.

SOUTH VIETNAM: Demands to know what U. S. will do if Communist guerrillas fight on after a cease-fire.

THAILAND: Edging away from close relationship with U. S., seeking better contacts with Peking.

MALAYSIA: Promoting a plan for regional neutrality to be guaranteed by U. S., Russia and China.

AUSTRALIA: No longer puts so much stock in defense alliances. Trend now is toward neutralism.

worse off now than it was under Sihanouk. There is a feeling that with or without Communist assistance, Sihanouk may be returned to power. Such a development would be, as one diplomat said, "at least an irritant" to the United States.

Signs are that in the aftermath of war, the U.S. will be confronted by many "irritants" in Indo-China.

SOUTHEAST ASIA: Doubt, Worry

Postwar relations between the U.S. and Thailand will present difficulties.

Just how long the U.S. will be permitted to use air bases in Thailand is problematical, according to observers on the scene.

The Thais, edging away from "togetherness" with the U.S., are actively seeking closer contacts with Red China. Continued American use of bases in Thailand may depend, in large part, on Peking's attitude, diplomats say.

One reason for Bangkok's fence mending with Peking is that Thailand has an insurgency problem which includes guerrilla raids on bases from which U.S. warplanes fly. The Chinese Communists reportedly are arming the guerrillas. The Thai Government believes that the Chinese could clamp a lid on the whole matter of insurgency.

Thailand's neighbor, Malaysia, is promoting a plan that would eliminate all foreign military presence from Southeast Asia, with the region's neutrality guaranteed by the U.S., Russia and Red China. So far, this plan is not getting much support.

Singapore's Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, has urged the U.S. to bolster Thailand as a buffer against Communist expansion southward toward Malaysia and Singapore.

Mr. Lee is openly doubtful of the ability of non-Communist governments to survive very long in South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos after an Indo-China cease-fire. His view is shared by some other key officials in Southeast Asia.

SOUTH ASIA: Many Complications

Once a settlement is nailed down in Indo-China, the U.S. is expected to put much more diplomatic emphasis on the Indian subcontinent.

Diplomatic progress won't be easy,

for, as one expert put it:

"Washington is deeply distrusted in India, has little effective leverage in Pakistan, and suffers continued, sometimes officially inspired anti-Americanism in the new nation of Bangladesh."

Complicating the outlook is the prospect of more competition—perhaps even confrontation—between the Soviet Union and Communist China for influence in South Asia.

Some analysts say there is at least a 50-50 chance that India and Pakistan will be at war with each other again in the 1970s. Such a conflict could bring active intervention by Russia on India's side and China on Pakistan's, setting off the kind of conflagration the U.S. hopes to prevent.

Russia's close relationship with India worries U.S. officials. For years, the Soviets have been India's main ally, major arms supplier and biggest single market. A new economic agreement signed last September will involve Moscow even more closely in India's economic life.

In terms of trade, investment, defense or strategic location, India has no great immediate importance for the U.S. But America does not want to see India—a nation of more than 520 million people—go completely under domination of the Soviet Union.

One Soviet move to which the U.S. may be forced to respond is the small but regular airlift of Russian military supplies through India to Hanoi, by way of Burma and Laos. Some military experts say that this airlift could disrupt an Indo-China settlement.

Meanwhile, the U.S. must decide whether to give Pakistan more arms aid to maintain some kind of military equilibrium on the subcontinent.

As for Bangladesh, a drift toward political chaos is evident at a time when the Soviet Union is consolidating its position there. Analysts say that this poses another problem for United States global strategists.

INDIAN OCEAN: Showing the Flag

A sharp increase in U.S. activity on the Indian Ocean is anticipated if the situation in Indo-China remains relatively calm after a cease-fire.

American planes, operating from the British-owned Diego Garcia Island and

other places, are expected to maintain surveillance all the way from East Africa to Indonesia.

The aerial reconnaissance will be designed to watch constantly Russian naval vessels, trawlers and oceanographic survey ships—all of which are part of the rapidly expanding thrust into an ocean crossed by some of the world's most vital sea lanes.

American warships, analysts predict, will cruise the Indian Ocean regularly as part of a psychological demonstration of a continuing U.S. presence.

Officials say that the U.S. does not want to turn the Indian Ocean into another Mediterranean, where American and Soviet fleets keep shadowing each other. The objective is to show that the U.S. will not permit a power vacuum to develop in this strategic part of the world, which Russia could exploit by default.

AUSTRALIA: Neutralism?

Australia no longer can be regarded as an automatic ally of the U.S. in Asia. Foreseen now is Australian support of efforts to create a neutral Southeast Asia.

One reason for this is the widely held conviction that the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) is just about defunct and irrelevant to the era now dawning.

Australia, like other Pacific powers, recognizes that a U.S. pullout from most of the Asian mainland could change the whole picture.

In New Zealand, Prime Minister-elect Norman Eric Kirk signaled his reaction to the change by announcing on November 25 that his foreign policy will include a phasing out of New Zealand's participation in SEATO and initiatives toward recognizing Red China.

• Taken together, the problems ahead point to an uneasy road for the U.S. After three decades, the U.S. is anxious to maintain its interests in Asia—but not at the cost of another Vietnam. How to do so shapes up as an enormous challenge over the coming months and years.

WASHINGTON POST
25 November 1972

The Korean Way

If the guiding purpose of American policy were to nourish democracies on the American model everywhere, then the United States would have no choice but to harshly condemn the charade referendum organized by President Park to turn South Korea into a dictatorship organized generally along the political lines of Communist North Korea. For there is little doubt but that Mr. Park has done something quite like that in using his already great power to construct an institutional structure for his own continued one-man rule in Seoul. It is bound to be a bitter disappointment to those Koreans who had hoped American political values could slowly take root and serve Korean needs, and to those Americans who still measure the success of policy by the extent to which allies act on the American model.

We are regretfully prepared to concede, however, that this is an increasingly obsolete and unnecessary standard by which to measure American policy in Asia. Americans may sincerely believe—and history may yet offer vindication—that for a generally poor country like Korea, the adoption of American ways offers the best political and social route ahead.

But it becomes more and more evident that Americans can insist on such adoption only if they are ready to enforce it and, as well, to guarantee the particular country against whatever unfortunate consequences may thereby ensue. In the case of Korea, the American presence is fading and the United States is progressively less willing to accept such consequences. The Koreans would be fooling and possibly hurting themselves to believe otherwise. The only safe conclusion left to them is to organize themselves as they best see fit. It is Koreans not Americans who must live with the results.

The fact is that the American interest now lies in having in Seoul a government strong and confi-

dent enough to do business with North Korea increasingly without direct American patronage. This is the logic both Koreas accepted a year ago when their respective patrons began to improve relations of their own. President Park understands this. Whether he has acted wisely in consolidating his power—whether Koreans now or later will decide that the loss of whatever civil liberties they had was necessary and worthwhile in order to get a chance at reunification with North Korea—is for Koreans to decide.

We would note that President Park's recent steps have done no visible damage on the various levels of diplomacy he has been conducting with North Korea. Missions and journalists go back and forth between Seoul and Pyongyang. A "hot line" is in operation. Red Cross talks, designed at the least to arrange contacts and eventually visits between the millions of Korean families separated by the Korean war, are continuing. Actual reunification of the two diverse parts of Korea seems remote but the personal involvement of the top leadership, including the North's Kim Il Sung himself, indicates a degree of seriousness which virtually no one anticipated a short year ago.

In sum, unless the United States is prepared to stay indefinitely on the scene, which it is not, and to direct and insure the political future of South Korea, which it is not, then Americans must temper their regret at Seoul's reversion to single-man rule with the realization that Korea is no longer ours to shape and mold, if it ever was. It could be that the United States should never have intervened in Korea 20-odd years ago and assumed the powers and responsibilities which it is now trying gradually to let go. That is another question. To become progressively superfluous, without exposing a friend and ally to excessive risks, is the proper goal of American policy now.

WASHINGTON STAR
1 December 1972

Death of a Democracy

For all those who believe in democratic government, the news from South Korea is discouraging. This small nation, for which more than 33,000 Americans gave their lives 20 years ago, has now taken what appears to be a decisive turn away from democracy and toward dictatorship.

South Korea's 15 million voters have massively approved revisions in their constitution that give President Park Chung Hee virtually unlimited powers for as long as he cares to exercise them. There was never any doubt about the outcome of the referendum: The government had conducted a widespread and intimidating campaign in favor of the amendments and had forbidden any debate or opposition. As it turned out,

94 percent of the voters followed suit.

Under the new provisions, 55-year-old President Park will be allowed an unlimited number of six-year terms, which effectively makes him president for life if he wants the job. Although there are provisions for a National Assembly and a National Conference for Unification composed of from 2,000 to 5,000 members, all effective power will be concentrated in the President's hands. According to the new constitution, he will have authority "to take necessary emergency measures in the whole range of state affairs, including internal affairs, foreign affairs, national defense, economic, financial and judicial affairs," as he sees fit.

The justification for this drastic grant of power is ostensibly the moves

that are being made between North and South Korea toward reunification of the divided peninsula. It will give Park an authority similar to that exercised in North Korea by the Communist government of Kim Il Sung to negotiate—or possibly even to fight each other—without the bother and fuss that democratic government necessarily entails.

It is also, however, a move which is certain to raise very serious questions about the continued presence in South Korea of American forces which have remained there since the end of the Korean war in 1953. Pressure to withdraw these troops has risen sharply in recent months. And it is unlikely that they will remain much longer in order to support a dictatorial government in Seoul.

WASHINGTON STAR

26 NOV 1972

Cambodia's Elite Grows Rich With U.S. Aid

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE
Star-News Special Correspondent

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia

The Cambodian economy is running on a "more business than usual" basis despite the war, courtesy of the American taxpayer, diplomatic and Cambodian officials who are disgruntled with rampant corruption and fattening in this capital say.

"There is no belt tightening here," one diplomat said, commenting on effects of the war on Cambodia. The vehicle which brought opulence in time of war is once again the same as in the other countries of Indochina, an American economic aid program with the same old ingredients, the setting up of a corrupt local official and Chinese merchant elite, insufficient control of U.S. funds, economic thinking on the part of American officials which takes no account of the effects of U.S. economic aid on the recipient country's society and, in the case of Cambodia, outright bribery of a foreign government.

Props For Imports

American economic aid to Cambodia is tied almost completely to financing imports into Cambodia. This is done through two programs the Commodity Import Program (CIP) and the Exchange Support Fund (ESF).

U.S. officials in Phnom Penh admit one of their aims is to keep the Cambodian volume of imports at a prewar level. After two years of war, Cambodian exports rice, rubber and tobacco have become almost non-existent as the Communists have seized control of large areas of the countryside, cut roads and rail communication. Of course, without exports, Cambodia cannot pay for imports. Therefore the United States has stepped in to finance Cambodian imports.

Complex Plan

American economic reasoning on financing Cambodian imports is this: the outbreak of war in Cambodia brought about a large Cambodian military budget. In order to pay

the troops and other war expenses, the Cambodian National Bank printed large numbers of banknotes for Cambodian government use. This meant there was a large supply of money in the country. As people had more paper money there was a corresponding rise in prices and inflation. The United States, by financing imports, makes goods available to soak up the extra money supply and movement of currency generates funds for the Cambodian government through customs revenues and taxes.

It all sounds very feasible until a close look is taken at the \$110 million U.S. aid economic program and what it actually does.

Some \$75 million is budgeted in fiscal year 1973 for the CIP, an amount economic sources say is about \$25 million in excess of Cambodia's actual import needs. Some of the money is being used to import luxury articles such as air conditioning equipment and televisions sets.

Elite Formed

Informed sources say it is ridiculous that these luxury articles should be imported to be sold to a small group of people who can only afford them because of the large profits they make out of the CIP in the first place.

This group is a small elite group of high-ranking Cambodian officials and businessmen. They are getting rich because the U.S. import program allows them to import goods from the United States at a preferential rate of 130 Cambodian riels to the U.S. dollar compared to a current market rate of about 190 riels to the dollar. These businessmen do not pass on this bonus to the Cambodian consumer whom they charge at the 190-rirel rate this profit is instead transferred into black market U.S. dollars which are slipped out of Cambodia to Hong Kong and Singapore, large-scale capital flight of Cambodian foreign exchange.

U.S. embassy officials, asked about this state of affairs, explain lamely that importers have a waiting period

for goods purchased in the United States of five or six months. Without this preferential tariff they would not risk

funds to order U.S. goods. Because it is U.S. money involved Congress insists Cambodian buy U.S. goods officials said.

Junior officials in the Cambodian ministries complain this preferential tariff system has led to formation of a small business elite while the ordinary Cambodian has various imported goodies dangled in front of his eyes which he can't afford. Desire to have luxury items has led to an increase in already rampant corruption in government offices and social dissatisfaction, sources said. Nor does the Cambodian government benefit from customs revenues or taxes. Economic sources charge there have been irregularities in the agency which processes importers applications and importers have not been paying customs dues or tax.

"Cambodia is an undisciplined society, there is no way of checking on these things here or collecting revenues properly," sources said. Thus the U.S. aim of adding to government revenues is imperfectly attained.

Sources here say the U.S. Cambodian import program would be more viable if it were confined to essential goods for the average Cambodian, cumbersome paper procedures eliminated making faster delivery times, the preferential tariff eliminated and therefore more Cambodian riels soaked up U.S. financed imports and the whole tied to cleanup of corruption in various Cambodian government departments, particularly customs.

The CIP accounts for 70 percent of Cambodian total imports. The remainder is handled through the exchange op-

erations fund a \$35 million fund to which the United States officially contributes 12.5 million.

U.S. economic sources here are enthusiastic about the ESF because the Cambodian national bank fixes the dollar-rirel rate daily, forcing would-be importers to bid for dollars for their import needs. This prevents "runs" by merchants on U.S.-supplied funds, U.S. officials say, because the bank

can enforce a high exchange rate simply by refusing to sell dollars if importers' bids are too low.

Out of Sight

This should not give U.S. officials reason for jubilation, however. What ESF does in fact is provide the Cambodian government with foreign exchange with which it finances local businessmen to import luxuries from countries like Japan. The United States has no means or rights to audit just how the \$12.5 million is used by Cambodia, economic sources here say.

Press reports in Cambodian newspapers published Nov. 9 revealed some abuses that go on. They alleged 1,000 Honda motorcycles were imported from Japan but no customs tax was paid and that one of the defendants in the case would be the chief of Cambodian customs. The case was postponed because the customs chief failed to appear in court.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

1 December 1972

Laos, Cambodia face lonely future

By Charlotte Balkowski
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

As South Vietnam continues to occupy center stage in the cease-fire talks here, two tiny countries of Indo-China — Laos and Cambodia — seem to be hidden in background shadows.

Yet, quietly, without publicity, the United States has been stepping up its military shipments to the region to stockpile as much equipment there as possible before a cease-fire takes place. The buildup is not on the massive scale that it is in South Vietnam, say informed sources, but an effort is being made to ensure that the politically shaky countries have a chance of survival after a cease-fire.

Thieu's emissary

It is not known whether Saigon emissary Nguyen Phu Duc and President Nixon discussed this question in their talks this week.

Since Mr. Duc was to meet with the President again Thursday, as well as with officials at the State Department, it was understood that the three principal issues under discussion were reestablishment of a demilitarized zone in Vietnam, the tripartite organization, and President Thieu's demand that a peace agreement provide for the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops.

However, according to some reports, one of the concessions made by North Vietnam in the recent talks in Paris was a provision that after a cease-fire goes into effect in the two Vietnams, it would also take effect in Laos and Cambodia and all "foreign troops" would leave both countries.

Rebel worry in Cambodia

Cambodia's concern has been that if the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong withdraw from Cambodian territory the Khmer Rouge — the rebel forces, which number some 30,000 — will take over Hanoi's supply routes and camps and go on with the guerrilla war against the Phnom Penh government.

President Lon Nol has offered amnesty to these rebel forces, which have been fighting with the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong, but there has been no significant response to the offer.

Among the "foreign troops" that would have to be pulled out are North Vietnamese forces and Viet Cong, several hundred U.S. military personnel, the elaborate quasi-military operation of the Central Intelligence Agency in Laos, and the Thai forces in Laos.

Whether North Vietnam would really withdraw its troops is a moot question. Knowledgeable officials expect Hanoi to carry out a token pullback, and then wait for a propitious time to continue the fight — as it would in Vietnam.

The administration is said to be willing to live with such arrangements, i.e., to tolerate a certain Communist presence in these countries. It reasons that if South Vietnam now has a chance of survival — given the economic and military situation there — so do Cambodia and Laos.

Washington's broad strategy, say these

BALTIMORE SUN
6 December 1972

Laos's fate in foreign hands

By ARNOLD R. ISAACS
Sun Staff Correspondent

Vientiane, Laos — As The weekly Laos peace talks wore into a second hour yesterday, one of the foreign diplomats waiting on the airy balcony outside the conference room in the Education Ministry building glanced at the bored government and Pathet Lao guards standing side by side in front of the door.

"All we are really doing," he remarked with a shrug, "is waiting for the rest of the world to decide what to do about Laos."

Since they began eight weeks ago, the negotiations between the government and the Pathet Lao have done nothing to challenge that assessment.

For the last decade, although thousands of Lao soldiers on both sides have fought and died in the remote valleys and mountains of their country, the war in Laos has been essentially one front in the larger conflict between the United

States and North Vietnam.

It appears almost certain that the shape of the peace will be decided in Washington and Hanoi rather than in Vientiane.

The peace talks have fallen into a pattern as predictable as it is unproductive, with both sides spending hours haggling over trivial points of procedure.

After the ceremonial arrival of both sides, each delegation filed into the conference room, permitting cameramen to take pictures as they took their seats. Then the door was closed.

Exactly 2½ hours later, the doors opened and each side handed out copies of the speeches that had been delivered inside.

Pheng Phongsavan, the chief government delegate, repeated the argument he had made at each of the previous seven meetings — insisting that the North Vietnamese troops who support the Pathet Lao are the real aggressors and must be withdrawn as part of any settlement.

Phetsol Soth, the acting chairman of the talks, also repeating his own previous speeches, demanded again that the Americans halt their bombing, disband the "irregular" combat forces that are paid directly by the United States and have carried the brunt of the fighting, withdraw the Thai "volunteers" who are also paid by the Americans, and end the supply arms and equipment to the government forces.

Mr. Soth also told reporters that the same procedural questions that have occupied the last seven meetings were discussed again. There are two of these—the display of the Royal Lao flag in the meeting room, and the name of the government delegation.

The Pathet Lao does not refuse to recognize the flag that it accepts as the flag of the kingdom. But it does object to the fact that government dele-

officials, is to "neutralize" Indo-China, seeking the help of Thailand, Indonesia, Japan, and other peripheral nations in keeping it this way.

Meanwhile, according to reports here, other concessions granted by Hanoi in Paris include reestablishment of a demilitarized buffer zone along the 17th parallel in which neither side would be permitted to carry on military operations.

Where the sensitive troop-withdrawal issue is concerned, these reports say that North Vietnam has agreed to a mutual demobilization in the South, provided Saigon releases the thousands of Communist "political" prisoners it is holding.

One thing seems clear. In the light of South Vietnamese President Thieu's strong opposition to the cease-fire accord, North Vietnam has reopened its positions and, while it may have made concessions, it is also raising new demands.

Certainly the issues now being discussed by President Nixon, Mr. Duc, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the State Department officials go well beyond the half dozen or so procedural disagreements which presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger said in October still remain to be resolved.

gates placed it between the tables without previous agreement by both sides.

It also refuses to accept the designation of the government side as the delegation of the "Provisional Government of National Union"—the name of the Communist-Neutralist-Rightist coalition established under the Geneva accords of 1962.

Not longer genuine

Claiming that Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma is no longer a genuine neutralist, the Pathet Lao refers to the government delegation as the "Vientiane rightist side," calling its own side the "Lao patriotic forces."

A new procedural point occupied an hour of yesterday's meeting, Mr. Soth reported, when the government delegation questioned his authority to lead the Pathet Lao delegation.

Mr. Soth temporarily replaced Gen. Phoune Sipaseuth, the permanent chairman, who left Vientiane Saturday for North Vietnam and Sam Neua, the site of the Pathet Lao Government.

Not far apart

On paper, the positions of the two sides do not seem too far apart. Both agree that foreign intervention should end and that Laos should be united under a neutral government. The differences lie in the definitions.

For the Pathet Lao, which has never admitted the involvement of North Vietnamese troops, an end to foreign intervention means an end to United States bombing and

support of government troops.

The creation of a neutral government means the replacement of the existing neutralist ministers—except probably Prince Souvanna himself—by persons they regard as "patriotic neutralists."

Government side

To the government, foreign intervention means North Vietnamese intervention and neutrality means the Pathet Lao, including Prince Souphanouvong should resume the four Cabinet seats they left vacant more than nine years ago, with the present neutralist and rightist members retaining a majority.

In fact, though neither side acknowledges it fully, both the United States and North Vietnam are heavily involved in the war.

By American estimates, the North Vietnamese have about 80,000 troops in Laos, although only about 20,000 of them are actually in combat units fighting Lao troops.

Maintain trail

The rest are transportation, engineering and service troops maintaining the Ho Chi Minh trail, the network of roads through Laos over which North Vietnam moves the bulk of its men and supplies to South Vietnam.

North Vietnamese strength is more than double the estimated 35,000 Pathet Lao troops, who, the Americans believe, are used more as porters and laborers than as fighting soldiers.

The American role was kept officially secret, though it was

widely known, for the first six years of massive American involvement in Laos.

It was not until March, 1970, that President Nixon acknowledged

Saigon terrorist incident

Saigon ~~7~~—Two terrorists on a motorbike threw an explosive device onto the grounds of the French consulate here last night, injuring one staff employee. The employee, a Malaysian, is a night watchman at the consulate. He was treated for a superficial arm wound and returned to work.

Edged on the record that U.S. aircraft were bombing the trail and were conducting air strikes in support of government troops—bombing that newspaper readers had read about for years.

On the ground, the U.S. furnishes all the weapons, ammunition and supplies for the 56,000-man Royal Lao Army. The main American effort, however, has been with the 30,000 soldiers serving in irregular units, recruited, paid, trained, advised, and in a few cases, virtually commanded, by Americans working for the Central Intelligence Agency.

The United States also supports Thai "volunteers" who have been brought into Laos in increasing numbers to make up for heavy casualties among the mountain tribesmen who made up the bulk of the irregular units. The number of Thai soldiers is classified, but it is said to have reached about 12,000.

Supporting Laos

Officially, the Americans are

supporting Laos at the request of the Lao government, which was supposed to be neutral under the 1962 accords but was given the right to seek aid for its self-defense.

The North Vietnamese, while not admitting to the presence of their troops, express solidarity with the Lao "Patriotic forces fighting the American aggressors."

In fact both the Americans and the North Vietnamese have fought in Laos primarily for their own purposes, and only secondarily in the interests of their respective clients.

The United States has supported Prince Souvanna in return for his consent to the American bombing of the Ho Chi Minh trail. North Vietnam, which most observers believe could have conquered all of Laos years ago if it had made a serious effort, has seemed concerned mainly with protecting its own borders and keeping Lao troops tied down far from the approaches to the trail.

Least populous

In Laos, the most primitive and least populous of the Indo-Chinese countries, this has meant a war that has ebbed and flowed across the country, causing enormous suffering—civilian casualties are unknown but certainly very high, and the government estimates one-fourth of the entire population has been uprooted—but never reaching any conclusion.

For most people in Laos, the war has been an affair of outsiders, and despite the Tuesday meetings on the fourth floor of the Education Ministry, the peace will probably be the same.

Eastern Europe

LOS ANGELES TIMES
17 November 1972

U.S.-Soviet Friendship and Its Troubling Effect on Dissenters

BY ERNEST CONINE

Andrei Sakharov, the most prominent member of the fledgling civil rights movement in the Soviet Union, made a disturbing observation in a recent interview with an American correspondent.

For years it has been an article of faith in the West that the winding down of the Cold War would not only make the world a safer place but would contribute to the growth of human freedom in the Communist countries.

There is no question that, in the wake of President Nixon's summit trip to Moscow last May, relations between the United States and Russia are the friendliest since 1918.

Yet, according to Sakharov, the new spirit of cooperation is actually making things worse instead of better for Soviet dissenters.

Since Mr. Nixon's summit visit, he said, "the authorities seem more impudent because they feel that, with detente, they can now ignore Western public opinion, which isn't going to be concerned with internal freedom in Russia."

★

Similar observations have been attributed to Jews in the Soviet Union.

According to Leonard W. Schroeter, a Seattle lawyer who made a recent trip to Russia, leaders of the Soviet Jewish community say the Moscow summit actually produced a deterioration in the situation of Soviet Jews.

Whenever the Kremlin makes a serious move toward East-West detente, they told him, the automatic response of the party and police apparatus is to tighten its grip on the population.

The Soviet Jews charged, in Schroeter's words, that the United States seems "more interested in

selling corn than in protecting human rights."

This is an unfair distortion of U.S. motives. But it points up the painful moral dilemma of this country.

In the larger sense, there is no question but that the easing of Cold War tensions is in the interest of both Americans and Russians.

The Nixon initiatives have produced a first-phase arms control agreement that, despite its limited scope, marks an important step toward ending the nuclear arms race.

Beyond that, if the Kremlin were not so anxious to buy American corn and sell Russian natural gas, it might not have finally thrown its weight into the effort to achieve peace in Vietnam. The same considerations may well act as a brake on Soviet troublemaking in the Middle East.

Finally, to the degree that increased trade with the Communists promotes greater prosperity here at home, it will serve the quite humane

function of providing more jobs for Americans.

Unfortunately, it is probably true that, from the Kremlin's viewpoint, the detente calls for more rather than less internal repression.

The bogeyman of capitalist encirclement is, after all, one of the major rationalizations for totalitarian rule. The people cannot be allowed to think that, just because Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev are clinking vodka glasses, Western notions of democracy have become any more acceptable.

Thus, as a respected Swiss commentator put it, "An active policy of contact and cooperation with the West, coupled with repression at home, do not constitute a paradox which needs to be resolved. Rather, they are two sides of the same coin."

The question is, how much lever-

age does the Soviet thirst for access to American trade and technology give us in this situation?

The record is plain that the Communists are prepared to be humane when it pays.

Thousands of ethnic Germans, for example, are being allowed to leave the Soviet Union as a Kremlin gesture of help to West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, whose policies of East-West reconciliation have come under fire from political opponents.

President Nixon is under heavy pressure from American Jews to announce that he will not ask Congress to authorize trade concessions to the Soviet Union, as called for in the new trade agreement, unless Moscow rescinds its massive exit tax on Jews and other Soviet citizens who want to emigrate.

So blunt an approach would almost certainly do more harm than good.

It may turn out, though, that the Kremlin can be brought around by quiet, nonpublic warnings that by outraging public opinion through its treatment of Soviet Jews and dissenters, it is jeopardizing congressional approval of the trade concessions.

By going on record with a threat to block implementation of the trade agreement unless the exit tax on Soviet Jews is abolished, 72 U.S. senators have strengthened the Administration's hand in this regard. Hopefully, the message will get through.

Unfortunately, economic leverage is not likely to work, even if tried, in the case of dissenting Soviet intellectuals who continue to suffer incarceration and even death in "mental" hospitals.

It is not a happy thought, but the grim fact may be that in the short run, at least, the cost of detente will be measured in the further tightening of the screws on the Soviet people.

Western Europe

WASHINGTON POST
1 December 1972

"Finlandization"

On Giving a Good Policy a Bad Name

By Stephen S. Rosenfeld

EVEN THOUGH 34 countries are now talking at Helsinki about the political future of Europe, too many American ambassadors and senators and others who should know better are still warning busily of the grave dangers of "Finlandization," as though the condition were a noxious disease—acceptable perhaps when confined to one unfortunate country but essential to keep from spreading across West Europe at large.

If the term merely patronized the Finns, one might simply treat it as a silly slur on a friendly and respectable nation, set up a Finnish-American Society to do the tea-and-sympathy work done for Britain by the English Speaking Union, and leave it at that.

But "Finlandization" is more. It has entered the common political vocabulary as a geopolitical concept meaning that Soviet influence would flood and undermine West Europe if substantial numbers of American troops were withdrawn.

In fact, "Finlandization" reflects more the unfounded assumptions of those who profess to fear it than the reality it purports to describe. It is a red herring brandished, often unwittingly, by those who believe it is America's destiny and Europe's fortune that the United States keep a good number of divisions there to protect the Europeans from the wicked Russians, and from themselves. The term is the Pavlovian bell of the "Atlanticists," that powerful group of establishment figures who have supported strong Atlantic links—that is, a large American influence and presence in Europe—since World War II.

THIS IS NOT THE PLACE to argue whether in the last generation the Atlanticists were proven right. It is the time to ask whether in the generation ahead the same requirements for American involvement persist. It is precisely here that a proper understanding of Finland's condition should be assayed.

Finland is, first, neutral, a member of neither military bloc. It has thus avoided the heavy budgetary costs, with attendant political and social dislocations, which bloc membership has commonly entailed.

Second, Finland is independent. In the
WASHINGTON POST
8 December 1972

Stephen S. Rosenfeld

Likening Europe To Finland Is a Distraction

THE NUMBER and range and, indeed, class of those who took issue with a piece on "Finlandization" in this space last week was

sense that its situation has not depended on the presence of foreign troops. The departure of foreign (American) troops would not at all upset Helsinki in the way that it would upset those various states (Germany, France, etc.) who have hooked their political and psychological equilibrium to the indefinite stationing of American forces. (Who's more "Finlandized"?)

Third, Finland is a Western-style parliamentary democracy, with far more real freedom than is implied by those who hold it up as a terrible example of what can befall a country living in Moscow's shadow, and with more real freedom than is available in some of the very countries which fear being "Finlandized."

Granted, it would be nicer not to share an 800-mile border with the Soviet Union. It would also be nicer not to have ended up fighting and losing the last war to the Soviet Union. But for Finland, that's life. What's then wrong with being "Finlandized"? It's already where most of Europe wants to be. In this time of détente, it offers a useful model of a small, precariously located country which has found a way to avoid the harshest burdens and risks of the cold war, to preserve its Western-style political liberties, and cultural traditions and, almost alone now among European states, to face changing circumstances with relative equanimity. Is not Finland more to be envied than pilloried or scorned?

YOUR GOOD ATLANTICIST will reply, of course, that Finland's "mutual assistance" treaty with the Soviet Union has made of it not much more than a semi-satellite. But this is an inaccurate transcription of a political record ordinarily read in another (East European) context. The 1948 treaty merely formalized Russia's not unreasonable insistence that Finland not again be used as a springboard for German attack; the Finns have been able to live with it perfectly well. Finland unquestionably shares an interest in not being so used. Paradoxically, its Soviet treaty association underpins its neutrality. Only if the Soviet Union firmly believes that Finland will not again become a springboard is Helsinki's claim to neutrality of real

so impressive as to prompt a second go at the question—which is, of course, the whole question of the proper and feasible role of the United States in Europe in the uncertain but hopeful period of "détente" unfolding now.

For what it's worth, I yield un begrudgingly to the main point made by most of the critics: Last week's piece was kind to a fault to the Finns in understating the nasty pressures which Moscow has put on them over the years and in failing to distinguish the Soviet-rampant quality of Finland's "neutrality" from the more relaxed varieties enjoyed by Austria, Sweden and Switzerland.

But if the critics showed that "Finlandization" involves more Soviet influence than a nation would choose for it, if they did not, with the exception of military analyst

worth.

Close students of this matter will know that the bulk of the material in this article is derived from "Finnish Neutrality," a candid perceptive essay which the Finns' United Nations ambassador, Max Jakobson, wrote in 1969.

He concluded it with an apt observation on the Yalta conference of February, 1945. Roosevelt and Churchill had agreed that the Soviet Union should have on its borders "friendly" governments. Stalin agreed that those governments should be "independent and democratic." The great tension that developed over the different meaning later applied to those words defined, of course, the cold war.

"In one country only have post-war developments conformed, in a manner acceptable to both sides, to the pattern envisaged at Yalta," Jakobson wrote. "Finland has consistently pursued a policy that has satisfied the Soviet craving for security. Finland has also maintained her independence and parliamentary democracy in the sense that the Western powers understand these terms. . . Finland had hardly ever, in the quarter century that has passed since the Yalta conference, even been mentioned in the disputes and quarrels between East and West. The Cold War has passed her by."

Whether the conditions exist elsewhere in West Europe for "Finlandization" to be regarded there as a viable alternative is certainly a fair and necessary question. But let the word henceforth stop being used as an epithet and let the policy it describes, for Finland, be recognized as the very substantial diplomatic achievement it has been. The country has as much security as the nuclear age permits anywhere, perhaps more; it has no foreign occupation; it has excellent relations with all of its neighbors, including the one that might otherwise be regarded as the most threatening; it has a dignified domestic life in accordance with its own choices and traditions; it has international respect. It has long enjoyed the "post-cold-war" benefits which even now, only now, the other nations of Europe are gathered—at Helsinki—to seek.

Edward Lutiwak—concede that the same condition could not be duplicated elsewhere in West Europe. This is so, Lutiwak observed, basically because "there is no direct border contiguity—a crucial variable of Russian political influence." Out of irrelevance, and out of consideration for the Finns—who lost two wars (1939-40, 1941-44) to the Russians and who share an 800-mile border with them—this point need be pressed no more.

What needs to be pressed further are the far more important questions of how in a time of super-power détente, nuclear power translates into political influence in a middle region like Europe; and what is the American interest in continuing to project enough power into Europe to spare Europeans the large harsh Soviet influence that

would flow in, many profess to fear, if Washington substantially or sharply reduced its military presence.

THESE LARGER QUESTIONS were pretty much ignored by most critics of last Friday's article. As a group, they are the "Atlanticists," believing that the Soviet intent towards West Europe is hostile, that the American presence is crucial to fend off Soviet domination, and that the American interest requires now a greater effort to show that the U.S. is not abandoning Europe to the wily, purposeful Reds.

On such questions, there can be no such thing as exactitude, or unanimity. Inquiry is the appropriate posture, yet inquiry cannot even begin if the prevailing Atlanticist outlook is accepted as the only one or the only correct one or as the natural state of affairs.

It restates the obvious to say that nuclear power is a new and difficult ingredient in world politics, and no one can really know what extra twist it confers. It depends. But the Atlanticist notion that West Europe—though more than a match for Moscow in conventional capabilities and economic resources—would crumble under Soviet nuclear political pressure, ought to be recognized for what it is: a statement of the "worst case"—possible but unprovable, in any event a rationale for the status quo.

A reasonable man would want to grant in turn that, likewise, the "best case" is possible but unprovable, and involves uncertainty. That is grounds enough for moving carefully but not grounds for standing still.

THE IDEA that only American troops in Europe make the American nuclear guarantee credible is another key—though conjectural—element in the conventional wisdom. Given the continuing pressures on Mr. Nixon to reduce troops, however, it is hard to see why the Atlanticists keep on emphasizing this element. Would not their own cause be better served by taking a more relaxed view? Or is it that the specter of a Soviet political takeover is used or needed by Atlanticists to justify maintaining the overblown American presence (310,000 troops, costing \$14 billion a year) into the second generation after the war?

Skeptics should note how elastic the American definition of its "interests" in Europe could become under the pressure of changing circumstances. When Russia rockets, that interest is perceived one way; when American unemployment stays sticky, in another.

Europe, nervous and accustomed to having Washington's dominance spare it the care of molding its own deeper political/military cooperation, sighs in relief each time Mr. Nixon vows not to reduce troops unilaterally. But he raised tariffs and devalued the dollar unilaterally. He made a nuclear deal arching over Europe unilaterally in SALT I and, all the time "consulting" with the Allies, he'll unilaterally make another deal involving Europe-based planes and ships in SALT II. A President eager to right what he regards as an economic imbalance with Europe cannot avoid asking whether—or how, and when—to throw troops into the scale.

In sum, Europeans and Americans who claim that West Europe could be reduced to Finland's station misstate the likelihood of that particular eventuality and distract attention from the larger political and economic context in which American policy will most likely be made over the next four years.

THE ECONOMIST
2-8 Dec 1972

Ulster

Russian rockets

The war in Ulster took an unexpected turn this week with rocket attacks by IRA Provisionals using Soviet-made launchers. Their targets were army installations and police stations, mainly along the Irish border; they killed one policeman and one soldier. The army captured one of the rocket launchers and hopes the Provisionals have not got their hands on too many of them, for it turned out to be a brand-new RPG 7, which is current issue to the Soviet and other Warsaw pact armies.

In the past, the Provisionals have used the 3.5 American bazooka, a cumbersome and sensitive launcher, and they have not had much success with it. The RPG 7 is a sophisticated weapon but it can be used without a lot of training. It weighs about 10 lb and one man can handle it easily. Firing from the shoulder at about 200 yards, the Provisionals seem to have scored seven good hits out of the 11 attacks they made on Tuesday and Wednesday. Attempts had been made to scratch out the manufacturing source on the rocket launcher the army were lucky enough to capture, but Russian lettering on the safety catch and the label tag on the nose cone gave away its origin.

The army does not know just how the rocket launchers reached Ulster. Communist activities on both sides of the Irish border have become more

conspicuous over the past six months, but there is no evidence that arms and ammunition are coming direct from any source in the Soviet alliance. It is more likely that the Provisionals either bought the weapons on the international arms market in western Europe, or that they got them from a Middle East source like Syria, which has been supplied with the RPG 7 in recent months by the Russians. The Provisionals have built a large number of contacts with Arab guerrilla organisations.

The crackdown in the south has made the republic a more difficult place for the IRA to get arms or ammunition. One of the best things that could come out of closer Anglo-Irish co-operation would be an effective ending to the present traffic in weapons. The Provisionals have never been able to equip themselves with a standardised weaponry; they have had to take what they could get from wherever they could get it. What annoys the security forces particularly is that liberal Sweden has done least to check sales by private arms manufacturers and that country is a major supplier of ammunition to the Provisionals.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
2 December 1972

Will Europe pay for Viet peace?

An East-West package
with many wrappings

By Joseph C. Harsch

What price will Western Europe have to pay for the emerging detente between the United States and Russia?

The question becomes increasingly urgent in the wake of the West German elections.

Russia is about to obtain from those elections something it has greatly wanted for

many years — the formal recognition by the West of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, especially the East German regime.

Is there to be fair, and safe, compensation to Western Europe for the enormous advantage to Russia of the legitimization of its imperial position in central and eastern Europe? Or has Russia already paid off — by being more helpful about settlements in Vietnam and the Mideast?

There is no longer any doubt about the legitimization process. The size of Chancellor Brandt's election victory in West Germany means that the new treaties between East and West Germany will be signed this month and ratified as soon as possible thereafter, probably in January.

Sovereign state

East Germany will become a recognized sovereign and independent state. It will soon be seated as a member of the United Nations. The long-cherished idea of German reunification is being renounced by all the Western powers as well as by West Germany.

In many ways this was desirable, and probably it was inevitable. There is a hope, though not yet formal assurance, that the German people will see more of each other under the new arrangement than they did under the old. The East German Government will, so the theory goes, lose its insecurity

complex and be more willing to permit the movement of people and goods through its barbed-wire frontiers.

And the willingness of the West to accept this legitimization of the Communist regimes in the East is one reason why the Russians have been willing to allow matters in Vietnam to move toward a settlement. An end to the American involvement in Vietnam and possibly also some Russian help in a settlement in the Middle East represent an American gain from the general detente that touches all relationships throughout the whole world.

European outlook

In the short run, Washington gets a good deal if, in return for recognition of East Germany, it gets out of Vietnam with some residual dignity and also with an end to the danger of serious trouble in the Middle East.

But in the long run what happens in Europe? Will Washington, in its eagerness for an end to the Vietnam and Middle East affairs and for Mr. Nixon's "generation of peace" allow a European settlement of dangerous longer term advantage to Russia?

There is little doubt about what the Russians want. They want security for their imperial system in Eastern Europe. But are they willing to give equal security to Western Europe? They certainly will never offer equal security to others out of generosity. The Russian bear does not behave that way.

This, of course, leads into the question of how much Russia really does need an injection of Western technical skills and Western capital investment to stimulate Russia's lagging economy. The detente is generating new impulses within the Communist countries. The less the perceived danger of war, the more the popular demand for an end to tensions and some enjoyment of consumer goods.

The Eastern European dependencies of Russia are all giving more heed to the demand for consumer goods. Can Russia hold out for long and be the only Communist country still practicing austerity? Perhaps Western Europe's security depends heavily on what Russia will be willing to do in return for Western technical skills and capital.

The bargaining ahead will be complex. The West has ample bargaining resources, if it only uses them wisely. But there is implicit in the situation a danger of giving Moscow more than would be fair, or safe. The danger really is in lack of coordination between Washington and the West European capitals.

If the peace plans of the old friends and allies are properly coordinated the resulting deal should be a fair one, as safe for the West as for Russia. But is there anything like enough coordination right now between Washington and the capitals of Western Europe?

WASHINGTON POST
2 December 1972

A Submarine Thriller in a Norwegian Fjord

From the Maddox and Turner Joy off North Vietnam in 1964, to the Liberty off Sinai in 1967 and the Pueblo off North Korea in 1968, Americans have had ample evidence of their own navy's practice of electronic intelligence missions at sea. Soviet ships involved in such work have had the good fortune so far not to become the center of like international incidents but this does not at all mean they do not engage in similar practices. On the contrary, a Soviet sub whose make and movements indicated a clear intelligence mission was spied by a Norwegian fisherman on Nov. 12 about 60 miles up a fjord in Norwegian territorial waters. Playing mouse to a somewhat diffident Norwegian navy's cat, the skipper countered efforts to make him "pop" or surface and made it to international waters after 13 days. Whether he'll end up with the Hero of the Soviet Union medal or duty as a recruiter in Kolymaskaya in deepest Siberia would be interesting to know.

In Norway and elsewhere there has been more or less of a flap over the submarine's seemingly startling and daring feat, although the number of subs that have conducted such missions, and have been sunk or bruised on them, is probably larger than most of us can imagine. In the incident in the Sognefjord, some have seen a calculated effort by Soviet hardliners to unsettle the conference on European security and cooperation now being planned at Helsinki. Others have been re-

minded of the 1960 sequence in which a provocative and ultimately disastrous U-2 flight was scheduled over Russia by officials unmindful of the possible impact it might have on the then-impending summit. Still others will no doubt point to the new incident as evidence of continued Soviet naval growth, or of hostile Soviet policy, or of something ominous to which the United States ought to respond.

We do not so much dismiss such political speculation as point out that the incident falls within familiar if grim patterns of intelligence routine. The thriller aspect of the sub's maneuvers in the Sognefjord has plenty of published and unpublished precedent. The Soviet-American summit agreement intended to halt "chicken"-type incidents at sea, by the way, referred only to those submarines self-acknowledged as being on "exercise." "Operations" were not covered. In any event, neither side has abandoned collecting intelligence. The ABM agreement even specifically sanctions certain national intelligence procedures conducted over the other side's territory.

Experience has shown that irresponsibility and bad luck can plague naval intelligence missions, as they can plague all other human activities. But a good case can be made that, precisely because submarines—if exposed—can slip away into the depths, they are much better suited than surface ships like the Pueblo or Liberty to the kind of intelligence missions that great powers perform.

Near East

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

1. December 1972

The core of the problem

By Elmer Berger

The existing moratorium on U.S. diplomatic initiatives in the Middle East must end now that the elections are over. Otherwise the vacuum will be filled with a continuation of "terrorism," "preemptive" raids by an Israeli military establishment armed with sophisticated American weaponry and an accelerated decline of American interests, influence, and honor throughout the Arab world.

For an American policy to succeed where previous efforts have failed, it will be necessary to reinforce initiatives with credibility which is now lacking. That is to say there will have to be public opinion support for any future diplomatic moves. Too often in the past some plan has been scuttled by a managed groundswell of "grass-roots" opposition from one party to the conflict.

Presently, the fundamentals of the conflict between Zionism and indigenous Palestinian nationalism are obscured by rhetoric and clichés:

1. "Terrorism" in the Palestine problem did not originate at Munich, or in the Jordanian desert in 1970 or with the fedayeen in 1967. Menahem Begin's book, "The Revolt," should be required reading for America's decisionmakers at all levels. It details the planned campaigns of Zionist terror, in late 1947 and 1948, six months before the scheduled termination of the Palestine mandate. Zionist guerrilla attacks on Jaffa, Haifa, and Deir Yassin, among others, started the flight of the refugees. Mr. Begin was one of the chief architects of the campaign deliberately designed to modify by force the partition recommendation in order to bring it more into line, geopolitically, with historic Zionist aspirations. He now sits in the Israeli Knesset as the recognized leader of the opposition.

2. The Israeli demand for the Arabs to sit across the table and "negotiate" with the Israelis needs to be appraised against the historical facts. There has been no lack of "negotiations" in the Palestine conflict. "Understandings" were reached as long ago as the post-World War I era, beginning with the agreement between Chaim Weizmann and the first Faisal. The most significant negotiations perhaps, came in May of 1949, under the patient statesmanship of Ralph Bunche. At Lausanne, in separate but identical protocols, the Arabs and Israelis agreed

to the fundamentals of the 1947 partition proposals, including maps. The fighting of 1947-'48 had created the refugee problem and resulted in the de facto division of Jerusalem. Israel agreed to the "Lausanne Protocols" as a necessary, prior step to its admission to the United Nations. The admitting resolution specifically recalled the 1947 partition recommendation and a General Assembly resolution of Dec. 11, 1948, requiring Israel, among other things, to offer the refugees a free choice between repatriation and compensation, as well as an international regime for Jerusalem. Israel agreed to pursue "no polleles on any question which were inconsistent with the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council." These "negotiated" agreements are now openly flouted by Israel and the defiance is, at least tacitly, supported by American policy.

There has already been an abundance of the "negotiations" which the Israelis and Mr. Nixon continue to advocate. What is lacking is the will to enforce, by all available means, the agreements already negotiated.

3. The most crucial element in the Palestine problem is the Zionist nature of Israel as "the sovereign state of the Jewish people." It is not the sovereign state for all with recognized, legitimate residence rights to the territory occupied by Israel, either before or since, June, 1967. The indispensable qualification for membership in "the state of the Jewish people" — and therefore for full equality of citizenship — is profession of Judaism. By definition, such a state cannot give equality to non-Jewish nationals, whose rights are recognized in every international agreement ever negotiated about Palestine.

That is the core of the problem, more than territory or "security" or any of the other conditions which the American public has been led to believe are obstacles to settlement. Until the Zionist state eliminates — or is made to eliminate — this basic nationality commitment which gives the Jewish people priority over others, and until American politicians cease justifying their uncritical support for Israeli policies by hailing the state as the "only democracy in the Middle East," there will be no peace and no end of terrorism.

Mr. Berger is president of American Jewish Alternatives to Zionism, Inc.

WASHINGTON POST
25 November 1972

Film Event in Iraq To Aid Palestine Cause

BAGHDAD, Iraq (Reuter) Iraq is to hold its first film festival in March—a "progressive" function devoted to the liberation of Palestine and world freedom.

More than 200 Arab and foreign film and television personalities will be invited, including American film actress Jane Fonda, acclaimed here for her opposition to U.S. intervention in Vietnam.

The festival's symbol will be an olive branch and its slogan: "The liberation of Palestine is a pillar of world peace."

The festival organizers—the state-run organization of radio, television and cinema—expect to screen more than 80 films dealing with various liberal causes in the world, notably the Palestine question.

The opening of the festival March 10 has been chosen to coincide with the fifth anniversary of the Battle of Karameh, in which Jordanian troops and Palestinian commandos joined forces to beat off an Israeli attack in the Jordan Valley.

The festival was inspired by a declaration issued by delegates to the 1969 film festival in Leipzig, East Germany, that stressed the need to "project" the Palestine case through motion pictures and television films.

The declaration also underlined the role of armed struggle in achieving liberation and backed the recovery of Arab territory occupied by Israel.

The Union of Arab Broadcasting Stations, the Arab League and the Palestine Liberation are to cooperate with the Iraqi authorities in organizing the Baghdad festival.

The organizers of other international film festivals will be invited to attend, as well as "progressive elements" from film and television industries around the world.

Salam Al-Sultani, festival secretary-general and head of the Iraqi cinema organization, announced recently that the prize for the top film would be a golden olive branch.

Silver branches will be awarded to seven runners-up and there will be 14 cash prizes ranging from 100 to 150 dinars (\$288 to \$393).

The jury will be made up of writers, artists and journalists from Iraq and "friendly" countries, Sultan said.

Several theaters in Baghdad will be reserved for showing motion pictures and television films entered in the festival so that a large number of people will be able to see them.

The Iraqi authorities are hoping that the festival will not only help the cause of Palestine, but also give a boost to this country's own growing film industry, established in the late 1940s.

WASHINGTON STAR
28 November 1972

Israeli Envoy Defends Role Backing Nixon in Campaign

By IDO DISSENCHIK
Special to The Star-News

TEL AVIV—Israel's ambassador to the United States, Yitzhak Rabin, last night justified his intervention in the American presidential campaign on behalf of President Nixon.

Rabin stopped short of calling it interference. But his explanation, broadcast over Israel's state-controlled television, left the impression he was not only satisfied with the election results, but was trying to collect Israel's political gratitude for his stand.

Speaking in the program Moked, the equivalent of the American Meet the Press, Rabin said one of the candidates (he did not call names but he was obviously referring to Sen. George McGovern) raised a flag calling America to come back home. This position, Rabin said, could hurt the interest of Israel, because the latter expects Washington to back her on the diplomatic and political fronts of the Middle East conflict by standing up to the Soviets.

Rabin said he felt it was his duty to explain to Americans what were the interests of Israel and how they might be

influenced by the positions taken by the presidential candidates. He emphasized that as ambassador he would have reneged on his duties if he had not done so. He said he would expect any ambassador to do likewise.

Asked what his reaction would be if the U.S. ambassador to Israel were to suggest this year—an election is due in Israel next October—that

Washington sees the position of one of the opposition parties as most suitable to her interests, he replied that he did not speak in Washington in such blatant terms. He denied referring to parties or candidates, saying he only stated Israel's interests in operative terms and left the Americans to draw their conclusions (as to which candidate was preferable to Israel).

lence by left-wing extremists that included kidnappings and bank robberies in the name of Marxist revolution.

Three of those arrested have been sentenced to death and executed. Several others face prosecution for capital crimes. They are among 1,047 persons who are awaiting trial, including left-wing journalists, professors and students.

In contrast with Greece, where the military has been in direct control since 1967, the armed forces of this country exercise their influence on the political parties from the wings.

'Controlled Democracy'

This "controlled democracy" began in March, 1971, when the army demanded the resignation of Suleyman Demirel, the leader of the large Justice party—which is rightist—as Premier, and the installation of a weak Premier, Ferit Melen, as head of a coalition Government "above parties."

This was accompanied by the proclaiming of martial law to deal with left-wing extremism,

and a call for the adoption by Parliament of reform legislation—including a land-reform act, a law regulating foreign investment in mineral resources and new "special courts" to deal with subversion.

After 20 months, during which the 450-member Parliament dragged its feet on the proposed reforms, the top officers of the armed forces demanded action, with an implied threat to the parliamentary elections scheduled for next October hanging over the political scene.

Party Leaders React

Last week, the party leaders, including Mr. Demirel and Bulent Ecevit, leader of the Republican People's party, the left-of-center Opposition, hastily drew up a work schedule for the Parliament that will bring all the reform bills out of committee by March.

This does not mean that there is agreement on all the reform measures, but a conservative majority seems ready to vote the legislation to as-

NEW YORK TIMES
6 December 72

ARMY IN TURKEY IN FIRM CONTROL

Runs the Government From
Behind the Scenes

By JUAN de ONIS

Special to The New York Times

ANKARA, Turkey, Dec. 2—"By the Constitution, elected civilians are supposed to run the country, but if you look at Turkish affairs in practical terms—the newspaper editor's voice trailed off.

What he meant, as everyone in Turkey knows, is that the army exercises a role in this

nation of 35 million that amounts to government behind the scenes, and becomes open intervention in moments of parliamentary crisis.

It is not only that 11 provinces—including those in which Istanbul, Izmir and other major cities are situated—have been under martial law since April, 1971, and that 3,300 people have been brought before military courts since then.

Universities Under Military

It is also that all the big universities here and in Istanbul are under military control, with soldiers at the doors of buildings and plainclothesmen mingling in classes and in student meeting places. All student organizations were banned last week.

This is the military's answer to what is known in Turkey as "the anarchy," a wave of vio-

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
30 November 1972

U.S. peacemaking role catches Arab world's eye

By John K. Cooley
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Beirut, Lebanon

The U.S. role as a possible peacemaker in the Middle East is becoming a focus of attention in the Arab world.

Washington is "likely to undertake a new American peace initiative in the Middle East during the coming year," according to Sen. J. W. Fulbright (D) of Arkansas, chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who has been visiting Saudi Arabia.

The Saudi news agency in Riyadh also quoted Senator Fulbright as praising the "wise policies" of King Faisal and as hoping for improvement in overall Arab-American relations to match the good relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia.

The Arab-Israeli question, he is said to have added, "is presently the only obstacle to such improvement."

Washington has shown strong interest in suggestions recently made by Saudi Oil Minister Zakl al-Yamani that the U.S. admit Saudi oil free of customs and quota restrictions, in return for an assured supply of crude oil and Saudi investment in the U.S. oil industry.

Development praised

Saudi Arabia's economic development, said Senator Fulbright, had very much impressed him. It was made possible by "careful planning, in an exemplary atmosphere of stability and perseverance."

An Arab political writer, Clovis Maksoud, reports from Washington in the Beirut newspaper Al-Nahar Nov. 28 that President Nixon plans to visit Cairo next spring or in late 1973 as part of a U.S. peace initiative.

(The Associated Press reports from Camp David, Md., that a White House spokesman has said the report that President Nixon will visit Egypt and Israel next spring has "no

substance." Mr. Nixon's press secretary, Ronald L. Ziegler, commenting on the Al-Nahar report, said: "The President has no plans at this time to visit the Middle East.")

Mr. Maksoud asserted that "sources close to the White House" assured him Mr. Nixon wanted to make the trip because his visits to Moscow and Peking this year proved so fruitful. A Mideast trip would stress Mr. Nixon's desire "to go down in history as the maker of peace in the Middle East," Mr. Maksoud added.

Any Nixon visit to the Middle East would follow the projected trip to Washington next April by Soviet Communist Party First Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev, Al-Nahar said.

Shift in course doubted?

Mr. Maksoud said he had learned that Senator Fulbright is pessimistic about chances for a shift in U.S. Mideastern policy

toward more sympathy for the Arabs. But, he added, Mr. Fulbright believes the U.S.-Soviet detente could remove some of the substance from the Israeli claim that Israel is the only effective force standing against Soviet influence in the Mideast and Africa.

Mr. Maksoud also reported considerable congressional attention to the growing U.S. need for oil from Arab states. Assistant Secretary of State Joseph J. Sisco, adds Mr. Maksoud, has recently been saying that the "microbe" of the Middle East conflict must be separated from U.S.-Arab economic and trade relations. The first sign of this, Mr. Maksoud writes, was Mr. Yamani's oil proposal.

Mr. Maksoud also reports from Washington that U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers, identified in the Middle East with the unsuccessful Arab-Israeli peace plan bearing his name, has asked President Nixon to allow him to stay on at his post in the new U.S. administration.

sure the holding of next year's elections.

Political observers believe that Mr. Demirel, who was forced to resign, is likely to emerge from the parliamentary elections with a mandate to form another government.

Series of Defections

The Republican People's party has suffered a series of defections, including the resignation of Gen. Ismet Inonu, the 88-year-old elder statesman of Turkish politics, with only the left wing of the party following Mr. Ecevit.

The apparent strength of the Justice party and of Mr. Demirel is based on public unrest over a large rise in living costs during the months since Mr. Demirel was ousted, with inflation pushing up prices about 20 per cent in the last year.

With left-wing terrorism under control, and with the prospect of Parliament acting on the reform measures, the military preference for staying in the background is considered likely to keep the parliamentary system going, even with a victory by Mr. Demirel.

WASHINGTON POST
7 December 1972

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

... And an Interview With Anwar Sadat

CAIRO—Egyptian President Anwar Sadat hopes for "good, new relations" between Cairo and Moscow, so badly fractured last July, but he believes Moscow's commitment to detente with Washington overwhelms every other aspect of Kremlin policy.

In short, although he cloaked his words in an exclusive interview with us here in diplomatic niceties, Sadat and Egypt have no assurance how much muscle party Chairman Leonid Brezhnev will use to champion Egypt's case when he meets with President Nixon next spring.

If that prospect does not change, and change Sadat

really, Sadat may abruptly move his country out of the somnolent, twilight phase which started with the Suez Canal cease-fire in August 1970. The change could shatter the cease-fire by next spring.

It was clear, Sadat told us in a parlor of his modest presidential residence facing the Nile, that the first Brezhnev-Nixon summit reached no consensus on the Middle East.

SOVIET RELUCTANCE

to pressure Mr. Nixon then on the question of Israel's continued occupation of the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula was perhaps unavoidable. Sadat told us. He fully understood that Moscow was

committed in the reelection of Mr. Nixon (and so, he added, was he).

Hence, the Middle East, where the Americans and the Russians champion competing clients, remained in limbo.

But Sadat will not stay in limbo forever. The Egyptians watched with anxiety the red carpet treatment Moscow gave President Nixon right after the mining of Haiphong Harbor. Such callow Soviet disregard of its ally in Hanoi, it is felt here, suggests the probability that Moscow will play similar hands off politics with its ally in Egypt. Likewise, Moscow's ban on long-range Soviet influence here clearly slows Soviet fear

that offensive Egyptian power might bring on a U.S.-U.S.S.R. confrontation.

Avoiding specific allusion to this in our talk, the unassuming, mild-mannered Sadat repeatedly stressed his conviction that, in today's post-summit world, Moscow is inextricably tied to Washington. So long as the present Kremlin leadership survives, it will not permit peripheral crises such as Vietnam and the Middle East to threaten that tie despite the vast Soviet investment in the Arab world.

NONE OF THIS, however, explains the apparent irrationality of drastically reducing Soviet influence here in the midst of Mr. Nixon's

24 November 1972

Egypt ready to declare war on BBC

From DAVID HIRST, Beirut, November 23

Egypt is preparing to declare war on the BBC. This alleged "factory of lies" is now bearing the brunt of official Egyptian anger over increasingly frequent reports of the problems faced by President Sadat.

According to Radio Cairo, "political quarters" in the Egyptian capital are considering applying a "total boycott" to the BBC. It said that many letters and cables had been received from Arab writers, entertainers, and ordinary listeners demanding such action "unless the BBC stopped within a short time serving as a Zionist tool." The BBC was engaging in hostile propaganda "against the Egyptian people themselves."

Earlier this month the Egyptian Information Minister, Dr Hatem, strongly protested to the British Ambassador about the BBC's reporting. In particular, he referred to what was at first reported as an attempted coup but later turned out to be the escape of a "mad officer" who drove in convoy to a Cairo mosque and called for war against Israel.

What has mainly upset the regime now is a report, originating with UPI Beirut, that air force officers recently tried to overthrow Sadat and replace him with the deposed War Minister, Ahmad Sadq.

It has now been officially disclosed that 24 air force officers have been undergoing interrogation for disciplinary reasons. This is supposed to be a refutation: for many Egyptians, it will sound more like confirmation.

In its campaign against the BBC, the Egyptian Government is planning to enlist the help of Arab Boycott of Israel. Its commissioner-general has issued a warning that if evidence is found that the BBC is circulating anti-Arab Zionist propaganda, boycott regulations would be applied to it and its staff.

This would mean, he said, that Arabs working for the organisation would not only be required to leave their jobs but would be liable for prosecution

and a sentence of up to 10 years imprisonment. Many of the BBC's Arab staff, especially on the cultural side, are Egyptians.

At the same time, the Egyptian "political quarters" are starting a campaign to "expose" what are called "lackey publications" in the Arab world which disseminate the same propaganda. They are drawing up lists of such publications.

The first list, disclosed yesterday, consisted of two Kuwaiti newspapers, Al-Siyasah and Al-Rai Al-Ammi. During the recent Arab conference in Kuwait the editor of Al-Siyasah, who has been in trouble before, organised an informal seminar at which some scathing things were said about Arab regimes.

Although Voice of America and, of course, Radio Israel, comes in for attack, the BBC is the real target, for though the Arabs have their complaints about it — notably as regards Israel — it is about the only broadcasting service most of them take seriously. Many Arabs find Israeli radio more informative than their own.

The anonymous intellectuals, who, according to Radio Cairo, are calling for a boycott of the BBC are presumably different people from the 500 writers and artists who, in a statement recently circulating in Cairo, declare that "Egypt's culture is dying a slow, painful death under a stranglehold of innumerable restrictions: censorship, religious, social, and political bigotry, graft and corruption."

election campaign. Sadat gave his trump card to the U.S.—inviting Soviet technicians out of Egypt as the White House has demanded since 1970—when Mr. Nixon could not respond in Sadat's favor because of his campaign courtship of the Jewish vote.

Sadat's long explanation to us boiled down to one essential: the expulsion of the Russians "had a history before it" in Soviet arrogance and repeated Soviet failures to deliver promised weapons. In short, the Egyptian army was on the edge of rebellion as the Russian military played lord and master on such sovereign matters as security, control of military bases and handling of equipment.

But having played his trump card, Sadat has yet to demonstrate any political gain from it in terms of new American pressures on Israel. That fact now heavily reinforces the skepticism in many high quarters here over the late president Gamal Abdel Nasser's decision to accept the August 1970 cease-fire.

WASHINGTON STAR
4 December 1972

Middle East Perspectives

Despite various rumors floating around of a major new American initiative for a settlement of the Middle East conflict, the time for such a move would seem to be singularly out of joint. In fact, no such initiative appears to be in the offing.

There is, perhaps, a certain basis for the rumor. In a recent interview, President Nixon singled out the Middle East as an area of "very high priority" for his new administration, "because while the Middle East has been, over the past couple of years, in a period of uneasy truce or armistice, or whatever you want to call it, it can explode at any time."

This is true enough. Indeed, the recent signs are that an explosion could be imminent. Repeated clashes of growing intensity between Israeli and Syrian forces have created something of a crisis — not only for Syria but for Egypt as well. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat is under increasing pressure from the more hawkish elements in his military establishment to take action against Israel. And Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan has recently warned the nation that renewed firing across the Suez Canal truce line is a lively possibility.

Rising tension has stimulated possibly inspired reports of a new American move. The latest of these, emanating from a French correspondent stationed in Beirut, attributes an elaborate "peace plan" to presidential adviser Henry Kissinger who is alleged to be preparing to visit Cairo in the near future. Among other things, the plan is reported to in-

clude an Israeli withdrawal from a reopened Suez Canal and negotiations to create a Palestinian entity on the West Bank of the Jordan River.

We can say with some assurance that the report is the purest poppycock. Henry Kissinger has quite enough on his plate already with his negotiations to end the war in Vietnam without becoming involved in trying to untangle the Middle Eastern puzzle. Besides, the scenario spelled out in these reports is wildly unrealistic: It would be utterly futile for the United States to work out a plan for an Israeli withdrawal with the Arab

countries and then try to impose the solution on the government in Jerusalem.

Realistically, no dramatic progress toward peace in the Middle East is at all probable at least until after the Israeli elections next year and even then it is most unlikely that the United States will play a leading role. The great powers — and the United Nations as well — have learned the futility of trying to impose solutions to the conflict. Peace, when it comes, will be the result of negotiations between Israel and the Arab states directly concerned. And journalistic pipe dreams to the contrary, this will not happen in the immediate future.

THE GUARDIAN, MANCHESTER
27 November 1972

Turkey's frail democracy a lost cause?

By a Special Correspondent

Time is running out in the struggle to preserve Turkey's 27-year-old democracy. Elections are due next October, and parliamentarians will be spending most of their time in their constituencies from the early summer onwards. This leaves little more than six months to settle the tangle of obstacles which jeopardise democratic practices.

One gloomy harbinger is the upsurge of political conflict in Turkey in past weeks, since Mr Ecevit's Republican Peoples' Party decided to leave Mr Melen's "above party" coalition. There is a real risk that the passions unleashed since they will get out of hand and that attempts may be made to proscribe the party.

Leaving the Government proved expensive for Mr Ecevit and his party. They lost 24 of their 123-man contingent in the National Assembly, and Mr Inonu, the party's founder, chose this opportunity to resign. None the less the RPP still believes that it was right to depart. It had long been unhappy with the idea of "above party" Government coalitions where the political parties supply votes of confidence and Ministers for the Cabinet, but do not share either in the responsibility for the Government or in the formation of its policies.

Though it has not yet described itself in this way, the RPP is now a de facto social democratic party. As such it felt it pointless to vote for reforms which seemed to have had the sting taken out of them. It also felt unhappy about the state of human rights in Turkey over the past year and the gaoling of intellectuals and writers. Furthermore it was irksome to have as RPP representatives in the Cabinet, a group of Ministers who would probably have broken with the party had they not been called upon to join the Government on its behalf.

Hence the RPP's fateful decision to withdraw. Analogous pressures

stantly, working at the grassroots of Mr Demirel's Justice Party. As a Right of Centre party, it finds less to disagree with in Mr Melen's Government programme. But it shares the RPP's dissatisfaction with "above party" Government and also its uneasiness at the seemingly disproportionate influence of the National Reliance Party, from which Mr Melen comes. Some Turks find it remarkable that a party can have only 16 members in the Assembly and yet give the Government its distinctive hue.

But the Justice Party does not have the RPP's freedom of choice. A majority party cannot go into opposition. Mr Demirel must remain tethered to the present Government or run the risk of a further crisis and possibly the termination of democratic arrangements.

To satisfy all concerned, Mr Demirel opted for a shrewd compromise. The Justice Party announced that it would not tamper with the status quo, but the Government had to solve its own problems. The party organ, *Son Havadis*, went on to suggest that the replacement of Mr Melen might contribute to this.

There for the time being things rest. The crisis which must be undergone if Turkey's Government is ever to return to a normal party political basis is postponed again. Meanwhile the two major parties in Turkey face periods of considerable strain. In the short run it is the Republican Peoples' Party which faces greater hazards. Since its departure from the Government, accusations, usually of communism, have rained down on it. These have come thickest from its former members.

Former defectors from the RPP now constitute a crucial element in Turkish politics. Their numbers are not impressive, and they are split between two parties and a scattering of independents in Parliament. But as vociferous "anti-

have considerable influence under present conditions. When the next elections come, it is generally thought that their ranks will be decimated as only a few of them have much constituency support. But until then, they have the prospect of being a kind of "establishment" in politics closely linked to the Government.

Hence some Turkish politicians feel that to survive, these former RPP politicians must either magically coalesce into a united party of their own and eliminate the RPP as the major Opposition grouping; or they must seek to slay off the day of reckoning. That is why such uproar was caused by Mr Ecevit's remarks last week that rumours were circulating in Parliament that seats in a future Constituent Assembly were being dangled before defectors from the RPP. It could still lead to his prosecution.

Effective democracy requires a strong Opposition party working inside the framework of the law. The RPP is now having to defend itself against its critics by claiming to be as legitimate a phenomenon as the Social Democrat parties of Western Europe. It remains to be seen whether this defence will hush the chorus of denunciations and accusations.

When Mr Ecevit last week pointedly demanded that Turkey should enjoy the same civil liberties as other countries of the Council of Europe, he drew a swift reaction. The Reliance Party wanted to know if he favoured the establishment of a Communist Party in Turkey. Mr Ecevit is meek almost to a fault, which is fortunate. One misjudged word now might land him and Turkey in real difficulties.

In the past, the Justice Party has had its share of defections. These now seem to be over. But the party cannot relax while there is doubt about the future acceptability of Mr Demirel as Prime Minister. No one doubts that he will win the election, but he may ride out the

storm. However politicians who hurl charges of communism at Mr Ecevit are often equally quick to portray Mr Demirel as a selfish reactionary blocking the Government's reforms.

This is unjust. Ever since the army intervention the Justice Party has acted sensibly and honourably. It could throw out the Government at any time, yet it has not even tried to shake it.

This good sense contrasts sharply with the vitriolic language now ringing out in other political quarters. To the outside observer, these denunciations have a depressingly familiar ring. In countries like Turkey, cries of the "Red peril" usually point to a coming storm.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
2 December 1977

Pakistan prods U.S. on military supplies

By Qutubuddin Aziz
Special correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Karachi, Pakistan.

Pakistan is urging the United States Government to permit the resumption of American military supplies to this country. To back its position, it cites the substantial infusion of Soviet arms into India's weapons system.

American military sales to Pakistan were suspended last year because of congressional opposition to U.S. arms supply at a time when a civil war was raging in East Pakistan (Bangladesh). U.S. officials had taken the stand that it was not a total embargo, but a hold on the delivery of military hardware to Pakistan.

During last December's 13-day war between India and Pakistan, the U.S. Government also stopped military supplies to India.

Early in April, 1971, the U.S. ceased issuing and renewing licenses for military shipments to Pakistan, and applied a hold on arms that had been committed in 1970. Pakistan was thus denied \$35 million worth of expected U.S. arms.

Embargo impact cited

Less than \$5 million worth of spare parts, for which licenses were issued prior to the hold, were shipped to Pakistan before the pipeline dried up in November during the Washington visit of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

Pakistanis argue that the embargo on arms supply to India and Pakistan, which the Johnson administration imposed during the Indo-Pakistan war of September, 1965, hit Pakistan much harder than India because Pakistan's armed forces were almost wholly American-equipped, while India had diversified the military hardware in its arsenals.

In recent months, Pakistan has leaned heavily on China for the import of military equipment to recoup the losses it suffered in the December, 1971 war with India. But Soviet military supplies to India, according to Pakistani officials, are much larger and include sophisticated weaponry with far greater destructive potential.

Pakistanis say that in spite of the Simla agreement between Pakistan President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Premier Gandhi, signed in July to signal a reconciliation between the two feuding neighbors, there has been no slowdown in Soviet arms supplies to India.

The era of peace and subcontinental cooperation which Mr. Bhutto and Mrs. Gandhi had hoped to usher in as a result of the Simla accord has still not dawned. India and Pakistan have not resumed the diplomatic relations which were snapped last December. The prisoners of war held by the two countries are another thorn in the side of enduring peace.

As suspicious neighbors, India and Pakistan have not overlooked their military preparedness and keep a sharp eye on each other's arms-procuring exercises.

The Pakistani viewpoint is that the United States, as the world's biggest arms supplier, should allow Pakistan to purchase urgently needed spare parts for previously supplied U.S. equipment on a commercial basis.

Most of the American military equipment Pakistan received from 1954 to 1965 has become obsolete. Pakistan finds it difficult to procure spare parts for them, especially for the F-86 Sabre jets, and medium and light tanks.

India has built up a sizable capacity for manufacturing its own heavy arms and ammunition. The Soviet Union has also been of help to India in developing its armament-manufacturing industry.

In October, 1970, the U.S. had offered to sell to Pakistan, on a one-time exception basis, \$80 million worth of military hardware, which was to include 300 M113 armored personnel carriers, 14 Northrop F-5 jet fighters, seven B-57's, and four maritime-patrol aircraft. The offer was on a cash-and-carry, full price basis.

Because of the civil war in East Pakistan, the U.S. last year pigeonholed the offer, and the deal did not go through. Pakistani officials are keen to have the offer revitalized.

NEW YORK TIMES
10 December 72

U.S. DEPORTATION OF SYRIAN FOUGHT

Jailed Man Says He Was
Arab Guerrilla Leader

Special to The New York Times

SAN ANTONIO, Tex. Dec. 9 —Aman who says he is a former Arab guerrilla leader is in prison here awaiting a decision by the United States Government on his request for asylum. He says that if he is deported to his native country, Syria, he would face certain death. Mamdouh Fadlatallah Barbour, 42 years old, was arrested in Arlington near Dallas on May 24 and charged with entry without a valid passport. He entered the United States on March 4 as a visitor under the name of Joseph Rizk and under a false passport issued by the Government

of Oman and obtained in Beirut, Lebanon.

On Tuesday he petitioned the Federal court here for release from United States Immigration Service custody so he could fight deportation.

According to his petition, Mr. Barbour fears he will be "persecuted and tortured" by members of the Salqa, described as the Syrian-supported military arm of the Palestinian resistance movement.

In his petition, he contends that the State Department informed the Board of Immigration Appeals on Oct. 27 that he was involved with Salqa and he was involved with Salqa and that on Nov. 24 the appeals board denied him bail on the ground that his release would endanger national security. 614

From his prison cell in San Antonio, Mr. Barbour acknowledged Thursday that he had worked for about one year with Salqa, that he had entered the United States under a false name and false passport and that he had brought with him \$131,000 of his own money.

The Syrian Government has informed the United States that Mr. Barbour, a former major in the Syrian Army, had "illegally departed Syria with embezzled public funds which has been entrusted to him for disbursement to his military unit," according to a letter dated July 17, written by A. G. Vaughan, district director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service in San Antonio and addressed to Mr. Barbour.

Mr. Barbour said he was ordered to work with Salqa for one year by his military superiors after he had clashed with a Russian adviser. The Russian, Mr. Barbour contends, asked him for military information, and he refused to provide it.

Mr. Barbour said he was opposed to the guerrilla movement's activities and had worked for the organization as assistant to the chief of training.

He said he had only worked in the office and had no choice but to work with the organization but to work with the organization if he did not want to lose his retirement pay after spending 22 years in the Syrian Army.

Bomb Threat Cited

"Last January, he related, 'after an unsuccessful attempt to start my car in Damascus, I discovered that a bomb had

been planted in my automobile. I was quite sure that the attempted assassination was on account of my political views and my opposition to the guerrilla activities. I believed that I would next either be sent back to prison or a successful assassination carried out against me. I resolved to leave Syria immediately."

He also said in an interview that in 1957 his father, together with another leader who is presently living in Saudi Arabia, had attempted to bring about the overthrow of the Syrian Government. Mr. Barbour said his father was imprisoned; he was released and died two years after his release.

Mr. Barbour gave the following account: "I left Syria on the 10th of February traveling by car to Beirut, Lebanon. There I contacted my relatives and friends and picked up the money which I had been sending to them for the last 10 years to save for me. This amounted to about \$131,000. While in Lebanon I obtained a false passport in the name of Joseph Rizk. I paid for it about \$700. It's a passport from the little country of Oman.

"I departed from Lebanon on Feb. 12 and flew to Istanbul, Turkey. On the second day of my arrival in Istanbul I went to the U.S. Embassy and applied for a visa to enter the United States. This application was made in the name of Joseph Rizk. Returning to the Embassy after three days, I was informed there would be a further delay in issuing my visa. Because Turkey is so close to Syria, I became frightened and I went to the Canadian Embassy and obtained a visa to enter Canada.

"On the 19th of February I flew to Ottawa, Canada, and on the second day of my arrival I obtained a visa to enter the U.S. under the name of Joseph Rizk, and on approximately the last day of March I flew to Dallas via Chicago. I remained in Arlington with my friends until the immigration official arrested me on May 24. I had planned to apply for asylum in the United States."

The Immigration Service in a letter written by Mr. Vaughan and dated July 17, denied him the asylum and ordered him deported to Syria.

been 200 miles from Athens when the demonstration occurred.

Quartet Deported

Two weeks later, four SSGP members, including Chairman John Pasmazoglou, were deported to remote mountain villages. From the tiny hamlet of Thermon, central Greece, Pasmazoglou, a former deputy governor of the Bank of Greece and the man who negotiated Greece's Association Agreement with the EEC, continues to serve as chairman of Greece's Eisenhower Fellowship selection committee.

Following an October visit to Thermon, Neal MacDermot, secretary general of the Geneva-based International Commission of Jurists, described the exiles' situation as Kafkaesque in dimension.

"According to the authorities, these men were exiled for extremist activities," MacDermot said, "But they were never told what these activities were, never given the names of their accusers, and never given an opportunity to refute the charges."

Nor was the specific nature of their offense revealed during the court proceedings which dissolved their organization.

The sole prosecution witness at the trial was a police officer, Theodoris Matzavas, born in the village of Amygdalia, 40 years of age, an Orthodox Christian.

'State of Exaltation'

More than the "subversive tone" of the debates themselves, Matzavas told the court, it was the "expression on the faces of the speakers and the deafening audience applause" that was significant.

"The audience was in such a state of exaltation that, had it been convinced that it could go out into the streets, acts of impropriety would certainly have occurred," he said.

Some observers counted as many as 60 policemen inside the tiny courtroom. Many were taking notes on their colleague's testimony. Others were simply occupying chairs, and the public was turned away.

Thus it ended, a modest effort at intellectual dissent. The grey uniforms of the police stood out against the drab courtroom walls. A single bare bulb hung from the ceiling and, above the judge's bench, was a picture of the

THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS
Washington, D. C., Wednesday, December 6, 1972

A Dissent Effort Dies in Greece

By MARY ANNE WEAVER
Special to The Star-News

ATHENS—Two of Greece's leading intellectual organizations, supposedly protected by a constitutional guarantee of free assembly and association, have now been banned.

Their plight reflects the continuing refusal of the military men ruling Greece to tolerate internal criticism.

It also shows the continuing decline of this nation's own constitutional mandates. The 1968 Constitution remains virtually suspended in the field of civil liberties.

Among the four articles of the Constitution activated thus far, those dealing with arbitrary arrest and detention have been violated repeatedly.

Now, the fate of the two intellectual organizations has provided a stern test of the guarantees of freedom of assembly and associations.

Drew Large Followings

Both the "Society for the Study of Greek Problems" (SSGP) and the "Greek-European Youth Movement" (EKIN) were independent organizations set up after the military coup of April 1967. Both campaigned for intellectual freedom and aimed at "the cultural-educational betterment" of their members through lectures, publications and debate. Both drew

a following from those opposed to the present military regime.

Though their membership figures were small (100 for the SSGP and 200 for EKIN), record crowds flocked to their meetings which, in a country otherwise void of debate, inevitably became springboards for the discussion of democratic ideals—hardly palatable to the heavy handed, though thin skinned, government of Premier George Papadopoulos.

Consequently, following a life span of less than 18 months, the organizations were banned. Their offense, according to a court ruling of last month, was that they hosted known leftists as "devoted from their statutes, speakers (including former EEC Chairman Jean Rey and German author Gunter Grass) and engaged in impermissible political activity, thus threatening public order, shaking confidence in the national economy, and exercising unethical criticism of the National Government."

Meeting Halls Shut

Society members reacted with something less than surprise as their existence, from the beginning, was tenuous indeed.

During meetings of both groups, security police were ubiquitous in their presence, confiscating identity cards at

of people away as the hall was ostensibly full. There were reportedly a number of attempts to infiltrate the organizations, and members were summoned regularly by the military police.

It was only in the spring of this year however that Greece's military rulers appeared to have reached the limits of their toleration.

Their first pique was an SSGP lecture by German author Gunter Grass in which the prize winning novelist charged that "only when Prime Minister George Papadopoulos (now holding the Regency and three Cabinet portfolios in addition to the Premiership) becomes Archbishop of Athens will he resemble God and take joy in himself."

Grass was hardly out of town when, for the first time since April 1967, student demonstrators took to the streets, chanting freedom songs and demanding university reforms.

The authorities reacted swiftly and arrested a number of youth leaders, including EKIN's President Panayotis Kanellakis. Charging the 25-year-old lawyer and son of a former private secretary to the King with inciting the students to demonstrate, the public prosecutor, noted pre-trial testimony that Kanellakis had been picked up in the midst of the "riotous crowd," Kan-

Why Opium Ban Won't Cut Heroin Traffic

by Dogan Uluc

ANKARA, TURKEY.

(Mr. Uluc is a Turkish newsman whose regular beat is at the United Nations.)

The United States and Turkey have a joint plan to end the smuggling to America of illicit drugs made from opium.

It won't work.

I know, because I have spent a lot of time among the Turkish opium farmers. They aren't about to give up their livelihood or their age-old way of life simply because Uncle Sam is offering them cash to stop cultivating the opium plant.

For Americans, the problem is that 80 percent of the heroin used by addicts in the U.S. originates from opium grown in Turkey.

For Turks, however, the raising of the opium poppy is an ancient and, in many cases, legitimate, operation. Opium has medicinal uses which are perfectly legal, and Turkey has long been a major supplier of this needed drug. The trouble is that along with the legitimate production has gone a great deal of illegal, undercover narcotics trafficking.

Prodded by U.S.

Under the prodding of the U.S. government, Turkey on June 30, 1971, passed a law banning the cultivation of all opium, supposedly after the 1972 harvest. As part of the deal, the U.S. promised to pay out \$35 million, most of which would go to find new sources of income for Turkish poppy farmers put out of business by the new law.

But the farmers aren't buying it. "Give my regards to President Nixon," a gray-bearded farmer named Salih Aga told me, "but while he's working there to prevent youth from dying for kicks, he's going to starve us to death here. We have to grow opium to eat, keep warm, feed our animals—in other words to go on living. And we'll do it even if they come in with the A-bomb."

The Turkish farmers' defiance, which can easily scuttle the whole Washington-Ankara deal, reflects their belief

that the way to end the lucrative international trade in dope smuggling is to crack down on the smugglers, not the growers.

Says Salih Aga bitterly, gazing out over poppy fields stretching to the horizon: "For centuries now, our ancestors have earned their livelihood from the opium they have grown on this soil. Now, since they can't cope with those guys in black suits, the governments have decided to tackle us."

"Those guys in the black suits," of course, are the operatives of the international crime syndicates that smuggle heroin and other killer drugs to the U.S. market. These traffickers prefer Turkish opium to all others because of its high morphine content, from 9 to 14 percent. Even on the legal market, Turkish

opium brings a higher price than any other country's. That's one reason the opium farmers aren't eager to give up poppy-growing in favor of another crop like wheat, barley or sugar beets that would be less deadly but also less lucrative.

If all the opium grown in Turkey today wound up on the legitimate market there would be no problem. The trouble is that it doesn't. The smuggling syndicates are willing to pay even higher prices for the product than the legal dealers. When they do get the raw opium, their markup—and profit margin—are terrific. A kilogram of opium costing between \$25 and \$32 in Turkey can be treated chemically to yield one-tenth of a kilogram of pure heroin with a retail price of \$25,000 to \$35,000 on the U.S. drug market.

A Turkish drug trafficker named Sakir Kasab said when he was arrested that he was in the opium business because "If you make only two or three killings, you hit paydirt."

It is unfortunate but true that the lure of such astronomical profits attracts not only small-time operators and petty criminals but higher-ups who protect

the trade all along the line. It is a common belief that diplomats, government officials and persons of high social standing are making large sums of money from the almost incredibly lucrative drug traffic.

Where do Turkey's 100,000 opium farmers fit into this picture? Naturally, they too are tempted by the possibility of easy profits. All opium produced in Turkey must legally be sold to the government, which

fixes the price at around \$10 a kilo. Black market operators currently offer three times that price. Although the farmers are supposed to hand over their entire output to the government, many of them have taken to planting side crops for sale to illicit agents. They often make more money from this than from their legitimate yield.

Curiously, the farmers themselves don't take opium except occasionally for medicinal purposes.

"You can't find a single drug addict around here," one farmer told me in Afyon, the principal opium-growing province whose name, in fact, means "opium" in Turkish. "We are too busy trying to earn our bread. We don't have time to pursue pleasure. Besides, heroin and other hard drugs make a man impotent. We regard our manhood too highly to fool around with such drugs."

Nevertheless, the poppy plant provides direct benefits for the farmers in addition to the money it brings in. They use its oil to cook their meals, its stalks for fuel, its green leaves for salad. It also is useful for fertilizer and for animal feed.

In their determination to prevent the implementation of the Washington-Ankara agreement, the Turkish farmers are bringing an enormous amount of pressure to bear on their government. They've made their views known to their representatives and they've sent vociferous delegations to Ankara. General elections are scheduled for 1973, and 250 legislators of the Justice Party, which is considered the probable winner, have already petitioned the Turkish Congress to rescind the law prohibiting the growing of opium.

These politicians argue that the opium ban would have a detrimental effect on Turkish agriculture and wouldn't achieve its purpose anyhow, since other countries are only too eager to supply the illegal drug traffic.

One member of the Justice Party put it this way to me: "So lucrative is the drug business that even Iran, which makes plenty of money from oil and is a close ally of the U.S., is growing opium again after a lapse of nine years. There are plenty of opium-growing countries, like Afghanistan, India, Thailand, Burma, Laos and Cambodia, that are relatively unaffected by foreign interven-

tion. But mention Turkey and people immediately tell us we are poisoning the world and have to stop raising opium immediately. If we can't get the ban rescinded now, we certainly will do so next year, when we win the elections."

In working for a ban on opium growing, U.S. officials have tried hard to appeal to the Turkish desire for enhanced prestige and respect in the world community. John E. Ingersoll, director of the Justice Depart-

ment's Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, has said: "We're asking a good deal of them [the Turks]. But they've got the courage to do it."

This remark was designed to strike a responsive chord in a country with a strong tradition of military bravery. However, some Turkish politicians, under growing pressure from their constituents, are having second thoughts. They are depicting the ban as a symbol of Turkish capitulation to U.S. foreign policy and consequently a blow to the national sense of pride and independence.

Many Turks, who are sympathetic to the U.S. desire to end the drug traffic that is ruining so many young American lives and contributing to the high crime rate, are becoming irked over the implied threat that Washington might consider cutting down its foreign aid to Ankara in retaliation for the continued drug traffic. They also resent the suggestion that Turkish co-operation can be "bought" by paying out compensation to the farmers who will be affected by the ban. Matters aren't improved by such suggestions as that of Rep. Charles A. Vanik (D., Ohio) who said, "Let's buy all the Turkish opium crop and burn it on the field."

Is there any solution which would work and at the same time be fair to the Turkish poppy farmers?

I believe there is. I think the best hope would be for the Turkish government to regulate the cultivation of opium by setting up state farms and establishing and enforcing strict controls over them. The opium growers would become state employees, being paid a regular salary. In addition, the state would build and finance chemical plants near these farms, where they would process the opium right where it is grown, and export the resulting pharmaceuticals.

Guaranteed controls

The proximity of the farms and the chemical plants would cut the costs of producing opium derivatives and also permit much closer supervision of the processing and exporting.

Furthermore, the opium growers would receive guaranteed incomes as state employees. They could also receive, as a fringe benefit, the byproducts of the pharmaceutical plants to provide them with cooking oil, animal feed, and other necessities.

By satisfying the farmers' basic needs, the government will be eliminating a major reason for the illicit drug traffic out of Turkey. It will also preserve a traditional way of life for thousands of people.

This plan will cost money. But the price would be a small one to pay for ending the poisonous drug traffic.



CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
29 November 1972

Africa's most successful

By Frederic Hunter
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Nairobi, Kenya

Amilcar Cabral is an agronomist — diminutive, balding, and bespectacled.

After training in Portugal, he tramped the swampy, pie-shaped enclave of Portuguese Guinea for two years, helping to conduct an agricultural census. He slept in villages and learned to read the peasant mind.

That was 20 years ago. And those experiences have shaped Mr. Cabral's present activities as leader of Africa's most successful guerrilla movement, the African Party for the Independence of Portuguese Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC).

He recently claimed that the PAIGC, representing Guinea's African majority and controlling most of the territory's area, will declare its unilateral independence within the next few months. Mr. Cabral was speaking at the United Nations as the first African guerrilla leader given observer status there.

November is UDI (Unilateral Declaration of Independence) season in Africa. This year the season is unusually active — and brimming with speculation.

The greatest speculation focuses on Mozambique, the Portuguese territory which stretches along the Indian Ocean between friendly South Africa and hostile Tanzania. Frelimo, the Mozambique liberation front, shows little capacity to move beyond small-scale ambushes and the mining of roads in the territory's northern half.

Still, the sizable Portuguese Army in Mozambique has proved incapable of containing these activities. As proof of this, Frelimo recently opened a new front in the narrow Manica and Sofala Provinces through which pass Rhodesia's road and rail links to the sea.

This situation has sparked persistent rumors of a UDI plan. Through it, prominent Portuguese — including Gen. Kaulza de Arriaga, the military commander, and Jorge Jardim, a prominent Beira businessman — will declare Mozambique's independence from Portugal. They will establish a government headed by a black figurehead, Dr. Miguel Murrup, who defected as Frelimo's deputy secretary for external affairs in 1970.

Meanwhile, Rhodesia has just begun its eighth year of self-declared independence. To mark the occasion Prime Minister Ian Smith again enunciated words to bolster the con-

guerrilla chief—Cabral

fused hopes of his white supporters. He stated his conviction that in the past year "we crossed the watershed in our striving for recognition."

He did not mention that UDI has solved none of Rhodesia's basic problems. It remains an unrecognized outlaw country. Economic sanctions are damaging its economy, preventing access to development capital. Race relations remain uncertain. So do prospects of a settlement with Britain. Most worrisome of all, Mozambique's worsening security situation threatens its sea links and calls into question its long-term capacity to control guerrilla activity on its northern and eastern borders.

Despite these problems, UDI has given Rhodesia valid claims to independent sovereignty. If it does not exist as a state in law, it certainly exists as one in fact. Because of this, others seek to learn from the example.

At present, Mozambique's UDI prospects cannot be regarded seriously. Too many political, economic, and security uncertainties loom. The mystique of a globe-girdling, 500-year-old Lusitanian nation still fascinates many who would have to support UDI unequivocally.

Small, poor Portugal would probably come to terms with local leaders who successfully declared Mozambique independent. But more crucial are the interests of South Africa. To succeed, a Mozambique UDI would need an assenting nod from Pretoria.

But growing UDI sentiment in Mozambique indicates significant pressures for change. If the Army fails to check Frelimo, and influential people continue to grow restive, things are going to happen there.

Mr. Cabral faces no such checks. He and the PAIGC are already in rebellion. They claim to have held elections in "liberated" Guinea and to operate the institutions of an independent state: an administration, a judiciary, a police force, a health service, and school and penal systems.

By declaring an African UDI they will open a new front in the diplomatic war with Portugal. The PAIGC could achieve recognition from a number of African states. That won't change things on the ground in Guinea — but it could give Portugal a host of problems at the UN.

WASHINGTON STAR
2 December 1972

Recognizing Rhodesia

Clark MacGregor, sometime presidential counsel for congressional relations and chairman of Mr. Nixon's re-election committee, now a United Aircraft executive, has outraged some liberals by suggesting that there may soon be a change in American policy toward white-dominated Rhodesia.

Speaking in Salisbury, MacGregor described the present U.S. policy of non-recognition as "unnatural," and predicted a change in that policy "sooner than most people realize." The State Department has denied that any change in American policy is contemplated. But the assumption is that MacGregor, a cautious and well-informed man, may have known what he was talking about.

Recognition of a government does not imply approval of a nation's policies. If it did, the United States could hardly recognize a country such as South Africa, not to speak of the entire Communist bloc. In international law, recognition normally is extended when it has been established that a government is in control of its territory and is likely to retain such control. Seven years after its unilateral declaration of independence, Rhodesia clearly meets this prerequisite.

It is true that the United Nations has imposed economic sanctions against Rhodesia, declaring the regime of Prime Minister Ian Smith to be a threat to

world peace. That a nation with a two-battalion army (one of which is black) should be so labeled is laughable.

It is true that the Rhodesian regime is illegal, in the sense that it unilaterally (and bloodlessly) declared its independence of Britain. There have been other "illegal" regimes, including our own.

It is true that the racial policies of Rhodesia are displeasing to many people, indeed, to this newspaper. But are they more displeasing than those of General Amin's tragicomic Ugandan regime, which we recognize?

There is one question which thinking people ought to ask themselves and it is this: Given the inability and/or unwillingness of the world to coerce Rhodesia into modifying its policies, is this end best served by isolating Rhodesia and driving it into the arms of South Africa or by accepting Rhodesia into the family of nations for what it is, an imperfect country in an imperfect world? If the United States were to recognize Rhodesia, that decision would be as defensible as many taken by this and other administrations.

Name-calling and the hurling of anathemas against South Africa for the past twenty years have only succeeded in moving that nation farther to the right. It would be a tragedy if that failure were repeated in Rhodesia.

NEW YORK TIMES
8 December 72

U.N. CONDEMNS U.S. ON RHODESIAN TRADE

Special to The New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., Dec. 7—The General Assembly today condemned the importation by the United States of chrome and nickel from Rhodesia in violation of the United Nations 1968 embargo on trade with Rhodesia.

It was the first instance in which the word "condemn" had been directed against the United States by name in an Assembly resolution.

The United States has been the target of mounting criticism, particularly from African

countries, since Congress approved legislation last year permitting the resumption of purchases of strategic materials from Rhodesia. The United Nations had adopted its 1968 embargo as a punitive measure against the white supremacist government.

The Assembly last year stopped short of a condemnation and merely expressed concern and asked that the trade cease. The new resolution, citing the United States and also South Africa and Portugal for trade with Rhodesia, was approved 93 to 8, with the United States among those voting "no" and 23 nations abstaining.

WASHINGTON POST
8 December 1972

U.N. Action

UNITED NATIONS—The General Assembly called for the total rupture of rail, air, sea, postal and radio communications with Rhodesia and the imposition of sanctions against South Africa and Portugal. It also voted to condemn the U.S. government's importation of Rhodesian chrome and nickel.

Western Hemisphere

WASHINGTON POST
14 December 1972

'Death Squad' Strikes in Brazil

RIO DE JANEIRO, Dec. 13 (AP) — The Brazilian "death squad" was held responsible today for summary execution of three petty criminals whose bullet-riddled bodies were found bound to tracks of a suburban railroad. Authorities of the illegal organization, said to be made up of off-duty policemen, had slowed down considerably since last year when federal authorities ordered a full-scale investigation that resulted in the arrests of several suspects. Many of the suspects were later sentenced to prison terms and one of them drew 275 years.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
6 December 1972

Soviet naval presence hinders breakthrough U.S., Cuba nod—at a distance

By Dana Adams Schmidt
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington
Although the United States is moving toward an agreement with Cuba on hijacking, resumption of normal Washington-Havana relations remains far off — for reasons of military and hemispheric security.

The reasons are illustrated in evidence presented to a House Subcommittee on Inter-American affairs three months ago. It has been kept secret until now.

After Secretary of State William P. Rogers delivered to two Swiss emissaries the U.S. reply to Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro's hijacking proposals Tuesday, he observed, "We have the foundation for an agreement."

The basis of a possible agreement, it was learned on high authority, is "punishment or extradition." The Cubans have made an agreement possible by dropping their earlier insistence that the United States punish Cuban exiles for crimes they are alleged to have committed, sometimes three or four years ago.

State Department officials explain that the talks on hijacking do not necessarily mean that the United States is getting any closer to Dr. Castro any more than did the talks in 1966 on an airlift for Cuban exiles. (Under the agreement worked out through the Swiss at that time, about 236,000 persons were flown out of Cuba to the United States up to September, 1971. A resumption of the airlift is expected in the next few weeks.)

The hearings that illustrated the current overall state of American relations with Cuba were chaired by U.S. Rep. Dante B. Fascell (D) of Florida, who said that the Soviet Union is continuing its naval penetration of Cuba at steadily rising levels, with full Castro approval.

The penetration has included the first visit to Cuba in April this year of a G-2 type submarine carrying strategic missiles with nuclear warheads that could be fired from under the surface. In addition, in mid-September a long-range Soviet aircraft operating from Cuba for the first time conducted airborne reconnaissance along the east coast of the United States.

While the U.S. has not interpreted these and more recent Soviet activities in and around Cuba as violations of its "understanding" with the Soviet Union on these matters, State Department officials say they are "very carefully watching the matter."

The "understanding" was based on an exchange of letters between President John F. Kennedy and Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev, following the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. The Russians agreed not to operate any more offensive weapons systems in Cuba.

In mid-1970 when the United States became concerned about the construction of naval facilities for the Soviet fleet at Cienfuegos, Cuba, talks with the Russians resumed.

As a result, Tass, the Soviet news agency, issued a statement that the Soviet Union was not operating offensive weapons systems in Cuba and had no intention of doing so. The State Department interpreted the statement as including the operation of sea-based weapons systems as well as those based on land.

Support facilities noted

The Russians have arranged rest-and-recreation facilities for their crews on Aletraz Island Cienfuegos, the subcommittee was told. These facilities, combined with a submarine tender stationed anywhere in a

Cuban port, would be sufficient to provide Soviet naval units with "maintenance, repair, and replenishment support that is not available to them anywhere else in the hemisphere" a Navy witness said.

Paul F. Wallner, western area analyst of the Defense Intelligence Agency, told the subcommittee that, while Cuban support for subversive activities in other Latin countries had declined in general since the 1960's, it was continuing "on a more selective basis."

He said the Defense Department had

indications that Cuba continued to provide support to subversive groups in Venezuela, Colombia, Bolivia, and Uruguay.

According to other American analysts, there are now about 3,000 Soviet technicians in Cuba, and Soviet support for the regime of Fidel Castro costs about \$1.5 million a day.

Under the terms of a possible hijack agreement, the United States is now willing to accept the exercise of Cuban justice as an alternative to extradition.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
8 December 1972

Cuba-U.S. hijacking accord near

By James Nelson Goodsell

Latin America correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

The imminent Cuba-United States hijacking agreement, or something very like it, could have been concluded three years ago — had Washington wanted it.

That is the view of informed Latin Americans who say that proposals put forward by Cuba in 1969 are essentially the same as today's draft.

For some time already, Cuba has been meting out severe jail terms to some skyjackers. And as far back as 1970, Havana began quietly returning a number of skyjackers to the United States.

Both Washington and Havana have more reason for wanting an accord today than they did in 1969, but in the Latin American view, the current negotiations now under way in Havana are leading to an agreement or some sort of understanding very similar to the 1969 Cuban proposals.

The Cuban proposals were outlined by its United Nations Ambassador Ricardo Alarcon Quesada in the course of wide-ranging speech Oct. 8, 1969. They also were aired by Havana Radio and other Cuban media at the time.

Proposal included ships

Cuba said that any agreement on skyjacking must also deal with the hijacking of ships as well as airplanes and with other violations governing traffic between Cuba and the United States.

Latin American sources note that there has been a steady flow of ship hijackings by Cubans wanting to go to the United States. Moreover, just before Mr. Alarcon spoke to the UN in 1969, a Cuban Air Force lieutenant seized a Cuban MIG-17 and flew it to Florida, where he was granted asylum.

The Cuban proposals in 1969 did not win favor with the United States at the time. Washington was more interested in getting some sort of international agreement on skyjacking alone, either through the United Nations or in the Organization of American States.

"The climate was not right for the Cuban proposals," a Latin American diplomat in Washington who was close to the issue then and now said. "The new Nixon administration was simply not interested in the idea of a broad accord on the issue of hijackings and instead wanted an agreement on sky-

jacking alone.

U.S. attitude shifts

"The times have changed and Washington apparently is willing to accept the Cuban position of 1969 in order to get an agreement on aerial piracy."

The growing bizarre nature of skyjacking and the increasingly difficult task of controlling incidents is seen as one of Washington's reasons for wanting an accord.

Washington's willingness to discuss this point is viewed as a significant concession on the part of the Nixon administration in order to get a skyjacking accord. But Latin American sources repeatedly note that had Washington wanted an accord in 1969 as much as it apparently does today, the Cubans then had the same proposal they have today.

Latin American sources indicate that Cuba also has more reason to want the agreement today than it did back in 1969.

In the Latin America view, Cuba's fresh initiative in proposing anew its 1969 position, which underlies the current talks in Havana, stems from its growing concern over what to do with skyjackers who bring aircraft to Cuba.

Concern indicated

Moreover, there is a Cuban fear that a future skyjacking incident could lead to disaster for the plane and the passengers — and that Cuba would be blamed. Cuban officials have privately admitted such concern in the past to visitors in Havana.

Thus, there is an apparent mutual desire on the part of Havana and Washington for a skyjacking accord, but the Cuban view that it ought to include ships as well as airplanes is prevailing.

The Nixon administration, meanwhile, is going to have a public-relations job on its hands, if the agreement goes through, since it will have to sell the Cuban exile community, many of whom have come to the United States by ship hijackings, on the need for the accord.

The seriousness of aerial hijackings, however, is such that Washington apparently is willing to face the wrath of the vocal exile community.

WASHINGTON STAR
7 December 1972

Castro's Wooing of U.S. Is Analyzed

A Defense Intelligence Agency analyst has told a House subcommittee that Fidel Castro's overtures toward normalizing relations with Washington have been primarily prompted by the nationalistic trend becoming evident in Latin America of countries wishing to be rid of dependence on the United States.

Paul F. Wallner, a Western Area analyst for DIA, gave this opinion at closed hearings in September before the House subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, headed by Rep. Dante Fascell, D-Fla. A transcript of the testimony, sanitized by DIA for security reasons, was released this week by the subcommittee.

Wallner told the subcommittee that Castro's overtures were not the result of any sig-

nal from Washington but rather developments within Latin America. He said Castro was influenced by the election of Marxist President Salvador Allende in Chile, the reformist military regime in Peru and "the nationalistic cult that is starting to become evident in South America."

"Belligerent Attitude"

The testimony indicated that because of the apparently warmer diplomatic climate, Cuba was in a better position to approach more normal relations with the United States.

Castro's stated conditions for improved relations with the United States, the DIA specialist said, include: Withdrawal of the United States from the Guantanamo Bay naval base; cessation of over-

flights over the island; a halt to support for exile operations against Cuba and an end to the economic blockade.

Wallner concluded that DIA sees a continuation of the trend toward normalization of relations between Cuba and other Latin countries although he said Castro continues limited and selective support for insurgents in Venezuela, Colombia, Bolivia and Uruguay.

There were deletions in this phase of his testimony indicating three other countries in which Castro is supporting insurgents.

The testimony of Wallner and other DIA experts was primarily on Soviet activities in Cuba and they said it is clear that the Russians have tried to persuade Castro to fol-

low non-violent approaches and do not furnish arms or training for violent revolution in the western hemisphere.

Views Reassessed

All Soviet military equipment provided to Cuba in recent years has been defensive, Wallner testified. DIA said no surface combatant vessels, submarines or submarine tenders have been in Cuban waters since May.

It also has been learned that Russia has been twisting Castro's arm to reach an agreement with the United States on air pirates and that there is now optimism that this may be achieved by bilateral talks through the Swiss.

WASHINGTON POST
11 December 1972

Progress on Hijacking With Cuba

Secretary Rogers reports that negotiations through the Swiss have produced the "foundation of an agreement" on a hijacking treaty with Cuba. This is encouraging news. The hijacking of American planes to Cuba has rightly terrified air travelers; the assurance of harsh punishment would surely help limit that threat. On its part, Havana sees Cubans' hijacking of Cuban ships to the United States, or their other departure by "illegal means," as a threat to the integrity of the Castro government; to that they correctly link the pinprick raids of American-based Cuban exiles which, it is reported, the United States has now said it will work harder to stop.

Fidel Castro's decision to resume the airlift that, before its suspension last year, had brought 256,000 Cubans to Miami can perhaps be read as his way to offer a certain legal alternative to those who may have considered violent hijacking or non-violent escape as the only ways to leave Cuba. The airlift cannot be a substitute for the orderly legal emigration that presumably would go on if Cuban-American political relations were normalized. Even then there might be a problem: more Cubans might wish to emigrate than the United States wished to accept. But Mr. Castro could hardly consider that as anything but a problem for his own solving. It is a fact of life with which he (as well as Washington) must cope, that the United States is only a short 90 miles away. In any event, normal political ties would certainly provide a viable alternative to hijacking for any Americans, except psychopaths, who might wish to go to Cuba.

From all accounts, the initiative on the American side for this round of dealing with Cuba has come from the State Department, which is taking—or being given—the opportunity to show its diplomatic stuff. State has had too few such opportunities in recent years. Evidently with one eye on a wary White House and the other on a wily Fidel Castro, State is being careful not to portray the hijack talks as the first step toward a possible accommodation, even though they obviously could be made to serve that purpose if both sides choose. But the talks proceed, despite a few mumbles from the Pentagon about Moscow's sometime use of Cuba as a submarine and air reconnaissance station. Mr. Nixon's summits in Moscow and Peking have made those mumbles much less audible, and much less necessary or relevant, than they ever were before.

Few Latins take seriously any longer the old argument, still put forward by some Americans in their behalf that Fidel is bent on subverting them. Rather, most Latins seem to see in a potential Cuban-American accommodation a step at once restoring the hemisphere's natural but interrupted sense of community, permitting them more easily to normalize their own relations with Havana, and offering many Latin governments the boon of satisfying their own domestic constituencies on the left. Unquestionably, hemispheric accommodation with Havana could play an important role in facilitating the more active and helpful second-term approach to Latin America that we hope Mr. Nixon has in mind.

WASHINGTON STAR
12 December 1972

U.S. Returns Boat, 2 Men to Cubans

The hijacked Cuban fishing boat, Maria Magdalena, was returned to Cuba last week-end with two crew members who sought repatriation.

A State Department spokesman said yesterday the other three crew members will remain in custody of the Immigration and Naturalization Service in Florida while the case is studied. The three younger members of the crew took control of the Maria Mag-

dalena last week and brought it to the Florida Keys, where it was found by the Coast Guard drifting and out of fuel.

The three crew members who asked political asylum in the U.S. were handed over to immigration authorities and the other two and the boat remained at Key West.

The State Department said the boat and the two men who unwillingly came into U.S. wa-

ters were escorted to a rendezvous at sea Saturday with a Cuban naval vessel and formally handed over.

The State Department would say nothing else about the three who remained in U.S. hands. Privately, officials were distressed at the timing of the Maria Magdalena incident because the U.S. and Cuba appear to be well on their way to a bilateral agreement that might end the use

of Cuba as a haven for plane hijackers.

Officials said the talks, being conducted through the Swiss, are going smoothly and some predict early agreement on conditions under which air pirates would be returned to face justice in the U.S. No Cuban planes have been hijacked but Cuba wants a U.S. agreement about returning seized ships and pirates.

WASHINGTON POST
13 December 1972

Allende in Mexico: Show of Solidarity

By Marliese Simons

Special to The Washington Post

GUADALAJARA, Mexico, Dec. 2—The Mexican and Chilean governments have converted President Salvador Allende's visit here into an energetic display of "Third World power," frequently denouncing foreign economic interests and ex-

News Analysis

pressing solidarity in their common struggle to achieve greater independence.

Officially, the Chilean president is making Mexico his first stopover on his 15-day foreign trip to repay the visit of his Mexican colleague to Chile in April this year.

But if President Allende has come to seek support for his domestic policies and for his recent battles against International Telephone and Telegraph Corp. (ITT), Kennecott and other foreign companies nationalized during the past two years, he has received more than a full measure in Mexico since arriving last Thursday.

The cheering crowds, the music and the rain of confetti wherever he goes obviously pleased Allende, but one Chilean official admit-

ted: "We are really overwhelmed—we had never expected anything like this."

If the Mexican stopover and his continuous demonstrations of solidarity are important to Allende, the Chilean's visit has particular importance for Mexico in view of its efforts to reduce its own close economic dependence on the United States.

In the last few months Mexico has witnessed an upsurge of economic nationalism directed specifically at the enormous American holdings here, and it is presently drafting legislation to impose stricter controls on foreign investment.

In its particular sympathy for Allende in his battles against foreign companies, Mexico also recalls its own difficulties after it expropriated British and American oil companies in 1938.

Since Allende arrived here, both presidents have reiterated the right of any nation to recover control over its own national resources. On Friday, before standing ovations at the Mexican Congress, Allende asserted that the ITT intervention had brought his

country to the brink of civil war. ITT documents disclosed in the American press revealed the giant corporation's efforts to prevent Allende from taking office.

"Yesterday in Mexico, today in Chile, the bastard interests of capitalist imperialists have tried to prevent us from being masters of our own destiny," Allende said.

Mexico is also using the Allende visit to reject Brazil's approach toward development, which apparently is favored by Washington.

In a clear but indirect reference to Brazil, the Mexican president told a luncheon attended by foreign diplomats and intellectuals: "If development without justice is a deception, apparent progress under dictatorship is a modern form of barbarism." He added that Mexico rejects the "model of economic growth which brings slavery."

Both Allende and Echeverria see themselves as Latin American and Third World leaders, and they have repeatedly reproached industrial nations and nuclear powers — specifically

the United States — for exploiting the underdeveloped world.

The Mexican President has clearly stated that he does not want socialism for his country, but Allende—a Marxist who is leading Chile to socialism — said that in his talks with Echeverria, "We have found a common language which is projected toward our continent and beyond our borders."

Mexico's students and workers, who are seldom allowed to demonstrate in public, have taken full advantage of the Allende visit, and in Mexico City as well as in Guadalajara many thousands have turned out to meet the Chilean leader with outpourings of enthusiasm, raised fists, and anti-American slogans.

In spite of strict security measures, many broke through the barricades to shake hands with Allende—and several times to embrace him. There were choruses of "Allende Si, Yankee No," and banners saying "Copper for Chile," "Free America," and "We Are With You in the Struggle for Socialism."

The Mexican government has gone out of its way to

organize a warm welcome for Allende, but it has not been able to disguise the distress of the right. For the last few months bankers and industrialists have been

grumbling about the leftist tendencies of the Echeverria government, which they see climaxed by the visit of a Socialist leader.

U.S. Ambassador Robert

McBride was not among the ambassadors at the airport to receive Allende, and though McBride was reportedly looking after Gov. Ronald Reagan on a brief visit here, some observers inter-

preted this as a sign of Washington's disapproval of the meeting. The U.S. ambassador did, however, attend a luncheon in Allende's honor.

THE GUARDIAN, MANCHESTER
1 December 1972

Chile's cool approach to foreign policy is examined by RICHARD GOTT

Allende travels, sure of Chile's virtue

PRESIDENT ALLENDE of Chile set off yesterday on a two-week trip that will take him to the United Nations, Moscow, and Cuba. Like all good crusaders, he has left his country safely locked up, in a chastity belt, with the key in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief, General Carlos Prats.

The general was appointed to the crucial job of Minister of the Interior early in November, and is acting President during Allende's absence. This measure should be sufficient to thwart any attempts by the Opposition to assault the virtue of Allende's Popular Unity Government during his absence abroad.

Some of his trip will be purely routine. In Mexico and Cuba he is merely repaying the visits to Chile made by Fidel Castro and the Mexican President, Luis Echeverria. His stops at Lima and Panama will do no more than reinforce the friendly relations that have already been established with the reformist nationalist generals that run those countries. And at the United Nations we shall hear the familiar appeal, couched in courteous and injured tone, of the poor demanding fair treatment from the rich.

Allende's foreign policy has been characterised by its utter sobriety. The Chilean road to socialism has involved no strident appeals for international revolution. It has been left to others to speculate about the relevance of the Chilean model to other countries and continents, and since the failure last year of Uruguay's Frente Amplio — consciously modelled on Chile's Popular Unity — foreign speculation has dried up.

In its relations with foreign revolutionaries, Chile has done only that which humanity rather than Socialist solidarity demands — giving asylum to Bolivian political exiles, and sending Argentine guerrillas to

Cuba rather than back to a certain death in Argentina.

Even the election promised to do something about the Organisation of American States (widely regarded in Latin America as the US Ministry of Colonies) has been tacitly forgotten. The claim, made early in Allende's term of office, that the centre of subversion in Latin America had moved from Havana to Santiago, now looks particularly foolish.

The Popular Unity Government, has of course, taken a number of steps to identify itself with various progressive forces in the Third World. It has made diplomatic contact with countries like Libya and Tanzania, and has withdrawn from the United Nations Special Committee on Korea.

But the establishment of diplomatic and trade relations with Cuba, China, and North Vietnam now appears, in the light of Nixonian pragmatism, to have been a necessary rather than a historic decision.

Allende's Foreign Minister, Clodomiro Almeyda, is as dedicated a Marxist Socialist as Allende himself, but in practice his conduct in office has been purportively grey and uncontroverted. With the exception of a few good new ambassadors, notably the one in London, the Chilean Foreign Service, like the rest of the bureaucracy, has suffered no significant change in personnel.

This sober foreign policy, much in keeping with Allende's skillful grasp of the art of the possible in politics at home, has paid dividends. Within the OAS, Chile has no significant enemies apart from the United States and Brazil: a very different situation from that faced 10 years ago by Castro, who succeeded in uniting the continent's Government's against him.

In Western Europe, Pompidou and Franco, as well as the Socialist International, all have a soft spot for Allende. This tolerance towards the Chilean

experiment arises largely from the belief that Allende is nobody's puppet. In spite of the preponderant rôle played within the Popular Unity coalition by the orthodox Communist Party, with its close links with the Soviet Union, the Chilean revolution is still seeking an authentic expression of Chilean nationalism.

Nevertheless, while Allende's lack of revolution rhetoric at home and abroad may have won him friends, it has not been successful in influencing international bankers. It is no secret that the Chilean economic situation is just about as bad as it could be, but there is no sign of anyone rushing to Allende's aid.

The foreign debt was successfully renegotiated this year, but only at the expense of burdening the country with additional debt. Yet unless firmer credit is made available, the economic structure and the Chilean road to socialism will come crashing down.

It is this fact that makes Allende's trip to Moscow next week so important. Far too many Chileans in Government who ought to know better are hoping that the Soviet Union will come to their rescue. Yet the history of Russian involvement in Cuba, where the Soviet Union subsidises Cuba's sugar production at the expense of the beet growers in Eastern Europe, suggests that the Russians will be highly reluctant to involve themselves again in pouring money into the bottomless coffers of a Latin American revolution.

In the past few years the Russians have been busy establishing their credentials in Latin America with a number of regimes of doubtful legality or popular appeal, and they will do little that is likely to endanger these relationships.

Though Chile's behaviour towards the Soviet Union has been exceptionally friendly, and though the Chilean Communist Party is certainly the most

significant single force in Allende's coalition, Chile is still an uncertain quantity in Russian eyes.

Allende and Almeyda are both Socialists, not Communists, and from the Nazi-Soviet pact to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Chilean Socialist Party has been critical of the official Communist line.

When Almeyda visited Eastern Europe last year he told Ceausescu that Chile felt closest to Rumania in foreign policy than to any other country. A statement that may have endeared him to the politicians in Bucharest, but can hardly have improved Chile's relations with Moscow. The East Europeans, it is true, did produce promises of credit of nearly \$100 millions, and the Chinese have also promised to buy their Chilean copper directly in future, and not through the London Metal Exchange.

The Cubans have now been enjoying Chilean wine and onions for some time. But none of this adds up to the type of financial support which the Chileans feel they ought to be getting from their Socialist brethren across the sea.

If the Russians don't deliver the goods, as seems all too probable, the stock of the Chilean Communist Party will sink even lower in the estimation of its colleagues in the Popular Unity coalition than it has reached already. For increasingly, the Communists are seen to be the most conservative members of Allende's Government, and the other parties are taking up positions that the Communists pejoratively describe as "ultra-Left."

Allende last went to Moscow in 1969, and there is no reason to suppose that he does not enjoy cordial relations with the Russian leaders. But it is doubtful whether they will offer him anything more promising than a pair of ear muffs to brave the Moscow winter — in which he will be duly photographed.

WASHINGTON STAR
8 December 1972

CARL T. ROWAN

Be Careful, Mr. President, of Latin America

CARACAS—"The big countries are rich, but why? Not just by their own efforts. Their riches have roots in the poverty and misery of the people of little, underdeveloped countries."

Speaking to me was Aristides Calvani, Venezuela's foreign minister — himself a wealthy man, yet one of the most bitterly articulate critics of the exploitation of Latin America by rich nations, meaning primarily the United States.

"There has been a deterioration of terms of trade," he said. "The prices of raw materials go down day by day while the prices of finished products go up."

Calvani says such injustices are driving Latin America further from the United States, adding that "the yearning for social justice now transcends Cold War considerations and confrontations . . . I don't know if Washington is sufficiently aware of the new passion with which countries in this area insist on be-

ing masters of their fates."

As President Nixon restructures his team to direct new trade policies, he would do well to ponder the words of Calvani and not simply dismiss them as the repetitious bitching of Latinos who constantly gripe about money.

An American diplomat who has spent most of the last 25 years in this area says: "We are perhaps 10 years away from a hemispheric blowup in which there will be a serious parting of the ways between Latin America and the United States."

The significant thing about Calvani's gripe is that he is no ranting Marxist, and the government he represents did not win power through Yankee-baiting. The striking truth is that nationalism is now so strong here that almost every segment of public opinion and political leadership is saying Calvani said, except more angrily in some cases.

Both President Rafael Caldera and Lorenzo Fernandez, the governing Social Christian party's choice to succeed him, spoke strongly to me of economic injustice in dealing with U.S. business enterprises. Caldera said he doubted that any Venezuelan politician could

slay in power if he did not move vigorously to end such injustices.

Carlos Andres Perez, presidential candidate of the Democratic Action party, began a long interview with this comment: "We're not happy with the policies of President Nixon toward Latin America. He abandoned all initiatives toward Latin America and gave this area a low priority. And the United States has been exerting threats and pressures through the Inter-American Bank. It is a serious wrong to use international money and credit this way."

It was Andres Perez who, as interior minister, beat down Communist attempts to overthrow Venezuela. Yet those comments about economic matters differed little from what I heard in a two-hour interview with Teodoro Petkoff, the former guerrilla who has come out of the mountains to head a new Marxist group called Movement to Socialism.

Petkoff says he is now inflaming the masses against "imperialist exploitation" and the Venezuelan oligarchy more successfully than he ever could from a guerrilla hideout.

"Never was there a greater public demand for expropriating the properties, first of our Rockefellers and then yours," he boasted.

Then came the angry students, crying that even Petkoff became "part of the establishment" when he put down his gun.

One student leader, Dimitri Briceno Reyes, said: "Our challenge is how to get rid of U.S. domination. There is a Cuban way, a Chilean way, a Peruvian way. We must find our own way. But we know that economic liberation and political liberation are like Siamese twins. You can't have one without the other."

Briceno asserts that unless power is taken from "the 15 wealthy families that are a front for U.S. business interest, Venezuela will face armed insurrection far more explosive than Cuba."

It is disconcerting to many Americans here to see this kind of discontentment and bluster permeating all levels of a friendly society which enjoys the highest per capita income in South America.

It is more than disconcerting to ponder the fact that most Americans aren't even aware of this increase in seething nationalism.

NEW YORK TIMES
10 December 72

U. S. and Chile

Is There a Civilized Way Out?

WASHINGTON — When Salvador Allende Gossens, the Socialist President of Chile, arrived in New York last Sunday, there was no American official on hand to welcome him. The White House apparently even ignored a message of greetings radioed by Mr. Allende to President Nixon when the plane entered United States air space.

When President Allende arrived in Moscow three days later, Soviet party chief Leonid Brezhnev, Premier Alexei Kosygin and President Nikolai Podgorny were all waiting at the airport with words of welcome and plans for extensive Soviet economic aid.

To be sure, Mr. Allende flew to the Soviet Union on an official visit and to New York to address the United Nations and not as a guest of the United States. Nevertheless, the cold

treatment accorded the Chilean President by the Nixon Administration was deliberate, and the contrast between that and the warm reception in Moscow raised a disturbing question: Was the Western Hemisphere witnessing a replay of the scenario that led 12 years ago to a break between the United States and Cuba, a break both sides say they want to avoid?

In the two years and three months since Mr. Allende came to power as Latin America's first freely elected Socialist President, the estrangement between Washington and Santiago has grown steadily wider. Each side presents a case against the other that — at least on the surface — leaves little room for reconciliation.

The case for Chile was presented pungently by Mr. Allende last Monday in a 90-minute speech before the

United Nations. To enthusiastic applause from diplomats of third-world countries, he charged:

• That the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, which has extensive holdings in Chile, tried to engineer coups to prevent his inauguration in 1970 and to topple him in 1971.

• That in reprisal for Chile's action in nationalizing American-owned copper mines and deducting "excess profits" of past years from the proffered compensation, the United States was suffocating Chile financially.

• That the Nixon Administration's actions in vetoing loans by international lending institutions, to say nothing of American commercial banks and the Government's own Export-Import Bank, amounted to an

George Bush, the American representative, who scribbled notes as Mr. Allende spoke, rejected the whole thrust of the Chilean's speech. United States capital investments abroad were of mutual benefit, he said at a news conference; "we don't think of ourselves as imperialists." The case for the United States, in fact, depended on an outlook diametrically opposed to Mr. Allende's.

Admitting that Washington was turning down Chilean requests for credit to finance imports from the United States and discouraging loans by the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank, Administration officials said this was principally because of Chile's low credit worthiness and the Allende regime's moratorium on debt repayments.

Beyond that, however, they said, the Administration's credit policy rested on Mr. Nixon's statement of last Jan. 19 that when foreign countries expropriate American holdings without adequate and swift compensation,

the United States will "withhold its support from loans under consideration in multilateral development banks." This rule, they said, clearly applies to Chile. In nationalizing American copper mines, especially the huge El Teniente mine of the Kennecott Copper Corporation, Chile, they argued, violated international law.

Despite the bitterness of these recriminations, there is still some hope on both sides for what one diplomat last week called a "civilized way out" of the impasse.

Many impartial economists say that Chile's worsening economic troubles are the result as much of domestic mismanagement as of American pressure. At the same time many diplomats and economists see contradictions in the Nixon Administration's position.

Credit worthiness, they note, was not a consideration when Washington, for political reasons, lent money in the past to countries with abysmally bad ratings. In 1964, for example, the United States gave generous credits to

a military dictatorship that took power in a bankrupt Brazil. More recently, Communist countries the Nixon Administration had reason to court received large-scale credits at a time when Chile had to pay cash for desperately needed American corn. Paradoxically, the Pentagon last May gave Chile \$10-million in credits for a C-130 Air Force transport and some tanks and trucks—indignantly denying that it was currying favor with the Chilean military in hopes of an eventual military overthrow of the Allende Government.

One hopeful feature is that the United States and Chile plan a comprehensive review of their differences in the near future. The moderates on both sides hope it is still possible to solve the copper problem and construct a satisfactory relationship between the two countries. Others fear that a critical turning point has been reached and that Chile is being forced into growing economic dependence on the Soviet Union.

—TAD SZULC

WASHINGTON POST
7 December 1972

Chile's Outburst—No Boon for Washington

At the United Nations, beleaguered Chile's beleaguered president did—unfortunately—the easy popular thing. Eschewing the more sober manner in which he has often addressed his own people, Mr. Allende instead indulged in dubious and gaudy rhetoric, accusing American corporations and banks and American-influenced lending agencies of "serious aggression" against Chile and his minority Marxist government. That Mr. Allende felt compelled to adopt a style so deliberately provocative to the United States can perhaps be explained as his way to prepare an entrance to Moscow, where he is shortly going in order to ask for the large credits denied him elsewhere, or as his way to help his chances next March in the congressional elections he must win to stay in power. Mr. Bush, the American ambassador, did well to turn the other cheek and pay a courtesy call on the Chilean leader before he left New York.

Stripped of inflammatory tinsel, the issue posed by Mr. Allende is, of course, legitimate. It is not American "aggression." It is the whole complex of sticky problems created by a small one-commodity country's effort to make domestic changes that touch the interests of its major customers, investors and creditors. Chile presents merely the latest and currently the rawest case in which this complex of problems has produced not only bilateral political tension—but will presumably pass—but acute economic distress and uncertainty for the smaller country involved. Chile's attempts to organize a world copper producers' cartel and to develop alternative markets and exports and credit sources may

some day give it other choices than those it has available today. At the moment, its prospects—and that may include Mr. Allende's own political prospects—are not blindingly bright.

There is no cause for American satisfaction in any of this. The current atmosphere serves neither American corporate interests in Chile or in other Latin American countries of the left, nor the broader American interest in easing and better equalizing the terms of the partnership which geography and self-interest force upon all states in the hemisphere. The past attitude of certain American officials and companies have no doubt given Mr. Allende certain grounds to claim injury. It is also true that, as the larger and more powerful party by far, it becomes the United States to show more equanimity than it always has. Still, Mr. Allende's grandstand play at the United Nations has not made it any easier for Mr. Nixon to try to do the right thing by Chile. Nor is it evident that Mr. Allende has done the right thing by Chile.

Mr. Nixon in his second term presumably would like to build in the small countries on the achievements he realized in his first term in the big countries. It is likely that he hopes to follow up his political successes on the international stage with movement towards a more just and cooperative world economic order. These are surely among the larger purposes of the reorganization Mr. Nixon has undertaken of the American government's foreign policy structure. They are necessarily among the larger purposes any enlightened history-minded President would wish to serve.

WASHINGTON POST
10 December 1972
Jack Anderson

A Hint Not Taken: Nixon Avoids Allende

PRESIDENT NIXON studiously snubbed Chile's embattled President Salvador Allende during his first appearance on U.S. soil last week to address the United Nations.

The President based his action on the secret reports of U.S. Ambassador Nathaniel Davis, who cabled from Santiago that Allende wanted an audience with Mr. Nixon in order to bolster his position with Chilean moderates.

Chile has been rocked by political strife and economic chaos. Allende's purpose in going abroad at this critical time, according to Davis, was to draw the spotlight away from his domestic troubles. He hoped to gain international stature, which might improve his political standing at home. Allende is eager to calm the turmoil and avert a crisis which could cause the army to intervene, Davis reported.

AS ALLENDE headed for the United States, he radioed a friendly greeting to President Nixon. But the President, not wishing to help the Marxist leader stay in power, pointedly ignored the hint. Allende received no invitation to visit the White House

but had to settle for an audience with Nixon's United Nations ambassador, George Bush.

The President, meanwhile, has been impressed by Davis's ability to analyze events in Chile. Long before the political crisis erupted, the ambassador cabled Washington:

"Perhaps what is significant now is growing conviction in opposition parties, private sector and others that opposition is possible . . . Even more important is increasing realization that opposition is necessary. What government is doing goes beyond transactionalism. (Allende's) objectives are increasingly seen as incompatible and as going beyond what can be accepted. If opposition interests are to be protected, confrontation may not be avoidable.

"Military attitudes remain great ambiguous unknown of Chilean politics. CAS and DATT reports of discontent and plotting in the military services have been substantially greater.

"CONVENTIONAL WISDOM both here and in Washington is that prospects of military intervention for

foreseeable future are extremely small. It is held that military will turn blind eye to virtually any constitutional abuse—and Allende is smart enough to avoid abuse so flagrant as to force open that blind eye.

"Other possibility is that public repudiation becomes so overwhelming, and discontent so great, that military will wait for this public repudiation to become more clear and more open than it is likely ever to be.

"I do not challenge foregoing judgments, but I am not sure how far in the future they can be relied on as rock-solid premise of U.S. policy. I note there is considerable variety in ways military might intervene, and behind-the-scenes pressure on Allende or great effective military participation in the governing process are also possibilities . . .

"Transaction, compromise and a sort of patching up (is) the traditional Chilean style. My colleagues continue to warn me that events move slowly in Chile, or perhaps better said, Chileans have great ability to rush to the brink, embrace each other and back off."

THE SUNDAY STAR AND DAILY NEWS
10 December 1972

U.S. Revising Top Latin Envoy Team

By JEREMIAH O'LEARY
Star-News Staff Writer

A major reshuffling is expected within the next two months among State Department officials and ambassadors dealing with Latin America.

These changes, insiders believe, will put a new team at the top of the department's Latin regional section and perhaps as many as 14 new ambassadors to posts in Latin America.

Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Charles A. Meyer is expected to return to his corporate executive job with Sears Roebuck & Co. after having set a record for the Latin post—three years. Meyer has consistently said he took the job for only one term, and that is taken to mean a change will be made before or soon after Nixon's second inaugural.

New Deputies Likely

His two deputy assistant secretaries, John Crimmins for South America and Robert Hurwicz for Central American-Caribbean, also are due for new assignments after serving for about three years. A replacement for Meyer would want to name his own regional assistants.

Some observers believe Hurwicz may become the ambassador to Panama where Robert M. Sayre was already packed to leave when his replacement, ex-Rep. Frank Bow died suddenly last month.

Crimmins, former ambassador to the Dominican Republic and head of the Cuban desk, also is expected to receive an ambassadorial assignment.

The number of nations in the Latin region likely to receive new ambassadors is dictated both by the length

of service of many of the incumbents and by a White House search for likely spots to send political contributors with diplomatic aspirations.

Some incumbents, however, are likely to stay. Nathaniel Davis in Chile is a relative newcomer there and is credited with good performance in the face of Chile's political and economic problems. William Bowdler in Guatemala and Viron P. Vaky in Costa Rica are also newcomers and would be expected to remain unless lapped for different jobs in Washington or elsewhere in the hemisphere.

Latin Specialists Cited

Both Bowdler and Vaky, like Sayre, have served as State Department liaison officers with the National Security Council and are rated as highly regarded professional Latin specialists in the diplomatic service.

George Landau in Paraguay has had only a few months on the job and is regarded as safe. Others in that category would include Turner Shelton in Nicaragua and Henry Catto in El Salvador.

Moves because of long tenure are likely for John Davis Lodge in Argentina, Ernest Siracusa in Bolivia, Francis Meloy in the Dominican Republic, Taylor Belcher in Peru, Clinton Knox in Haiti and Robert H. McBride in Mexico. Hewson Ryan in Honduras is considered vulnerable because he is a career U.S. Information Agency officer and so is Findley Burns in Ecuador because his background is in State Department clerical responsibilities.

Vincent de Roulet in Jamaica is reportedly anxious to leave and Charles Adair in Uruguay is expected to leave by Feb. 1 to take advantage of retirement incentives. The

uncertain ambassadorships are those held by William M. Rountree in Brazil, Leonard J. Saccio in Colombia, Robert McClintock in Venezuela, Anthony Marshall in Trinidad and Eileen Donovan in Barbados.

All Offer Resignations

All ambassadors and non-career diplomats have submitted their resignations in accordance with Nixon's directive to reorganize. Some of the ambassadorships are considered "plums" for campaign contributors or presi-

dential favorites. These "plum" assignments include Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad, Honduras and several of the less volatile Latin nations. Miss Donovan has been ill and is a career officer but she also is the only woman ambassador in the Latin re-

gion. Knox is the only black ambassador in the Western Hemisphere.

It is considered likely that the administration will keep one woman and one black in the lineup no matter what changes are made.

NEW YORK TIMES
3 December 72

U.S. and Cuba

Definitely A New 'Tone'

WASHINGTON—The United States and Cuba, implacable enemies for more than a decade, came close last week to neighborly agreement in their first important negotiations since diplomatic relations between them were severed in 1961.

To experienced Washington diplomats, the extraordinary thing about it was how quickly and smoothly the two Governments were able to agree on the outlines of an accord designed to curb hijackings of American airliners to Havana, although a number of details remain to be ironed out.

To be sure, the negotiations were being conducted through the Swiss Government, which represents American interests in Cuba. But as the Nixon Administration studied the draft agreement submitted by Havana last Saturday—the American reply was to be delivered early this week—the word here and at the United Nations was that the Cubans hoped the hijack talks would lead to something broader.

The present negotiations followed the hijacking of a Southern Airways plane last month and an earlier hijacking of an Eastern Airlines plane. In proposing the negotiations, Cuba said she did not wish to be a haven for criminals.

So far, knowledgeable diplomats said, Cubans at the United Nations were doing no more than sending out feelers—while saying for the record, just as the Americans were, that the antihijacking agreement was an end in itself. Yet Cuban diplomats have been telling friends that they had been detecting a new and "constructive" tone toward Havana in the American news media and Government, and that they were pleased that Washington responded so promptly to the proposal to negotiate the air piracy pact. The question they raised—discreetly—was whether their American friends thought that the prevailing political climate here would allow President Nixon to adopt a more flexible policy toward Cuba.

For example, they would ask, would Mr. Nixon be likely in the foreseeable future to lift the economic boycott of their island, negotiate in some form the return to Cuba of the Guantanamo naval base, or look the other way if enough Latin American governments decided to end the political ostracism of Havana? These points, they stressed, were essential to normalizing relations between the two Governments.

On the American side, the official word remained, as Mr. Nixon stated

It in an interview last month, that there could be no change in policy toward Cuba until and unless Premier Fidel Castro modified his own attitude in relation to the United States and Latin America. But privately some officials suggested that Mr. Nixon's statement could conceivably be subject to new interpretations in the light of subsequent events, such as a successful conclusion of an antihijacking pact.

An encouraging sign was that Washington agreed at once to negotiate the antihijacking agreement on the basis of a Cuban draft document forwarded by the Swiss. This was accepted even though Cuba insisted that an accord to extradite or try American hijackers must include commitments by the United States to refrain from aiding "illegal" departures from Cuba and tolerating hijackings of Cuban vessels by anti-Castro exiles and their occasional raids against the island.

Washington was not ready to spell out such commitments in an agreement—it claims that it had always discouraged activities of this kind under United States neutrality laws—but Government lawyers thought there might be a way around it, satisfactory to both sides.

There was optimism that the agreement could be completed before the end of the year. "Then," an official said, "we shall see where, if anywhere, this takes us in the larger question of relations with Cuba. But it could be somewhere interesting—if everybody is patient and stays cool."

—TAD SZULC

WASHINGTON POST
27 November 1972

Clayton Fritchey Next Summit May Be in Cuba

SOON AFTER BEING inaugurated Jan. 20, 1969, President Nixon held a press conference at which he was asked about the chances of U.S. rapprochement with Communist China. Mr. Nixon instantly slammed the door on such a possibility, although it apparently was already in the back of his mind.

A few days after his reelection this month, Mr. Nixon was asked how he stood on Cuba, and his an-

swer was that there would be "no change whatsoever" in his policy—"unless and until (and I do not anticipate this will happen) Castro changes his policy toward Latin America and the United States."

So now what? Is the ground being laid for a reenactment of the Peking scenario, this time with Cuba in the title role? A number of experienced observers, both here and abroad, suspect that a détente with Havana, pre-

ceded, of course, by secret Henry Kissinger missions, is in the cards.

THE FRENCH publication Paris Match led off its post-election editorial with this sentence: "The re-elected Nixon will be tough toward Europe and will extend a hand to Fidel Castro." Paris Match may be right, but it won't be that simple. The byzantine Nixon foreign policy, as we have come to know, operates in mysterious ways its wonders to perform.

In the case of the People's Republic of China, the President seized on the opening provided by the visit of a U.S. Ping-Pong team to Peking. It was in the wake of this fortuitous event that Dr. Kissinger first secretly visited Premier Chou En-lai.

Today, another bizarre happening—the armed hijacking of a U.S. plane to Havana—seems to be thawing the relations between the Cuban and American governments. In communicating with each other over

the hijacking, they have been markedly civil and cooperative. Any communication at all is a notable step forward, for the United States has had no diplomatic relations with Cuba since 1961.

THE STATE Department has gone out of its way to call attention to a note it sent Havana expressing U.S. "gratification" for the Cuban government's cooperation in the handling of the hijacked Southern Airways airliner. It was the second day in a row that the United States publicly thanked the Cuban government for its help.

The State Department spokesman carefully said, "There is no necessary connection between the resolution of the hijacking phenomenon and normalization of relations" between the United States and Cuba. Nevertheless, American officials are obviously pleased at the turn of events, especially Castro's personal help on the hijacking.

It is no secret around the White House that the President, who loves to travel, is looking for new worlds to conquer. He has already visited most of the Marxist capitals of the world. The Cubans are about the only Communists left that we

aren't doing business with.

HUGH SUDEY, Life magazine's well-informed White House watcher, says, "Envoys to the Organization of American States confidently predict that the next major summit meeting, if it is not in Hanoi, will be in Havana." That would eminently suit many members of the OAS, who are becoming increasingly restless with the isolation of Cuba imposed on the organization by the United States for the last 16 years. Several of the Latin nations have already broken away and recognized Castro on their own.

A detente with Cuba is a step Mr. Nixon could take without any risk of partisan

political reprisal. Democratic leaders like Sens. George McGovern, Edward M. Kennedy and J.W. Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, feel the boycott of Cuba no longer makes sense, and have so stated.

As for Cuba, it has the same incentive for rapprochement with the United States as Peking had—deterioration of relations with Moscow. The Russians are obviously fed up with the heavy burden of sustaining their Cuban satellite, and the Cubans in turn don't like being pushed around by Big Brother. They are plainly sick and tired of each other. It's an inviting opening for Mr. Nixon.

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
28 NOV 1972

Didn't Help

Friends in High Places...

By Ronald Koziol

A Chilean narcotics smuggler, Cuban Premier Fidel Castro, Chilean President Salvador Allende, and three American airplane hijackers who killed an Alabama state highway trooper.

It's an odd lot, but put them all together and you have a fascinating yet little known story of how the three hijackers and the narcotics smuggler almost became part of a secret exchange deal.

The story is of particular interest now since Castro has indicated willingness to consider talks with the U. S. on airplane hijackers who flee to Cuba.

High-Level Intrigue

The political intrigue involved in the exchange that never took place reached the highest levels of both the Chilean and United States governments, and was only pieced together recently by a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee which has been investigating drug traffic and its impact on U. S. security.

The main character in the story is Oscar Squella, who was a high ranking member of a coalition involved in the campaign of Allende in 1970. Squella had been promised a cabinet post if Allende was elected president.

But fate, in the form of U. S. customs agents, stepped in and ended Squella's political ambitions.

On the night of July 27, shortly after Squella landed a C-46 cargo plane in

Tampa, Fla., he was seized by customs agents. Inside the plane, the agents found 203 pounds of cocaine worth \$50 million.

Neal Sonnet, former U. S. assistant attorney general in Miami, told the subcommittee of Squella's personal ties to Allende and the efforts made for his release.

Approached by Attorney

Sonnet told of first being approached by Squella's Miami attorney in August, 1971, and suggesting that because of Allende's closeness to Castro, some type of arrangement might be made to drop the charges against Squella in return for some hijackers now in Cuba.

Sonnet said he dismissed the request since "we considered Squella to be a major narcotics figure and since the amount of cocaine was the largest shipment ever seized."

But early this year, just a few weeks before the start of Squella's trial, Sonnet received a more specific offer from the Miami attorney.

For the release of Squella, would the government be interested in the return from Cuba of Robert L. Goodwin, 24, of Berkeley, Cal.; Michael R. Finney, 20, of Oakland, Cal.; and Charles Hill, 21, of Albuquerque, N. M.

Charged with Murder

On Nov. 27, 1971, the three had hijacked a Trans World Airlines jetliner to Cuba from Albuquerque. They had earlier been charged with the Nov. 8, 1971, murder of New Mexico state

trooper Robert Rosenbloom.

Since a specific offer was made, Sonnet notified officials of the Justice Department and the Narcotics Bureau in Washington. If the offer was accepted, the three would be returned to this country and the charges against Squella would be dropped—quietly and without publicity.

Within days, the Justice Department rejected the offer. But Squella's attorney personally took the case to Henry Peterson, who at the time was in charge of the department's criminal division.

Peterson sent a personal representative to Miami who met with Squella's attorney, then reviewed the entire case with Sonnet. It was decided to try the case and reject the offer for Squella's release.

15-Year Prison Term

Last Jan. 24, a jury in Miami found Squella guilty and sentenced him to 15 years in prison.

There is no doubt that Allende, himself, was interested in the outcome of the case. His name was among those listed in a certificate filed with the court.

Next to Allende's name, it is noted, "... close personal friend of the defendant, interested in the outcome so the defendant may again serve the government of Chile as a member of the coalition government..."

But even the president of Chile couldn't save his friend from an American prison.

WASHINGTON STAR
10 December 1972

The New Cold War

By WILLIAM R. FRYE
Special to The Star-News

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y. — The world had a preview last week, of the cold war it may be seeing in the mid and late 1970s: A struggle between the wealthy, industrialized North and the impoverished South—between the haves of the world and the have-nots.

This glimpse of things to come was provided by Salvador Allende Gossens, the Marxist president of Chile. Allende came to the U.N. and sounded a battle cry of North-South conflict as distinctly as Winston Churchill, at Fulton, Mo., rallied the West for the ideological cold war of the 1940s and '50s.

Allende's thesis was that the two-thirds of the world which is struggling with misery, poverty, disease and ignorance has the right and duty to overthrow "economic aggression" and "Imperialism" by countermeasures in the economic realm.

Instead of merely pleading for help from rich and powerful nations, the poor should, Allende suggested, take whatever they could lay their hands upon.

Specifically, he implied, they should nationalize foreign-owned industries, as Chile has nationalized copper; and if the previous owners had made "unreasonable" profits, these could be confiscated retroactively by deducting the "excess" from compensation.

If the expropriated company sought to force fuller compensation by organizing reprisals abroad, as Chile's adversaries have done, there could—according to this battle plan—be a world-wide "suspension of all economic or commercial transactions" with the company.

THE "THIRD WORLD" would be organized to guarantee that such a boycott was carried out, and that it extended—for example—to refusal by stevedores to handle the company's products.

This was a bold and ambitious plan, far beyond Chile's immediate capacity to execute. But it was not something to be lightly dismissed.

The immediate effect in the U.N. was tumultuous. Allende received a shouting ovation.

It was obvious that, in defying the rich and economically powerful, the new Pied Piper of the world's underdogs had said what a great majority of the U.N. wanted to hear. He had touched a smoldering flame with a jet of gasoline.

Certainly there had been hyperbole and posturing in the speech; of course it has been aimed, in part, at the domestic Chilean audience.

But there was also the authentic fury of frustration—frustration with the snail's pace at which the gulf between rich and poor in the world is being closed, frustration at the apparent futility of pleas and arguments about the moral and practical urgency of foreign aid.

Allende claimed, for example, that foreign-

owned copper companies had over the past 42 years, invested \$30 million and taken out \$4 billion in profits.

"Let me give one simple and painful example of what this means to Chile," he said.

"In my country there are 600,000 children who will never be able to enjoy life in a normal human way because during their first eight months of life they did not receive the minimum amount of protein. Four thousand million dollars would completely transform Chile. Just a part of this sum would ensure proteins in perpetuity for all my country's children."

THERE ARE gaping holes in this logic, not least of which is the fact that without the skill and experience of the foreign entrepreneurs, the copper might still be below ground. Allende's definition of "profits" can also be challenged.

But there is no mistaking the intensity of feeling behind his view, or the danger it poses to world order if not met. One early result could be disruption of the U.N.'s Second Development Decade, which depends heavily on a willingness of capital exporters to invest in poorer countries.

Allende complained at length of the damage done to Chile's credit—the drying up of sources of financing for the country's development projects. He saw this as a wicked conspiracy of foreign companies and banks. Nowhere did he show an awareness that his own policies were largely responsible for destroying his country's credit.

The element of vicious circle is obvious. The more foreign investments are expropriated, the more investment capital dries up; and the greater the "financial strangulation" (in Allende's phrase), the greater the desperation which springs from poverty.

ALLENDE WAS ELECTED to office. It was the first time a Marxist had ever won power on a major scale by the free democratic process. If he is able to retain power by this route, he may become a greater threat, by far, than the extra-legal communists of the past who have advocated violent revolution. He may succeed where the Castros and Guevaras and Maos have failed.

For this to be avoided, the grievances on which Allende's power and influence have fed must be removed. If the cooperative approach represented by the unpopular phrase "foreign aid" continues to be rejected in Congress and elsewhere; if the rich of the world continue to begrudge the poor even \$1 out of every \$100 which they earn—American foreign aid comes to less than 40 cents—then Allende's summons to conflict will catch fire and spread, perhaps uncontrollably.

And this North-South cold war may dwarf the one between East and West as a forest fire dwarfs a summer-beach cookout.